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1Summary
In February 2015 the British Parliament adopted the Counter-Terrorism and
Security Act 2015 for the purpose of filling gaps in the previous counter-
terrorism legislations. The temporary restriction on travel measures thus
introduced, target the increasing problem with so-called foreign fighters and
consist of two elements. The power to seize and retain passports and/or
travel documents entrusts a port constable the discretion to decide whether
there are reasonable grounds to suspect that an individual intends to leave
the United Kingdom for engaging in terrorism-related activity while being
abroad. In such event, the constable is permitted to seize the passport and/or
travel documents, and on authorization from a senior police officer, retain
them.  The second element is triggered when a person is outside the UK and
the Secretary of State considers there are reasonable grounds to suspect that
the person is, or has been, involved in terrorism-related activity. The
Secretary of State may then seek permission from a court to impose a
Temporary Exclusion Order upon the individual. The court is obliged to
give permission, unless the decisions taken by the Secretary of State are
obviously flawed, which results in the person being prohibited from
returning to the UK, regardless of whether the affected individual is a UK
citizen or not.
In the event of other States following the UK in introducing new counter-
terrorism measures to prevent people from travelling abroad to participate in
terrorism, it is vital to assess the human rights implications these measures
bring.
In this thesis, I argue that the temporary restriction on travel measures are
criminal in nature although in the domestic legal order they are classified as
administrative powers. The European Court of Human Rights established in
its judgment in Engel and Others v the Netherlands three criteria for
determining the de facto character of domestic provisions as they should be
understood within the meaning of the European Convention on Human
Rights: the label in national law, the nature of the offence and the severity of
the penalty. In applying these criteria to the temporary restrictions on travel,
my analysis shows that the use of these powers amounts to an imposition of
a criminal sanction, in particular due to the severe intrusions with the
affected individual’s human rights and liberties they cause.
To consider a provision criminal in nature, as opposed to administrative,
renders the need to include procedural safeguards appropriate for criminal
law standards. The fundamental protection in this respect is the right to a
fair trial codified in ECHR, article 6. For the use of the temporary
restrictions on travel measures to be lawful, adequate judicial review is
crucial in order to protect from an arbitrary application. As my analysis
reveals, the Act lacks sufficient safeguards to the detriment of the targeted
individual, which I contend is due to the choice to regard the provisions as
containing administrative powers.
2Sammanfattning
I februari 2015 antog det Brittiska parlamentet the Counter-Terrorism and
Security Act 2015, i syfte att fylla ut luckor i den tidigare kontra-terror
lagstiftningen. De temporära reseförbud som därmed infördes riktas mot det
tilltagande problemet med så kallade foreign fighters och består av två delar.
Befogenheten att beslagta och kvarhålla pass och andra resedokument ger en
gränskontrollerande tjänsteman friheten att bestämma om det föreligger
skälig grund att misstänka att personen ifråga har för avsikt att resa utanför
Storbritannien för att delta i terrorismrelaterad verksamhet. I en sådan
situation har tjänstemannen tillåtelse att beslagta passet och/eller
resedokumenten och, efter tillstånd av en polistjänsteman av högre rang,
kvarhålla dem. Den andra delen aktiveras när en person befinner sig utanför
Storbritannien och Secretary of State (den minister som har det
övergripande ansvaret för säkerhet och terrorism, lagstiftning och
budgetfrågor) anser att det finns skälig anledning att misstänka att personen
är, eller har varit, delaktig i terrorismrelaterad verksamhet. Secretary of
State kan då söka tillstånd hos en domstol om att få ålägga individen en
temporär exkluderingsorder. Domstolen är skyldig att ge tillstånd, såvida
inte de beslut Secretary of State har fattat är uppenbart felaktiga. Till följd
av detta förbjuds individen att återvända till Storbritannien, oavsett om det
är en Brittisk medborgare eller inte.
För den händelse att andra länder följer Storbritannien och introducerar nya
kontra-terror åtgärder för att förhindra människor från att resa utomlands för
att delta i terrorism, är det nödvändigt att granska vilka konsekvenser för
mänskliga rättigheter dessa åtgärder medför.
I den här uppsatsen argumenterar jag för att de temporära reseförbuden är
straffrättsliga till sin natur, även om de i det inhemska rättssystemet
klassificeras som administrativa åtgärder. Europadomstolen för mänskliga
rättigheter fastställde i sitt avgörande i Engel med flera mot Nederländerna
tre kriterier för att avgöra den de facto karaktären på nationella
bestämmelser så som de ska tolkas inom ramen för Europakonventionen för
mänskliga rättigheter: den nationella klassificeringen, brottets beskaffenhet
och straffets allvarlighet. Genom tillämpning av dessa kriterier på de
temporära reseförbuden, visar min analys att utövandet av befogenheterna
innebär ett åläggande av en straffrättslig sanktion, särskilt med beaktande av
de allvarliga intrång i individens mänskliga rättigheter som de orsakar.
Att betrakta lagrum som straffrättsliga, i motsats till administrativa, ställer
krav på att inkludera processuella skyddsmekanismer som är lämpliga för
den straffrättsliga standarden. Det grundläggande skyddet i detta hänseende
är rätten till en rättvis rättegång i Europakonventionens artikel 6. För att
användningen av de temporära reseförbuden ska vara laglig måste en
godtycklig tillämpning undvikas, vilket kräver en adekvat rättslig
granskning. Min analys visar att lagen saknar tillräckliga skyddsmekanismer
vilket medför en nackdel för den berörda individen, något jag menar beror
på valet att betrakta åtgärderna som administrativa.
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51 Introduction
The history of terrorism and counter-terrorism legislation in the United
Kingdom goes far back in time. The political struggle of IRA in Northern
Ireland, alongside various isolated terrorist attacks, has provoked several
legislative measures intended to be temporary but prolonged into a state of
permanency.1 The majority of the Acts composing the anti-terrorism laws
were drafted and enacted as a reaction to a tragic event.2 In contrast, the
Terrorism Act 20003 was the result of a careful consideration based on a
substantial review and thus “consolidated, normalized, and made permanent
the previous patchwork of ‘provisional’ counter-terrorism laws”.4
Nevertheless, the Terrorism Act 2000 has been criticized particularly for its
failure to avoid the need for new emergency measures – as evidenced by the
adoption of the Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001.5 This shortcoming
is further revealed by the number of counter-terrorism acts issued post 2001:
the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, the Terrorism Act 2006, the Counter-
Terrorism Act 2008, the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures
Act 2011; and the last one, the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015
(hereinafter, the CTS Act 2015 or the Act will serve as synonyms), which is
under scrutiny in this thesis.6 Indeed, the latest Act is the seventh concerned
with counter-terrorism measures that has been introduced the past fourteen
years.7
The triggering factor this time is a raised terrorist threat level from
substantial to severe, meaning that a terrorist attack is “highly likely”.8 The
Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) indicates that the threat primarily
derives from international terrorism and UK nationals travelling overseas to
serve as foreign fighters represent a part of the problem.9 Accordingly, the
Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill (CTS Bill) was drafted to inter alia
“disrupt the ability of people to travel abroad to fight […] and to control
their return”.10
1 Walker, Clive, Blackstone’s guide to The Anti-Terrorism Legislation, 1 ed., Oxford
University Press, New York, 2002, p. 1.
2 Walker, 2002, pp. 3-4.
3 The Terrorism Act 2000: 2000 Chapter 11 [20th July 2000].
4 Neal, Andrew A., “Terrorism, Lawmaking, and Democratic Politics: Legislators as
Security Actors” in Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 24, Issue 3, 2012, pp. 357-374,
p. 360.
5 See Walker, 2002, pp. 4-7 and Neal in Terrorism and Political Violence, p. 360.
6 Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015: 2015 Chapter 6, [12th February 2015].
7 Liberty (the National Council for Civil Liberties), Liberty’s second reading briefing on
the Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill in the House of Commons, December 2014, para.
1.
8 CTS Bill, Explanatory Notes, HL Bill 75-EN, para. 3.
9 https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/about-us/what-we-do/the-threats/terrorism/threat-
levels.html; https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/about-us/what-we-do/the-
threats/terrorism/international-terrorism/international-terrorism-and-the-uk/foreign-
fighters.html, 30 March 2015.
10 CTS Bill, Explanatory Notes, para. 4.
6In this thesis, I will study the rationale and character of the recently added
temporary restrictions on travel powers – to seize and retain passports
and/or travel documents and to impose a temporary exclusion order (TEO) –
along with the impacts on human rights and liberties these new powers
bring. The temporary restrictions on travel powers allow a constable at a
port to seize, and apply for retention of, the passport and/or travel document
from an individual based on reasonable grounds to suspect that the person is
intending to leave the country for engaging in terrorism-related activity
abroad. This will prevent the person from travelling outside the UK for a
period of 14-30 days. Likewise, the Secretary of State is entrusted with the
discretion to decide whether there is reasonable ground to suspect that a
person is or has been involved in terrorism-related activity while being
abroad and it therefore is necessary to temporarily exclude the person from
the UK. Let us say, for instance, that a person is abroad and there seem to be
reasonable grounds for suspecting that he or she is involved in terrorism-
related activity. A court gives the Secretary of State permission to impose a
TEO, resulting in the person’s inability to return home to the UK unless he
or she accepts the conditions indicated by the Secretary of State in a permit
to return.
1.1 Purpose and research question
My work in this thesis stems from a proposition, based on which I will
conduct my research. I argue that, the temporary restrictions on travel
constitute a way of imposing sanctions amounting to criminal penalties.
This assumption stems from the jurisprudence of the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR or the Court) where national provisions have been
judged ‘criminal’ within the meaning of the European Convention on
Human Rights11 (ECHR or the Convention), although in the domestic legal
system they have been designated as part of another regime of law. This
means that human rights law requires criminal law standards, such as the
right to a fair trial, to be met in order to minimize the risk of violations of an
individual’s human rights and liberties.
During the passage of the CTS Bill, the UK Government issued an ECHR
Memorandum addressing potential impacts on the affected individual’s
human rights. This assessment, however, was conducted from a different
point of view than mine, namely that the measures are purely administrative
in nature. From this perspective, the Government concluded that the CTS
Act 2015 is compatible with the Convention. On the contrary, from my
standpoint, the temporary restrictions on travel should be determined as
containing norms of penal character, otherwise it would inappropriately
influence the respect for and protection of the individual’s human rights. To
be clear, I do not suggest that there should not be any preventative
measures, on the contrary these are vital in the fight against terrorism.
11 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Rome
4.XI.1950.
7However, taking into account that the preventative powers in ‘ordinary’
criminal law are limited by procedural safeguards intended to protect the
individual’s rights and liberties, I consider the need of rigid safeguards to be
equally (and perhaps even more) important when it comes to combating
terrorism as the powers to interfere are more far-reaching than in ‘ordinary’
criminal law.
Consequently, the aim of this thesis is to examine the ECtHR’s case law to
detect the criteria that the Court has used in determining certain provisions
as being ‘criminal’ within the meaning of the Convention, notwithstanding
another classification in domestic laws. I will then apply these criteria to the
temporary restriction on travel measures provided for by the CTS Act 2015
in order to estimate the de facto character of the provisions. This in turn is
intended to enable an assessment of the consequences of this presumed
criminal character. Thus, for realizing this goal, I will answer the following
questions:
(I) What powers do the temporary restrictions on travel give to the
executive and what is the rationale behind their introduction?
(II) Which criteria has the European Court of Human Rights
established when considering the de facto character of national
provisions imposing sanctions to the detriment of an individual?
(III) When applying these criteria to the temporary restrictions on
travel measures contained in the Counter-Terrorism and Security
Act 2015, what is their de facto character?
(IV) Supposing that the de facto character is criminal, which
procedural safeguards must be respected in order to protect the
individual’s human rights and liberties?
The first question will be answered in chapter 2; chapter 3 is dedicated to
question two and three; and chapter 4 will be dealing with question four.
The reasons for targeting my focal point at the temporary restrictions on
travel are three:
(I) They bring new powers to the personnel entrusted with the
execution of the anti-terror laws12;
(II) these new powers might interfere substantially with the affected
individual’s rights and liberties, substantially enough to be
judged as entailing penal characteristics (as will be elaborated
upon in this thesis); and
12 The novelty of the powers is, however, a matter of interpretation. Powers similar to
seizing passports exists under the Royal Prerogative to cancel and withdraw passports, see
below chapter 2.4.1; and the practice of excluding individuals has previously existed in
relation to terrorism in Northern Ireland; individuals were excluded from Great Britain to
Northern Ireland based on the government’s suspicion that they were involved in terrorism
without judicial hearing. See Foley, Frank, Countering Terrorism in Britain and France:
Institutions, Norms and the Shadow of the Past, Cambridge University Press, New York,
2013, p. 188.
8(III) due to the current attention paid to people choosing to travel to a
distant country with intention of engaging in what could be
deemed as terrorism, my personal interest lies with the cross-
border dilemma of the so called ‘foreign fighters’.13
Because of the increasing disquiet about foreign fighters, states need to
adopt or amend their legislation to face and challenge the problem with
persons travelling to combat zones to engage in the conflict. To impose
temporary restrictions on travel is one way of doing this and the United
Kingdom is one of the first to introduce such measures. Already prior to the
adoption of the CTS Act 2015, the British counter-terrorism legislation was
one of the most far-reaching in Europe and the UK definition of terrorism is
extraordinarily wide.14 The introduction of the CTS Act 2015 extends this
far-reaching legislation further. At the probabilities of other States
introducing similar measures in addressing the problem with foreign
fighters, it is crucial to scrutinize their human right’s implications, and how
their use conform to international human rights instruments. That is what
this thesis will do.
1.2 Method and material
Counter-terrorism measures are often subject to judicial review on
application of an individual whose rights and freedoms are allegedly
violated due to the exercise of these powers. The “draconian and illiberal
measures” are thus frequently found to be contrary to human rights.15 A
reasonable guess is, accordingly, that the powers contained in the CTS Act
2015 will be under scrutiny by national courts as well as the ECtHR in the
future. The contribution of this thesis is thus to precede the judicial process.
My methodology is quite straightforward and encompasses three steps.
First, I will introduce the CTS Act 2015. Second, I will examine the
jurisprudence by the ECtHR to detect the criteria for establishing a
‘criminal’ character and subsequently apply these criteria to the temporary
restriction on travel measures. Third, I will assess the consequences of the
13 The current focus is reflected, for instance, by an article in The Economist: “It ain’t half
hot here, mum. Why and how Westerners go to fight in Syria and Iraq”, Vol. 412, No.
8902, 30 August 2014, pp. 28-30; a reportage in Swedish television by Uppdrag
Granskning, episode 6, 18 February 2015, available at:
http://www.svtplay.se/video/2688371/uppdrag-granskning/uppdrag-granskning-avsnitt-6,
12 May 2015; and a series of reportages published by Le Monde,
http://www.lemonde.fr/proche-orient/article/2015/04/13/pres-de-1-500-francais-
combattraient-en-syrie-selon-l-ue_4614689_3218.html, 12 May 2015.
14 Walker, 2002, p. 29. In his submission to the JCHR, Walker stated “UK has the most
extensive terrorism laws in the whole of Europe, and the necessity for new additions should
always be questioned, as should their impact on right and legitimacy”, Counter Terrorism
and Security Bill 2014-15, 5 December 2014, para. 2. On the extent of powers entrusted to
the discretion of executive officers, see the ECtHR’s assessment in Gillan and Quinton v
the United Kingdom, Appl. No. 4158/05, 12 January 2010, paras. 79-85.
15 Neal in Terrorism and Political Violence, p. 359.
9findings in the second part, i.e. how the safeguards included in the Act
coincide with what is required by the criminal law regime. In doing that, I
will enable an assessment as to whether these powers are of de facto penal
character and whether the requirements of the right to a fair trial in ECHR,
article 6 should in fact be taken into account when the powers are used.
For realizing a thorough analysis of the temporary restriction on travel
measures, I will conduct a traditional legal study of the Act, related bill
documents and case law where relevant. One cornerstone in conducting a
legal research is to attend to authoritative sources.16 Belonging to the
Common Law system, the British case law is of immense importance for the
interpretation of legal provisions as the judges’ decisions have the function
of binding precedents as well as the function of developing the law.17
Accordingly, while assessing the supposed criminal nature of the Act, I will
resort to jurisprudence in relation to the definition of terrorist, which is
relevant for determining whom the legislation targets. However, due to the
recent adoption of the CTS Act 2015, it will not be possible to rely upon
interpretations of its contents by the judges; except for when reference is
made to former legislation, there simply is no case law yet. Consequently,
the material that will serve as my primary sources in relation to the CTS Act
2015, are the explanatory notes, various Impact Assessments, the ECHR
Memorandum and the research and briefing paper issued by the Government
throughout the passage of the Bill. In addition, I will use documentation
from the Legislative Scrutiny performed by the Joint Committee on Human
Rights (the JCHR or the Committee), as well as evidence given to the JCHR
and the Home Affair Committee. Furthermore, divers submissions and
reports related to the Bill and counter-terrorism legislation in general will be
studied.
All member states of the European Union have to cooperate sincerely and,
inter alia, refrain from realizing measures “which could jeopardise the
attainment of the Union’s objectives”.18 Hence, a correct interpretation of
the domestic legislation – when concerning an issue encompassed by the EU
competence – should be carried out in consideration of the union’s
authoritative sources of interpretation, particularly case-law from the Court
of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter the EU Court of Justice) and
the general principles of the European Union.19 As regards counter-terrorism
regulations, there are two main instruments to take into account, namely the
Council of Europe Framework Decision on combating terrorism and the
Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism. These, along
with the latest contribution on behalf of the United Nation (UNSC res. 2178,
2014), will be considered in determining how measures dealing with foreign
16 Korling, Fredric & Zamboni, Mauro (eds.), Juridisk metodlära, 1 ed., Studentlitteratur,
Lund, 2013, p. 29.
17 Hanson, Sharon, Legal method, skills and reasoning, 3 ed., Routledge Cavendish Taylor
& Francis Group, London and New York, 2010, p. 156.
18 Treaty of Lisbon amending the treaty on the European Union and the treaty establishing
the European Community, 2007/C 306/01, Article 3a.3
19 Reichel, Jane, ”EU-rättslig metod” in Korling & Zamboni, pp. 109-140, p. 125.
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fighters have been approached in other jurisdictions. In this respect, case
law from the EU Court of Justice, and reports on both the EU and the UN
regulations will serve as a basis for my analysis, albeit no exhaustive
account will be provided. Moreover, the ECHR is of particular interest since
the UK legislation will be analysed from a human rights perspective and the
Convention is thus the point of departure. For the interpretation of the
ECHR and its provisions, cases from the ECtHR are inevitable to include in
the research. Consideration will also be given to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
As to the material concerning the ‘criminal’ criteria established by the
ECtHR, my primary sources are obviously cases from the Court. For
reasons of time and space, it is not feasible to give an exhaustive account of
the case law on the topic; rather, a limited selection of cases will serve as
authorities in this respect. The chosen jurisprudence, however, are cases
frequently referred to by the Court itself and by scholars commenting on
related issues.20 In addition, there are a tremendous amount of doctrine
available; thus, how to approach administrative and civil sanctions in
disperse circumstances have been elaborated upon, interpreted and analysed
repeatedly since the Court’s first ruling on the matter (in the case of Engel
and Others v the Netherlands, judged in 1976).21 On the contrary, the
application of the Engel-criteria to administrative or civil provisions
concerned with countering terrorism is not as easy to find; with respect to
the CTS Act 2015 in particular, there is none for natural reasons.
Consequently, this thesis will be one of the first in this specific field.
1.3 Delimitations
The CTS Act 2015 is a comprehensive supplement to the United Kingdom
anti-terrorism legislation consisting of seven parts and eight schedules.
Notwithstanding the relevance of examining the Act in its entirety and
situate each part in their specific contexts, this thesis will primarily be
dedicated to the travel restrictions contained in part 1. This is not to be taken
for neglecting the significance of other measures in facing the threat posed
by terrorists in general and foreign fighters in particular, but is simply
motivated by time and space concerns. Due to the magnitude of anti-terror
laws in the United Kingdom and the multiple provisions included in Acts
mainly concerned with other issues (such as the Data Retention and
20 See for instance Emmerson, Ben QC and Ashworth, Andrew QC, Human Rights and
Criminal Justice, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2001; and Nowak, Karol,
Oskyldighetspresumtionen, Nordstedts Juridik, Stockholm, 2003.
21 The significance of the distinction between criminal sanctions on the one hand and
administrative or civil sanctions on the other is comprehensively discussed, albeit without
reference to the Engel-case, in “Les Problèmes Juridiques et Pratiques Posés par la
Différence entre le Droit Criminel et le Droit Administratif Pénal/The Legal and Practical
Problems Posed by the Difference between Criminal Law and Administrative Penal Law”
in Revue Internationale de Droit Pénal, Vol. 59, Nos. 1-2, Association Internationale de
Droit Pénal, 1988.
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Investigatory Powers Act 201422 and the Immigration, Asylum and
Nationality Act 200623, for instance) the scope of this thesis do not allow for
a comprehensive analysis of the entire counter-terrorism framework in the
UK. Nor will I study the internal relationship between the CTS Act 2015, on
the one hand, and previous domestic legislation on the other. The Human
Rights Act 1998 was enacted in order to give “further effect to the rights and
freedoms guaranteed under the ECHR; …”24, thus, the compatibility with
the former generates in principle the compatibility with the latter.
During the passage of the CTS Bill, both the Government and the JCHR
recognized a potential interference of ECHR, article 1425; in particular in the
light of the discriminatory use of the stop and search powers in the
Terrorism Act 2000, the extensive discretion entrusted with the executives is
troublesome.26 In relation to passport seizures, the Government asserted that
the Code of Practice will indicate how to monitor the exercise of the powers
in order to prevent their discriminatory application.27 To scrutinize whether
violations of article 14 are realized by the use of the temporary restriction on
travel measures must inevitably include future studies of empirical material;
at this point in time, there is no such material available and the inclusion of
such would render the scope of this thesis far too extensive. Thus, it suffices
to note that the introduction of the temporary restrictions on travel could
potentially render breaches of the right to non-discrimination.
Furthermore, the UK employs a general strategy for countering terrorism
called CONTEST, its third and latest version was published in July 2011.
The strategy aims at reducing the threat from terrorism “so that people can
go about their lives freely and with confidence”28, and consists of four main
parts: Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare.29 The purpose of the first
element is to stop in-country terrorist attacks as well as those overseas
threatening the UK interests; the second section addresses radicalisation;
Protect aims at strengthening the protection against terrorist attacks and thus
reduce the state’s vulnerability; and the Prepare part is intended to ease the
consequences of an attack should it not be possible to stop it.30 Changing
terrorist threat affects the strategy and leads to the integration of new
Government policies.31 As such, the CTS Act 2015 is one fraction of this
strategy and predominately strengthens the Pursue, Prevent and Protect
22 The Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014: 2014 Chapter 27 [17th July
2014].
23 The Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006: 2006 Chapter 13 [30th March 2006].
24 The Human Rights Act 1998: 1998 Chapter 42 [9th November 1998].
25 JCHR, Legislative Scrutiny, para. 2.40.
26 That the powers have been used in a discriminatory fashion was confirmed by the ECtHR
having examined evidence presented in the case of Gillan and Quinton v the United
Kingdom, para. 85.
27 ECHR Memorandum, para. 8.
28 CONTEST The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism, July 2011, para.
1.2
29 CTS Bill, Explanatory Notes (n 6), para. 5.
30 CONTEST, paras. 1.16, 1.27, 1.33 and 1.40.
31 Ibid., para. 1.1.
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streams of work.32 The strategy refers to the ambitions of a four years period
meaning that this year the strategy is at sunset. At the assumption of a fourth
CONTEST version being published in the near future, beside its amplitude,
there is little reason to make the strategy a priority within the scope of this
thesis. To analyse the appropriateness and execution of it would require
studies of a considerable amount of empirical material as well as evaluations
thereof, an exercise lacking feasibility within this work.
It must be noted that the introduction of the CTS Act 2015 is at the margin
of what is acceptable with regard to the United Kingdom’s international
legal obligations towards other States, of which the respect for Human
Rights is just one part. During the passage of the CTS Bill, Guy S.
Goodwin-Gill submitted an account on the implications in this respect33;
however, the scrutiny of the responsibilities to other states and to the
international community has to fall outside the scope of this thesis.
Furthermore, for reasons of time and space it is not possible to give an
exhaustive account of the components of the right to a fair trial, nor of all
issues related to each element of the right that I will discuss. Instead, I will
deliberate upon the right to a fair trial and related matters in those parts that
are affected by the use of the temporary restrictions on travel.
1.4 Definitions
To determine the legal definition of terrorism as dictated in the United
Kingdom is important as it serves as the basis for identifying which actions
constitute terrorist acts and therefore who is a terrorist. Moreover, the legal
definition is also the foundation for prescribing or extending controversial,
intrusive powers assigned to the discretion of the executive authorities.
Accordingly, the definitions of relevance for this thesis will be briefly
presented here; in chapter 3.2.1 I will elaborate further on the extreme width
of the UK definitions.
First, section 14(2) and schedule 1, paragraph 1(11) of the CTS Act 2015
refers to the Terrorism Act 2000 as regards the meaning of the terms
“terrorism” and “terrorist”. Consequently, terrorism is the use or threat of
(i) serious violence against a person; (ii) serious damage to property; (iii) an
action that endangers another person’s life; (iv) an action that creates a
serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section thereof; or (v) an
action designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an
electronic system. The use or threat of such actions must be designed to
influence the government of an international governmental organisation or
32 CTS Bill, Explanatory Notes (n 6), para. 5.
33 Goodwin-Gill, Guy S., ‘Temporary Exclusion Orders’ and their Implications for the
United Kingdom’s International Legal Obligations, Bills (14-15) 065, 2 December 2014.
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to intimidate the public or a section thereof; it must also be made for the
purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause.34
Second, a terrorist is, according to the Terrorism Act 2000, section 4035, a
person who has committed an offence ranging from membership in a
‘terrorist’ organisation; via support and information; to financial aspects in
connection with terrorist activities.36 A terrorist may also be someone who
is or has been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of
acts of terrorism.
Third, the CTS Act 2015, section 14(4) and schedule 1, paragraph 1(10)
defines ‘involvement in terrorism-related activity’ as one or more of the
following:
(a) the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism;
(b) conduct that facilitates the commission, preparation or instigation
of such acts, or is intended to do so;
(c) conduct that gives encouragement to the commission, preparation
or instigation of such acts, or is intended to do so;
(d) conduct that gives support or assistance to individuals who are
known or believed by the individual [person] concerned to be
involved in conduct falling within paragraph (a).
Fourth, the preamble of the United Nation Security Council (UNSC)
resolution 2178 defines the term ‘foreign fighter’ as
individuals who travel to a State other than their States of
residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration,
planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or
the providing or receiving of terrorist training, including in
connection with armed conflict […].37
In the UK the notion of ‘foreign fighters’ is not expressly defined, albeit the
research paper to the CTS Bill refers to “British nationals going abroad to
join terrorist groups”.38 Taking into account the definition of ‘terrorism-
related activity’, it is presumed, for the purpose of this thesis, that the
British understanding of ‘foreign fighter’ is consistent to the one adopted by
the UN.
34 See the Terrorism Act 2000, sections 1(1) to 1(5) in Supplement B.
35 See Supplement B.
36 See the Terrorism Act 2000, sections 11, 12, 15 to 18, 54 and 56 to 63, available at:
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/contents, 11 March 2015. In addition,
subsequent counter-terrorism Acts proscribe further offences, for instance, the Terrorism
Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011: 2011 Chapter 23 [14th December 2011],
s. 23; Terrorism Act 2006: 2006 Chapter 11 [30th March 2006], part 1; and CTS Act 2015,
s. 10.
37 United Nations Security Council Resolution 2178, S/RES/2178 (2014), 24 September
2014, preamble, p. 2.
38 CTS Bill, Bill No 127 of 2014-15, Research Paper 14/63, 27 November 2014, p. 2.
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1.5 Outline
In order to enable the analysis of the temporary restrictions on travel
introduced by the CTS Act 2015, it is fundamental to understand the main
lines of the Act. Chapter 2 will therefore provide an overview of the Act in
pursuit of answering the first research question: what powers does the
temporary restrictions on travel give to the executive and what is the
rationale behind their introduction? First, the purpose of the Act will be
approximated for facilitating the understanding of the necessity of and the
rationale behind the Act. Second, the temporary restrictions on travel
measures will be carefully examined as this will serve as the basis for
comprehending their stringency, which is why I advocate that the measures
are indeed of de facto penal character.
Next, in chapter 3, I will examine the autonomy of the term ‘criminal
charge’ as interpreted by the ECtHR. For ensuring an equal application of
the ECHR, the Court has established three criteria of relevance when
determining whether a national provision is in fact of ‘criminal’ nature,
regardless of how it is labelled in the domestic legal system. Accordingly,
this chapter will be dedicated to the second and third research questions,
namely:
- Which criteria has the European Court of Human Rights established
when considering the de facto character of national provisions
imposing sanctions to the detriment of an individual?
- When applying these criteria to the temporary restrictions on travel
measures contained in the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015,
what is their de facto character?
I will thus introduce the three so-called Engel criteria and how they have
been developed in the Court’s jurisprudence. Following these criteria I will
examine how the temporary restrictions on travel powers are labelled in UK
law; I will assess the nature of the offence; I will ascertain the severity of
the penalty.
Lastly, chapter 4 will encompass the analysis intended to answer question
four, i.e. supposing that the de facto character is criminal, which procedural
safeguards must be respected in order to protect the individual’s human
rights and liberties? The analysis will therefore proceed to examine what has
been stated about the involvement of judicial authorities during the passage
of the Bill, and how the criminal nature of the two measures affects these
considerations. More specifically, I will assess the implications on the
individual’s right to a fair trial as protected by inter alia ECHR, article 6.
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2 The Counter-Terrorism and
Security Act 2015
To facilitate the understanding of the temporary restriction on travel
measures introduced by the enactment of the CTS Act 2015, the first stop is
to approximate the purpose and rationale for advancing the Bill. Second, the
substantial provisions of the Act will be scrutinized. Thus, this chapter will
give account of the content of the Act39 and, for sake of clarification, related
concerns and critiques that have been discussed during the passage of the
CTS Bill.
2.1 The purpose of the Act
The Bill proposal and the following adoption of the Act is a direct reaction
to the severe threat level announced by the JTAC in August 2014, meaning
that a terrorist attack is “highly likely”.40 Facing the troubling fact that
individuals travel from the United Kingdom to conflict zones abroad, the
Government ascertains the intention to “strengthen the legal powers and
capabilities of law enforcement and intelligence agencies to disrupt
terrorism and prevent individuals from being radicalised in the first
instance”.41 The overarching goal is to protect the public and ensure public
safety.42 The Government considers that
[t]he Act reduces the risk of terrorism to the UK by:
- Preventing individuals from travelling abroad to commit
terrorist related activity;
- Disrupting the ability of terrorist, or those suspected of
terrorist related activity, to return to the UK;
- Enhancing our ability to monitor and control the actions of
those in the UK that pose a threat; and
- Combating the underlying ideology that feeds, supports and
sanctions terrorism.43
The new powers are intended to exist alongside those previously in place,44
constituting yet another extension of the already comprehensive application
of anti-terrorism laws in the UK.
The necessity of introducing additional powers, in particular the temporary
restrictions on travel, has been a topic of repeated concern during the
passage of the Bill. In that respect, the motivation frequently resorted to is
39 Relevant parts of the Act are attached in Supplement A.
40 CTS Bill, Explanatory Notes, para. 3.
41 Ibid.
42 CTS Bill, Privacy Impact Assessment, November 2014, p. 2.
43 Overarching Impact Assessment for the Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015- Royal
Assent, Home Office, IA No: HO0150, 11 February 2015, para. 4.
44 Ibid., para. 8.
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the risk of foreign fighters gaining experience and knowledge abroad, thus
posing a threat to the public in the United Kingdom upon their return.45
However, even prior to the CTS Act 2015 measures similar to the temporary
restrictions on travel were in place; under a Royal Prerogative power to
cancel or refuse passports with regard to public interest, British citizens
have been stopped from travelling when the purpose has been to engage in
terrorist-related activity. Likewise, foreign nationals have been prevented
from re-entering the British territory and those endowed with dual
nationality have had their British citizenship revoked.46 The objective of the
CTS Act 2015 is thus to provide for measures absent in former legislation in
order to strengthen the powers to prevent terror attacks from being
realized.47 As such, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation,
David Anderson, deemed them “reasonably useful extra powers”.48
A second matter that has been disputed during the Bill’s passage is the
resort to ‘fast-tracking’; such a method leaves the opportunity for proper
scrutiny at peril. The JCHR expressed concerns about “the compressed
timetable [that] has inevitably affected our ability to scrutinise the Bill
fully”.49 As justification, however, the Government expressed that “given
the pressing operational need for enhanced powers to respond to the current
terrorism threat” there was no possibility to extend the timetable in order to
permit further parliamentary scrutiny.50 James Brokenshire MP, Minister for
Security and Immigration, similarly explained that due to the “clear
operational needs […] there is a degree of urgency” which is the reason for
an accelerated process to get the powers available.51 Furthermore, the
Minister adduced that “the Bill represents a considered and targeted
response to the very serious and rapidly changing threats we face” and
ensured the Committee that the Government had consulted operational
partners to ensure that the Bill became feasible, contributing with
operational value, while simultaneously striking “the correct balance
between our rights to privacy and security”.52 Accordingly, the raised threat
level in combination with the urgent need of dealing with those choosing to
travel abroad to engage in terrorist related activity, are the reasons
necessitating a new Act as well as justifying the fast-tracked process.
45 See for instance the response to Q7 by the Deputy Assistant Commissioner for the
Metropolitan Police, Helene Ball in House of Commons, Home Affairs Committee, Oral
evidence: Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill, HC 838, 3 December 2014; and House of
Lords, House of Commons, Joint Committee on Human Rights, Examination of Witness:
James Brokenshire MP, Minister for Security and Immigration, Home Office, Q17.
46 CTS Bill, Explanatory Notes, para. 47.
47 For further explanation relating to parts 2-7 of the Act, see CTS Bill, Explanatory Notes,
paras. 49-54.
48 Home Affairs Committee, Oral evidence: Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill, Q122.
49 House of Lords, House of Commons, Joint Committee on Human Rights, Legislative
Scrutiny: Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill, Fifth Report of Session 2014-15, HL Paper
86, HC 859, para. 1.10.
50 CTS Bill, Explanatory Notes, para. 29.
51 JCHR, Examination of Witness, Q2.
52 James Brokenshire MP, Immigration and Security Minister, Home Office, Counter-
Terrorism and Security Bill: Legislative Scrutiny, Bills (14-15) 078, 20 January 2015, p. 1.
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In this respect, one further remark is necessary. In accordance with the UK
legislative practice, the CTS Bill was accompanied by several Impact
Assessments, both overarching ones dealing with the general aspects of the
entire Bill, as well as more specialized ones handling the specific measures
one by one. The assessments provide for the background and rationale for
intervention; the objectives and contents; the existing measures in the field;
the groups affected by the legislation; the consultation process; and the
options available to the Government.53 As regards the options, the
Government has consistently identified two options: Option 1 – do nothing,
and Option 2 (the preferred option) – do what the Government proposes in
the Bill.54 That is to say, in contrast to considering additional options
available to tackle the problem as identified in the background and rationale
for the measures. One such plausible option is presented by the JCHR in
respect of TEOs; since the primary purpose with imposing a TEO is to
facilitate the control of the individual once he or she returns, a less
restrictive alternative would be to authorize the imposition of a ‘notification
of return order’ instead of exclusion order. In the Committee’s view, such a
notification would allow the UK authorities to exercise the same supervision
as intended with a permit to return, while simultaneously avoid the stringent
sanction of excluding a British citizen from the country.55 Whether the
choice to address only two options in the Impact Assessments is the
common practice when passaging a bill in the UK; whether it is the result of
the Government’s decision to fast-track the Bill; or whether there is another
reason, I will leave unspoken. It suffices to note that less intrusive
alternatives, potentially equally effective, have been identified.
2.2 Temporary restrictions on travel
Part 1 of the CTS Act 2015 contains the controversial and more innovative
provisions on ‘temporary restrictions on travel’. The passage of the Bill has
been described as adopting “some of the most problematic changes to
counterterrorism policy in years”56 and the powers in part 1, in particular,
has been described as “pretty draconian”57; by others, they have been
deemed “valuable” and “reasonably useful”.58
53 See for instance the structure of the Overarching Impact Assessment for the Counter
Terrorism and Security Act 2015 – Royal Assent.
54 For instance, in the Overarching Impact Assessment the second option is to “introduce
legislation to disrupt the ability of individuals to travel overseas fight, or commit terrorist
related activity, as well as disrupt their ability to return here; enhance our ability to monitor
and control the actions of those in the UK that pose a threat; introduce measures to allow IP
resolution; and better support those individuals at serious risk of being radicalised”, para.
20.
55 JCHR, Legislative Scrutiny, paras. 3.11-3.12.
56 Human Rights Watch, UK: New Counterterrorism Bill Curbs Rights, 1 December 2014.
57 Expression by the Chair, Home Affairs Committee, Oral evidence: Counter-Terrorism
and Security Bill, Q6.
58 Expressed by Helen Ball and David Anderson, Home Affairs Committee, Oral evidence:
Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill, Q8 and Q122.
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The purpose of this section is to scrutinize the powers and the associated
discussions in order to fully understand their character and content. This
will constitute the core for the verification or rejection in chapter 3 of my
assumption that the powers are of de facto penal character, and the ensuing
analysis on the powers’ implications on an individual’s human rights and
liberties, provided for in chapters 3 and 4.
2.2.1 Power to seize and retain passports and/or
travel documents
The substance of the seizure and temporary retention of passports (or
equated document59) and/or travel documents (i.e. a ticket or similar
permitting a person to travel across the UK borders60) is provided for in
Schedule 1 of the CTS Act 2015. According to section 1(1), the powers are
triggered when a person “is suspected of intending to leave Great Britain or
the United Kingdom in connection with terrorism-related activity”. The
rather extensive schedule encompasses regulations as to who has the
authority to exercise the powers against whom, the threshold for exercising
the power and their contents, albeit the more specific instructions on
functions are provided for in a Code of Practice61 issued by the Secretary of
State.62 Moreover, the schedule indicates the procedural safeguards intended
to obstruct an arbitrary interference with an individual’s rights and liberties
(their sufficiency will be discussed below).
(a) Rationale
The power to seize and retain passports and/or travel documents (hereinafter
I will refer to ‘passports’ only, which will include travel documents as well)
is, as noted above, intended to fill a gap in the existing legislation. Prior to
the adoption of the CTS Act 2015, there was no possibility for the police or
border officers to immediately disrupt a person from travelling; hence, the
identified temporal gap. The use of the Royal Prerogative to cancel or refuse
a British passport entails a process too complex and time consuming to
hinder a person at a port from leaving. Nor are the existing port and border
powers to examine an individual sufficient, as they do not enable a
disruption of travel.63
59 See definition of ’passport’, CTS Act 2015, schedule 1, para. 1(7).
60 See definition of ‘travel document’, CTS Act 2015, schedule 1, para. 1(6).
61 Home Office, Code of Practice for Officers exercising functions under Schedule 1 of the
Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 in connection with seizing and retaining travel
documents, February 2015.
62 CTS Act 2015, schedule 1, para. 18. The legal status of the Code of Practice is expressed
as: “Police Constables (of any rank) and Border Force Officers (whether designated or
otherwise) must exercise any functions conferred upon them by Schedule 1 in accordance
with this code of practice”. It is also admissible as evidence in a civil or criminal court
which may take it into account where relevant, para. 20.
63 These powers are provided for in Terrorism Act 2000, schedule 7, see CTS Bill,
Explanatory Notes, para. 48.
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During the passage of the Bill, contradictory opinions have been presented
regarding the necessity of introducing the provisions. On the one hand,
Liberty has emphasised the already existing power for the police to arrest
someone without warrant if the police reasonably believes that the person is
a terrorist as defined above. Such an arrest enables a pre-charge detention
during up to 14 days while investigations are carried out; should such a
measure be combined with a possibility to release the suspect on bail,
Liberty argues, a reasonable condition could be to surrender the passport.
Hence, there is no need for introducing the power of passport seizure and
retention since the same result, i.e. to prevent people from travelling outside
the UK, would be obtained, but “in a way that is much more robust with
regard to both due process safeguards and keeping the rest of the population
safe”.64 On the other hand, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism
Legislation, David Anderson contended that the Bill proscribed useful extra
powers and that the seizure of passport “can be a beneficial thing” since “30
days certainly ought to give enough time to enable the relevant decisions to
be made about whether to apply for the royal prerogative from the Home
Secretary or whether to prosecute”.65
In considering both of these standpoints, the JCHR concluded that there was
a gap in the existing legislation, albeit “not nearly as wide” as the
Government claimed. Thus, the necessity of the Bill had been demonstrated
since “preventive action of this sort […] could prove more effective than
taking action at a later date”.66
(b) Content
In order to seize and temporarily retain a passport from a person, whether
national or non-national67, at a port, the constable must have “reasonable
grounds to suspect” that the person intends to leave the country for the
purpose of being involved in terrorism-related activity.68 In such a case, in
accordance with schedule 1, paragraph 2(5-6), the constable may search for,
inspect and retain any travel document, and require a person to hand them
over. The search may be exercised on the person, his or her belongings and
a vehicle in which the constable believes the person have been or will be
travelling. Once a travel document has been seized, the constable must “as
soon as possible” either seek authorization for retaining the document or
return it. The application for retention should be considered “as soon as
possible” and the authorization must not be in writing; for authorizing a
retention a senior police officer must be satisfied that there are reasonable
grounds for the suspicion.69 Should the retention application be granted,
schedule 1, paragraph 5 provides that the travel document may be retained
64 Liberty, para. 12.
65 Home Affairs Committee, Oral Evidence: Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill, Q151.
66 JCHR, Legislative Scrutiny, paras. 2.12 and 2.15.
67 CTS Act 2015, schedule 1, para. 1(7).
68 CTS Act 2015, schedule 1, para. 2(1). According to schedule 1, para. 1(8), the term ‘port’
means an airport, a sea port, a hoverport, a heliport and a railway station with cross-border
connections.
69 Ibid., para. 4.
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for a period of 14 days, while consideration is given as to whether to cancel
the passport, to charge the person with an offence or to make the person
subject to any measure or order in connection with protecting the public
from a risk of terrorism. After 72 hours, paragraph 6 requires another police
officer than the one who approved the retention in first instance to execute a
review aiming at determining whether the authorization was flawed. The
threshold of “reasonable grounds to suspect” a person’s intention of
engaging in terrorism-related activity and the obligation to request
authorization for retention of the travel documents, are both considered as
part of the safeguards preventing an arbitrary use of the powers.70
Additionally, schedule 1, paragraph 8 provides for the possibility to prolong
the retention period from 14 to 30 days. Such an extension is subject to
judicial review, although the judicial authority is limited to try whether the
“relevant persons have been acting diligently and expeditiously” in their
efforts to investigate the matters of potentially cancelling the passport,
charging the person or subjecting him or her to anti-terror measures. The
Government has emphasized the involvement of judicial authorities as an
important safeguard;71 the JCHR, however, has criticized it for only
allowing oversight of the diligent and expeditious exercise of the powers as
opposed to determine whether there are reasonable grounds for suspicion.72
These contradictory views will be approached further in chapter 4.
Moreover, in protection of the affected individual’s interests, the Act
requires in schedule 1, paragraph 9 that the person is given the opportunity
to make an oral or written representation before the judicial authority when
it considers an application for retention, and determines that the person is
entitled to legal representation. However, by virtue of schedule 1, paragraph
10, the court enjoys the discretion to exclude both the affected individual
and his or her representative from the hearing; as well as decide that none of
them will be allowed to take part of material adduced as evidence if such a
disclosure would threat national security or have consequences for criminal
investigation and prosecution.
The judicial authority’s function is limited, as mentioned, to answering the
question whether the relevant persons are acting diligently and expeditiously
in performing their investigations. Should the court be satisfied to the
affirmative, it is obliged, by virtue of schedule 1, paragraph 8(4), to grant an
extension of the retention period; otherwise, the extension must be negated.
In the latter event, the passport should be returned as soon as possible; the
person may in such case request information about the reasons for seizure
and retention, to which a response, as comprehensive as possible while
protecting national security, must be provided within 42 days.73 The same
70 Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill, European Convention on Human Rights
Memorandum by the Home Office, Bills (14-15) 059, (ECHR Memorandum), para. 5.
71 ECHR Memorandum, para. 5.
72 JCHR, Legislative Scrutiny, para. 2.29.
73 CTS Act 2015, schedule 1, para. 5(3) and Code of Practice, para. 74. An exception to this
is provided for in para. 7, which allows for further retention if the constable believes that
the document might be needed as evidence in criminal proceedings or in connection to a
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person might be subjected to a repeated use of the powers, regardless of the
extent of the retention period the first time, albeit the repetition is
circumscribed by an initial retention period of 5 days (as opposed to 14) and
the judicial review will include consideration of exceptional circumstances
that justifies the repeated use.74
(c) Offences
In schedule 1, paragraph 15, the CTS Act 2015 introduces two new terrorist
offences. If a person fails to hand over his or her travel documents without a
reasonable excuse, or if a person “intentionally obstructs, or seeks to
frustrate, a search”, he or she will be guilty of committing an offence. For
that reason, he or she might be convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for
a maximum of 6 months, or to a fine, or to both penalties.
(d) Human Rights implications identified during the passage of
the Bill
In its Memorandum on the Bill’s compatibility with the ECHR, the
Government identified that the powers to seize and retain passports would
“likely amount to an interference” with the right to private and family life
contained in article 8 “in a wide range of factual circumstances”.75 In
addition, the Government acknowledged a potential breach of article 3 as
the “exercise of the power could effectively render the person destitute,
constituting inhumane treatment”.76 Furthermore, the JCHR indicates that
the provisions also relates to the right to freedom of movement as per article
12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).77
These assertions will be scrutinized further in chapter 4, along with potential
intrusions of other rights and liberties; for now, it suffices to note that the
power triggers the application of these provisions.
2.2.2 Temporary Exclusion Orders
The second chapter of part 1 of the CTS Act 2015 entails the provisions
regulating the imposition of an order to temporary exclude an individual
from the United Kingdom. An individual subject to a TEO is, according to
section 2(1), prohibited from returning to the UK unless he or she does so in
acceptance of a permit to return, or the return is the result of a deportation
order from another state to the UK. In addition, schedule 2 is applicable
possible deportation order. The return might be equally obstructed by any power or
provision in other regulations than schedule 1 that allows for lawful retention of documents.
74 CTS Act 2015, schedule 1, para. 13. Unfortunately , neither the Explanatory Notes or the
Code of Practice offer any guidance on what would constitute exceptional circumstances;
the Code of Practice states that it is not intended that the power should be used as a “long
term disruption tool” and that the repeated use within a six month period would be “highly
unusual”, para. 68.
75 ECHR Memorandum, para. 3.
76 Ibid.
77 JCHR, Legislative Scrutiny, para. 2.5.
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when a TEO has been issued with urgency – i.e. when the Secretary of State
considers the case so urgent that there is no time to request a court decision
prior to the imposition of a TEO78 – and schedule 3 regulates proceedings in
court. Besides, schedule 4 states the conditions for appeal against a
conviction on a TEO offence.
(a) Rationale
Considering the fact that an increasing amount of British citizens go abroad
to participate in combats as foreign fighters, the Government has identified a
gap in the existing counter-terrorism legislation. Before the CTS Act 2015,
there were powers in place allowing for a disruption of travel to the UK of
non-British citizens, while the new TEO powers will enable the same
measure to be imposed on UK nationals.79 Hence, British citizens that have
travelled to a country where terrorist organizations operate might not be
allowed to return to their home country – unless, of course, they agree to
obey by the conditions indicated by the Secretary of State in a permit to
return. However, the Minister for Security and Immigration, James
Brokenshire, asserted to the JCHR that the purpose of a TEO is to manage
the return of an individual, not to exclude someone from the country, as
there is a “need for control to be exerted in respect of their potential
return”.80
Considering the evidence given by the Minister, the JCHR challenged the
necessity of imposing an order that effectively results in a temporary
exclusion of a person. A less intrusive option, the Committee argued would
be to require an advance notification of return; a failure to provide one
would be subject to criminal penalty.81 Shami Chakrabarti, director of
Liberty, expressed a similar opinion stating that “TPIMs […] already exist,
so there is no need, in my view, to have this threat of depriving a British
national from coming back to the country that is responsible for them”.82 On
the contrary, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, David
Anderson, reasoned that the TEOs “might have some benefits” since it has
the potential of catching young, vulnerable people going abroad and instead
of directly subjecting them to criminal sanctions, the controlled return
alternative might be useful for them.83
In response to the JCHR’s suggestion to alter the Bill and replace the TEOs
with a notification of return order, the Minister for Security and
Immigration pointed to the presumed ineffectiveness of such a measure:
78 CTS Act 2015, schedule 2, para. 1.
79 CTS Bill, Explanatory Notes, para. 48.
80 JCHR, Examination of Witness: James Brokenshire MP, Q17. See also Brokenshire,
Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill: Legislative Scrutiny, p. 4.
81 JCHR, Legislative Scrutiny, paras. 3.11-3.12.
82 Home Affairs Committe, Oral evidence: Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill, Q86.
83 Ibid., Q138. In his answer, David Anderson stressed the need of “[injecting] some
judicial control into [the TEO procedure] because it is quite an onerous thing to do to
somebody; the order can last for up to two years”.
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By only requiring an individual to notify the Government of their
return to the UK and not obliging them to travel on a route or date
which has been agreed with the UK authorities [which is, inter alia,
what the permit to return would do, author’s note], we would seriously
limit the operational effectiveness of the power and thus our ability to
manage the threat these individuals pose to the British public.84
Conversely, the effectiveness of the TEOs as provided for has also been
questioned, mainly on two grounds. First, from the Examination of Witness
James Brokenshire in the JCHR it is apparent that the Committee members
were concerned over the factual imposition of the TEOs, i.e. how the
exercise of the power would be implemented in practice. The Minister
asserted that the executive would “seek to serve the notice on the individual,
preferably in person, but, clearly, service may be on their [sic!] last known
address in the UK”.85 The scenario of a person, subjected to a TEO,
showing up at an airport without knowing that he or she has been imposed a
TEO, was presented to the Minister, who admitted that it would not be
possible for British police to “fly out there” and arrest the person overseas.
Thus, how to deal with the situation would have to be solved on a case-by-
case basis.86 In this connection, another option was presented to the
Minister:
You are putting in place a complex arrangement that would be legally
challengeable and expensive, with police officers going to foreign
countries to interrogate people. Why not allow them to travel to
Britain and, at the point they get off the aeroplane or the boat, take
them into custody, offer them the managed process – one of your
options – or arrest them for a crime and put them on trial?
In his answer, the Minister referred to the potential risk of the individual:
Even overseas, they may pose a direct threat to the UK by either
seeking to radicalise or to control others within the UK, so we need to
manage risk [sic!] in an appropriate way. […] We have that existing
measure that we are strengthening further in this Bill to prevent people
from getting on aircraft, and then separately, we have the powers
under the temporary exclusion order to facilitate the return of an
individual in a controlled way, and, frankly, to keep them out if they
do not adhere to that.87
The practicalities when imposing a TEO on someone was obviously not
settled during the passage of the Bill, which might be problematic for the
future efficiency of their use, as well as for the avoidance of an arbitrary
application.
The second concern in relation to the effectiveness of the measures, is that
the TEOs excludes those who might be willing to adhere to a permit to
84 Brokenshire, Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill: Legislative Scrutiny, p. 4.
85 JCHR, Examination of Witness: James Brokenshire MP, Q25.
86 Ibid., Q26.
87 Ibid., Q27.
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return but are practically unable to apply for one (this issue will be
addressed further in chapter 3.2.3), but, on the contrary, “for those who
genuinely seek to do us harm, the system of TEOs, permits and section 8
reporting obligations will offer few obstacles”.88 Liberty argues that the
imposition of a TEO will obstruct the ultimate goal to neutralize the threat
posed by these individuals, as they will rather notify the person of the
authorities’ interest in him or her and push the activities “further
underground”. Moreover,
[i]t is difficult to see how a proposal which temporarily traps an
individual in a region where jihadi groups have a strong presence will
further the core objective […] of breaking the link between UK
extremists and terror groups in foreign countries.89
It is obvious that the justification for, the necessity and the efficiency of the
TEOs are disputed; their existence is indeed the most controversial
provisions in the Act. Inevitably, I will come back to the issue later on.
(b) Content
The Secretary of State is entrusted with the discretion to decide whether to
impose a TEO, assuming that five conditions outlined in section 2(2-7) are
met:
(A) the Secretary of State must “reasonably suspect[…] that the individual
is, or has been, involved in terrorism-related activity outside the United
Kingdom;
(B) the Secretary of State must “reasonably consider” that the imposition of
a TEO is necessary in order to protect the public in the UK from a risk
of terrorism;
(C) the Secretary of State must “reasonably consider[…] that the individual
is outside the United Kingdom”;
(D) the individual must have a right of abode in the UK; and
(E) a court must give permission to the Secretary of State to impose a TEO
or the Secretary of State must “reasonably consider” that the case is too
urgent to await the court’s permission.
A TEO is valid for two years, except if the Secretary of State revokes or
otherwise ends it earlier, but the revocation or expiration (at the end of a
two-year’s period) does not prevent another TEO to be imposed on the same
individual. An order (as well as the revocation of an order) becomes valid
by the time of notification and during that period, the excluded individual’s
British passport is invalidated.90 In less urgent circumstances, the Secretary
of State is obliged by sections 3(1-2) and 3(6-7) to apply to the court for
permission to impose a TEO; the function of the court is then to determine
88 Liberty, para. 17.
89 Ibid., paras. 18-19.
90 CTS Act 2015, s. 4. The Secretary of State is required to keep the necessity of the TEO
for purposes of protecting the public against terrorism under review during the time it is in
force, s. 2(8).
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whether the Secretary of State’s decision that conditions A-D are met is
“obviously flawed”. Should the court answer the inquiry in the negative, it
is obliged to give permission, otherwise the court may not.
In case of urgency, on the other hand, the Secretary of State may impose a
TEO without prior consideration by a court. The court will instead perform
a review within 7 days and then determine whether the “urgent case
decisions were obviously flawed”.91 The decisions the court will examine
are both the ones in relation to condition A-D (the relevant decisions) as
well as the one on the urgency of the case; should any of the relevant
decisions be obviously flawed, the court is obliged to quash the TEO,
otherwise it must confirm the order. Should it be the urgency decision that is
obviously flawed, the court may choose between quashing and confirming
the imposition of a TEO.92
Once a TEO is in force, the affected individual may apply to the Secretary
of State for a permit to return, which the latter must issue “within a
reasonable period after the application is made”.93 Still, the right to have a
permit to return issued is restricted by a requirement to attend an interview
at a time and place indicated the Secretary of State; should the individual
fail to attend the interview, the Secretary of State may by virtue of section
6(2) refuse to issue a permit to return. Furthermore, mandatory conditions
may be included in the permit to return, a failure to comply with them will
effectively invalidate the permit; the terms of a permit are for the Secretary
of State to decide.94 Having returned to the UK, the Secretary of State may
additionally impose certain ‘permitted obligations’ on the individual, as
indicated by section 9(1-2), namely (a) a requirement to report to a police
station and/or to attend appointments as provided for in Schedule 1 to the
TPIMs Act 2011, and (b) an obligation to notify the police of the
individual’s place of residence and any changes in that respect. When a
subjected individual has returned to the UK, he or she may request a court
review of the Secretary of State’s decision in relation to conditions A-D; to
impose a TEO; about the continuance of condition B95; and a decision to
impose a ‘permitted obligation’. The powers of the court in such a matter
are limited to either quash the TEO (or the permitted obligation) or give
directions to the Secretary of State to revoke the TEO (or the permitted
obligation); otherwise, the court is required to decide that the TEO (or the
91 CTS Act 2015, schedule 2, para. 3.
92 Ibid., schedule 2, para. 4.
93 Ibid., s. 6(1). A permit to return might equally be issued in case of deportation to the UK,
or if the Secretary of State considers that there is an urgency requiring a permit to be issued
expeditiously even though no application has been made by the individual or a there is a
duty to do so because of a deportation order, s.7.
94 Ibid., s. 5(2-3 and 8).
95 Should the Secretary of State fail to review the necessity of a TEO and decide upon its
continuity, the court will treat the situation as if a decision that it continues to be met had
been made, s. 11(11).
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permitted obligation) continues to be in force. An appeal against the court’s
ruling may only be made on questions of law.96
Schedules 3 and 4 contain provisions regulating the proceedings in court
connected to TEOs; the former applies to proceedings when the Secretary of
State seeks permission to impose a TEO or, reversed, where a TEO has been
imposed urgently and is subsequently referred to the court. It also applies
when an individual within the UK has requested a review of the decision to
impose a TEO, and to an application requesting anonymity in court with
respect to the individual concerned.97 Paragraph 5 of the schedule ensures
explicitly that, albeit special rules of court may be made in relation to TEO
or appeal proceedings, this does not mean that the procedural safeguards in
ECHR, article 6 may be circumvented. As it is possible to exclude the
individual to whom the proceedings relate as well as his or her legal
representative, a special advocate may according to schedule 3, paragraph
10, be appointed in order to represent the interest of the individual (this will
be discussed further in chapter 4).
Next, schedule 4 regulates the appeal proceedings against convictions
determining the breach of an offence (see below). In such a case, schedule 4,
paragraph 1 gives that the convicted individual has the right of appeal if the
TEO is quashed and he or she “could not have been convicted had the
quashing occurred before the proceedings for the offence were brought”; the
same requirements applies to an appeal in relation to a permitted obligation
notice. According to paragraph 4(1), the court must allow the appeal and
quash the conviction. In furtherance, schedule 4 contains provisions
indicating the competent court and the formal conditions applicable to the
appeal proceedings (such as the time to lodge an appeal depending on the
competent court).
(c) Offences
Similar to the offences relating to the seizure and retention of passports,
CTS Act 2015, sections 10(1) and 10(3) provides that if an individual
returns to the UK, without reasonable excuse, in contravention of a TEO, he
or she is guilty of an offence. That is also the case if an individual fails to
comply with the conditions in a permit to return or a permitted obligation.
The consequence of committing such an offence is, according to section
10(5), a penalty of maximum 5 years imprisonment upon conviction on
indictment, or a maximum of 12 months or a fine, or both, upon a summary
conviction.
96 CTS Act 2015, s. 11. A permitted obligation might also be subjected to variation, s.
11(6).
97 See the definition of ’TEO proceedings’ in CTS Act 2015, schedule 3, para. 1.
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(d) Human Rights implications identified during the passage of
the Bill
As noted earlier, the regime of TEOs is highly controversial, in particular
because of the potential violations of human rights that might arise by the
use of the powers. The JCHR noted that the use of TEOs may be
incompatible with the ECHR, as well as the right to be protected against an
arbitrary deprivation of the right to enter one’s country under article 12.4
ICCPR.98 The Committee summarized its opinion as follows:
The provisions in the Bill still have the effect of invalidating a UK
national’s passport while they are abroad, and of preventing their
return unless they comply with conditions imposed by the Secretary of
State, without any judicial process apart from ex post facto judicial
review which, by definition, will have to be pursued from abroad. In
our view, this gives rise to a very real risk that the human rights of UK
nationals will be violated as a result of the imposition of Temporary
Exclusion Orders. We are opposed in principle to any exclusion of UK
nationals from the UK, even on a temporary basis.99
In contrast to this severe critique, the Government reasons that the ECHR is
not even “directly engaged” since the person subjected to a TEO will be
outside the UK when the notification is given. Hence, as concerns articles 2,
3, 5 and 6 of the Convention there is no authority for extra-territorial
application and there is thus no risk of breaching UK’s obligation under that
instrument.100 On the contrary, the Government acknowledges the risk of
interferences with the right to private and family life in article 8, albeit the
Government considers that such an intrusion is “capable of being necessary
and proportionate” since the excluded person has the ability to stop the
intrusion him or herself by complying with the specified conditions.101
In response to the JCHR’s concern about a potential breach of the United
Kingdom’s obligation under ICCPR, article 12.4, James Brokenshire
emphasises that the provision is concerned with ‘arbitrary’ deprivation of a
person’s right to enter his or her home country. A decision to impose a TEO
is not arbitrarily made – because it is safeguarded by the requisition to meet
conditions A-E, as described above – and, more importantly, TEOs do not
result in the deprivation of the ability to return to the UK (but rather subject
that ability to an obligation to comply with specific conditions, author’s
note).102 All of these considerations and further remarks will be elaborated
upon in more detail in chapters 3.2.3 and 4. First, however, the criteria for
determining whether a provision is ‘criminal’ in nature will be detected.
98 JCHR, Legislative Scrutiny, para. 3.4.
99 Ibid., para. 3.9. Similar critiques have been presented by Goodwin-Gill, para. 30, and
Shami Chakrabarti, Director of Liberty, when giving evidence before the Home Affairs
Committee, Oral evidence: Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill.
100 ECHR Memorandum, paras. 10-11.
101 Ibid., para. 15.
102 Brokenshire, Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill: Legislative Scrutiny, p. 4.
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3 Penal characteristics
In this chapter I will introduce the ECtHR’s approach to the notion of
’criminal charge’ within the meaning of ECHR. No exhaustive account of
the Court’s case law concerned with the issue will be provided, nor of the
academic discussions on the topic. Rather, I will introduce the relevant cases
as needed for enabling the assessment of character of the temporary
restrictions on travel.
3.1 The meaning of ‘criminal’ in the European
Convention on Human Rights
The discussion about whether a sanction connected to a specific conduct is
of a ‘criminal’ character within the meaning of the European Convention of
Human Rights is not at all a novel topic. On the contrary, the meaning of the
word ‘criminal’ in the terminology of inter alia ECHR, article 6 has been
interpreted and elaborated upon in the case law of the ECtHR for nearly half
a decade; the classification of the offences and related sanctions in domestic
laws has varied from being disciplinary, to administrative, to civil.
Nonetheless, the notion of a ‘criminal charge’ must be interpreted
autonomously within the scope of application of ECHR. Consequently, for
the purpose of the Convention, the ECtHR has determined that the character
of an offence and the attached sanction might be deemed as ‘criminal’,
regardless of how the provisions are classified in domestic law.103
The criminal, or as it may be non-criminal, character of an offence and
sanction, in turn, depends on three criteria established by the Court in the
case of Engel and Others v the Netherlands, in which the Court found it
critical to examine whether the domestic proceeding concerned ‘any
criminal charge’ for the scope of article 6 “for although disciplinary
according to Netherlands law, they had the aim of repressing through
penalties offences alleged against the applicants, an objective analogous to
the general goal of the criminal law”.104 Thus, the Court reasoned that it is
first necessary to ascertain to what field of law the offence belong in the
national legal system, i.e. to criminal law, administrative law or whatever it
may be; the relative value of which, however, is only formal and subject to
comparison with the equivalent provision in the legal order of other
Contracting States. Second, and more importantly, the nature of the offence
is a relevant factor; and third, it is required to consider the degree of severity
103 See Engel and Others v the Netherlands, Appl. Nos. 5100/71; 5101/71; 5102/71;
5354/72; 5370/72, 8 June 1976 , with further references,  where the Court stated “[i]f the
Contracting States were able at their discretion to classify an offence  as disciplinary
instead of criminal, or to prosecute the author of a ‘mixed’ offence on the disciplinary
rather than on the criminal plane, the operation of the fundamental clauses of Articles 6 and
7 […] would be subordinated to their sovereign will. A latitude extending thus far might
lead to results incompatible with the purpose and object of the Convention”, para. 81.
104 Ibid., para. 79.
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of the penalty at stake.105 In the case, the decisive factor turning the national
proceedings into a ‘criminal charge’, even though they belonged to the
system of military disciplinary law in the Netherlands, was the serious
punishment – deprivation of liberty – that could have been imposed; that the
final outcome did not in fact result in the possible punishment was of minor
significance.106
The three criteria have been reiterated and elaborated further by the ECtHR
in succeeding cases. Benham v the United Kingdom107 and Janosevic v
Sweden108 concerned the obligation to pay community charge and taxes
respectively; both were of civil character in the domestic legal order. In the
former the nature of the offence was of a general character, applicable to all
citizens, albeit the Court noted that it contained “some punitive elements”.
In addition, the applicant, sentenced to thirty days imprisonment, was liable
for a maximum penalty of three months’ deprivation of liberty; the factors
altogether made the Court conclude that the applicant had been ‘charged
with a criminal offence’ within the meaning of ECHR, article 6.109 In the
latter case, the Court deliberated on the nature of the Swedish system of tax
surcharges in contrast to the criminal offence of tax fraud. In realizing that
the main purpose of tax surcharges is to “exert pressure on taxpayers to
comply with their legal obligations and to punish breaches of those
obligations”, as opposed to be intended as a pecuniary compensation, the
Court considered that tax surcharges are both deterrent and punitive.110
Thus, the purpose of the penalty and the general character of tax surcharges
sufficed to classify the sanction as ‘criminal’; however, that character was
“further evidenced by the severity of the potential and actual penalty”.111
Moreover, in Steel and Others v the United Kingdom112 concerning the
application of ECHR, article 5, the Court made reference to the Benham-
case while taking into account the nature of the national proceedings and the
potential penalty, and concluded that the offence – breach of the peace –
was ‘criminal’ within the meaning of the Convention.113
It stems from the approach taken in Janosevic v Sweden that the criteria are
alternative in nature, although a cumulative application might be adopted
where the separate examination of each criterion is insufficient to determine
the criminal character of a sanction.114 This methodology was subsequently
confirmed in the case of Sergey Zolotukhin v Russia115 where the Court
reasoned that the nature of the offence (“minor disorderly acts”) under the
105 Engel and Others, para. 82.
106 Ibid., para. 85.
107 Benham v the United Kingdom, Appl. No. 19380/92, 10 June 1996.
108 Janosevic v Sweden, Appl. No. 34619/97, 23 July 2002.
109 Benham, para. 56
110 Janosevic, para. 68.
111 Ibid., paras. 68-69.
112 Steel and Others v the United Kingdom, Appl. No. 67/1997/851/1058, 23 September
1998.
113 Ibid., para. 49.
114 Janosevic, para. 67.
115 Sergey Zolotukhin v Russia, Appl. No. 14939/03, 10 February 2009.
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national administrative law taken together with the severity of the penalty
(maximum of fifteen days imprisonment) pushed the national proceedings
into the ‘criminal’ sphere.116
The EU Court of Justice has equally addressed the issue in relation to the ne
bis in idem-principle due to the use of double sanctions for the same
‘offence’. In the Bonda-judgment117, an administrative regulation in
pursuance of a common agricultural policy within the European Union was
tested against the three Engel-criteria. Primarily, the EU Court of Justice
noted that the regulation under scrutiny was not criminal but administrative
according to EU law (which it, in the circumstances of the case, equated
with domestic law); secondly, in reflecting on whether the purpose of the
administrative sanction was punitive, it found that the essential aim was not
to punish but to secure the management of funds within the Union.118
Lastly, the EU Court of Justice took into account that the result of the
sanctions was to deprive the concerned farmer of the prospect of obtaining
aid in the three years to come, which it deemed not to be equivalent to
criminal penalties; hence, the administrative sanctions under scrutiny did
not conflict with the criminal proceedings instituted against the applicant in
a way that the ne bis in idem-principle would obstruct the latter.119
It follows from the variety of the substantive matter in these cases that
regardless of the national classification of an offence and the attached
sanction, a provision might nonetheless be judged as ‘criminal’ in a
European context.120 It is equally clear that the criteria used to examine
whether the proceedings under consideration are in fact ‘criminal’ as
established in the Engel-case, are applicable whenever the notion of
‘criminal’ is relevant, i.e. regardless of which article is allegedly breached.
Furthermore, due to the EU Court of Justice’s inclination to adhere to the
jurisprudence by the ECtHR and the latter’s interpretation and application of
the ECHR, the criteria may be applied also when the inquiry concerns EU
regulations.
Despite the frequent resort to the criteria by the courts, their application has
not passed undisputed; the critiques concern mainly the multitude of criteria
and sub-criteria as how they relate one to another is not clear.121
Nevertheless, both the ECtHR and the EU Court of Justice have
continuously adopted them, before and after the critique; thus, the criteria
will be used in the following in determining the de facto character of the
temporary restrictions on travel measures.
116 Sergey Zolotukhin, paras, 56-57. This case confirms the application of the three Engel-
criteria, not only as far as ECHR, article 6 is concerned, but also in relation to the ne bis in
idem-principle in article 4 Protocol No. 7.
117 C-489/10 Bonda, Judgment of 5 June 2012.
118 Ibid., paras. 38-40.
119 Ibid., paras. 2, 43-45.
120 For a more detailed account of the variety of offences examined by the ECtHR in
relation to the notion of ’criminal’, see Emmerson and Ashworth, pp. 152-171.
121 Trechsel, Stefan, Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings, Oxford University Press, New
York, 2005, p. 30.
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3.2 A penal character of the temporary
restrictions on travel?
Before examining the de facto character of the temporary restrictions on
travel in the CTS Act 2015, the first issue that has to be considered is which
the relevant action capable of amounting to a ‘criminal charge’ in the
Convention’s terminology is. In the Engel-case, the relevant ‘charge’ was a
decision to impose disciplinary actions against the applicants taken by the
commanding officer.122 In Zolotukhin the relevant ‘charge’ was the
proceedings in relation to ‘minor disorderly acts’123, and in Janosevic it was
the procedure of imposing tax surcharges.124
In relation to passport seizure and retention, it is the decision taken by a
constable, when there are reasonable grounds to suspect that an individual is
at a port with the intention to leave the UK for the purpose of going abroad
to be involved in terrorism-related activity, that triggers the imposition of
the power.125 However, for the initial seizure of the passport to turn into
retention – which is what might last for fourteen to thirty days – a senior
police officer must authorize it.126 As to TEOs, it is the Secretary of State
who decides to impose such an order when he or she reasonably suspects
that the individual is or has been involved in terrorism-related activity
abroad, provided that certain conditions are fulfilled.127 Prior to imposing a
TEO, a court must decide, in regular circumstances, whether the decision
taken by the Secretary of State is obviously flawed.128
Thus, in applying the Engel-method, the decisions “that settle […] once and
for all what [is] at stake”129 are the senior police officer’s authorization to
retain a seized passport and the court’s permission to the Secretary of State
to impose a TEO (albeit in urgent cases the decision of the Secretary of
State the relevant one). These are the decisions that I presume have a penal
character, which is what will be tested henceforth.
3.2.1 Label in national law
In order to apply the Engel-criteria to the temporary restrictions on travel
powers, it is first vital to determine what conduct is the relevant one. In this
case, there are offences expressly proscribed in schedule 1, paragraph 15,
and section 10 respectively, which creates a delusion for approximating the
relevant ‘offences’. The conduct and the label will nonetheless be elaborated
upon here in connection to a brief touch upon a wider debate of a more
122 Engel and Others, para. 83.
123 Sergey Zolotukhin, para. 54.
124 Janosevic, para. 65.
125 CTS Act 2015, schedule 1, para. 2(1). See also above, chapter 2.4.1.
126 Ibid., schedule 1, paras. 4-5.
127 Ibid., s. 2. See also above, chapter 2.4.2.
128 Ibid., s. 3.
129 Engel and Others, para. 83.
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general kind, namely the matter of ‘overcriminalization’ and
‘undercriminalization’.
Since the seizure of a passport is executed against a person being at a port
presumably with the intention to leave for terrorist-purposes, the relevant
conduct is to attempt to leave the UK for the specific purpose of
participating in terrorism-related activity abroad. Similarly, a TEO might be
imposed when a person, who is outside the country, presumably is (or has
been) involved in terrorism-related activity; hence, the relevant conduct is to
somehow be involved in something as remote as facilitating, encouraging or
giving support to the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of
terrorism, while being abroad. This is a vibrant example of the extreme
width of the UK definition of terrorism, especially when applied in
conjunction with the notion of terrorism-related activity, which triggers the
powers to use temporary restrictions on travel (this will be elaborated upon
further in next subchapter).
To criminalize this kind of conduct appears as going too far, in the sense
that the criminal law perhaps should not encompass such a conduct that
anyone could unintentionally exercise. Duff calls this phenomena the
“perversion” of criminal law; “the criminal law is perverted when it is used
for purposes that are not proper to it”.130 Taking into account this argument,
that legislators sometimes inappropriately criminalizes conduct that should
not be addressed as a ‘criminal offence’ (the issue of ‘overcriminalization’),
points in the direction that the conduct that I have identified as the relevant
action in relation to passport seizures and TEOs should not be approached
as a ‘criminal offence’. On the other hand, there is the reversed problem of
‘undercriminalization’, meaning that states avoid labelling offences as
criminal in order to circumvent the attached obligation to guarantee
procedural safeguards to such a process.131 To avoid labelling the conduct a
crime, does not take away the fact that the sanctions are of de facto penal
character, i.e. punishments for acting in a certain manner. Thus, when the
consequence of a specific action is a penalty, whether imposed through
administrative or judicial procedures, the argument of evading
‘overcriminalization’ is rendered null.
Although it might reasonably be expected that a person refrains from doing
something that might cause a ‘reasonable suspicion’ that there is a criminal
intent underlying an action – such as travelling abroad with an intention to
engage in terrorism activities – there is nothing suggesting that the
‘reasonable suspicion’ evidences that a crime indeed will take place.132
Hence, the reasons for avoiding criminalizing actions that might as well be
entirely legitimate – such as possessing articles or travelling outside the
130 Duff, R A, “Perversions and Subversions of Criminal Law” in Duff et. al. (eds.), The
Boundaries of the Criminal Law, Oxford University Press, New York, 2010, pp. 88-112, p.
92.
131 See Ashworth and Zedner in Duff et al. (eds.), p. 82.
132 For a parallel discussion concerning the offence of ‘possession for terrorist purposes’ in
the Terrorism Act 2000, section 57(1), see Duff in Duff et al. (eds.), p. 93.
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country for the purpose of vacation or businesses. Yet, the UK has
criminalized several so-called ‘low-level terrorist offences’133, giving
reasons for approaching travelling for terrorist purposes in the same manner.
This in turn would allow for the procedural guarantees, as per ECHR, article
6, to apply for the protection of the affected individual. Another, perhaps
more reasonable approach, would be to maintain the imposition of travel
restrictions as a non-criminal counter-terrorism measure, but nonetheless
circumscribe it with due-process safeguards similar to those applicable in
criminal law-proceedings. Ashworth and Zedner have branded this approach
as ‘civil preventive hybrid orders’ characterized by the fact that the orders
“may be made without conviction, or at sentence after conviction. Breach of
the order is a criminal offence with a maximum sentence of five years’
imprisonment”.134 Considering the offences related to the passport seizure
and the imposition of a TEO as presented previously, this ‘hybrid’ between
civil and criminal law seem to be what we are dealing with. Accordingly,
should the individual refuse to hand over his or her travel documents,
disobey the restrictions on return or fail to comply with a permitted
obligation, the potential consequence to be convicted for an offence might
be sufficient to motivate the imposition of procedural safeguards similar to
those applicable to criminal offences.135
Another aspect is that the construed ‘offences’ appear as minor in relation to
other criminal offences; to travel abroad with a (suspected) intention to
encourage or offer assistance to someone while in another country struggles
to be compared to traditional criminal acts (murder, assault, fraud or arson
for instance). Nonetheless, a ‘minor’ offence might be criminal just as much
as other acts “as there is nothing in the Convention to suggest that the
criminal nature of an offence, within the meaning of the Engel criteria,
necessarily requires a certain degree of seriousness.”136 This view was first
expressed in Öztürk v Germany137 in which the Court stated that albeit the
conduct – causing a traffic accident – was “admittedly a minor offence” it
“does not take it outside the ambit of Article 6”.138
As concerns the seizure of passports or the imposition of a TEO, the
procedure involved is purely administrative in the sense that they are
“controlled and implemented by the government (executive)” as opposed to
133 Foley, p. 201.
134 Ashworth and Zedner in Duff et al. (eds.), p. 63.
135 Such an approach has been adopted by British courts, for instance in W v Acton Youth
Court [2005] EWHC 954 (Admin), when dealing with civil preventative orders. In the case,
Pitchers J reasoned that imposing the civil orders relevant in the case was a “powerful
weapon […] Thus, for someone who obeys the order, there may be a significant restriction
on his liberty. For someone who breaches the order, the consequence can be severe: for an
adult, imprisonment up to […] five years in the Crown Court. […] The actual and potential
consequences for the subject of an ASBO [anti-social behaviour order, authors note] make
it, in my judgment, particularly important that procedural fairness is scrupulously
observed”, paras. 29-30. See also Ashworth and Zedner in Duff et al. (eds.), p. 84.
136 Sergey Zolotukhin, para. 55.
137 Öztürk v Germany, Appl. No. 8544/79, 21 February 1984.
138 Ibid., para. 53.
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a judicial authority.139 It is the executive senior police officer and the
Secretary of State respectively that take the relevant decisions. Even with
the involvement of a court in relation to the imposition of a TEO, the
procedure is rather administrative than judicial as the court does not try the
circumstances as such but only determines whether the decisions
(concerning conditions A-D as presented above in chapter 2.4.2) by the
Secretary of State are obviously flawed140; hence, the limited supervisory
function of the court.
Regardless of whether the procedures of seizing and retaining passports and
imposing a TEO are classified as administrative or a ‘civil preventative
hybrid’, it appears safe to conclude that the label in national law is not
criminal. This renders it inevitable to continue applying the Engel-criteria
for the purpose of determining the de facto character of the measures.
3.2.2 Nature of the offence
The purpose of the second Engel-criteria is to determine the nature of the
offence, or “the conduct imputed to the applicant” as the Court phrased it in
the Janosevic-case.141 In that respect, the ECtHR noted in Öztürk v Germany
that the rule, which the applicant had contravened, was directed “towards all
citizens […]; it prescribe[d] conduct of certain kind and [made] the resultant
requirement subject to a sanction that [was] punitive”. In addition, the
offence pertained to criminal law in the majority of the Contracting
States.142 All these consideration rendered the Court’s conclusion that the
offence, though regulatory in the domestic legal order, was ‘criminal’ within
the meaning of ECHR, article 6.143
In accordance with the reasoning in Öztürk three main features to which the
Court pays attention in assessing the nature of the offence, can be identified:
- How the conduct is classified in other Contracting States;
- Towards whom the rule is directed; and
- The purpose of the related sanction.144
Thus, the crucial points in determining the nature of the offences, to which
the sanctions of passport retention and TEOs respectively are imposed, stem
from these three features.
139 Cf. Foley, p. 176, note 1.
140 CTS Act 2015, s. 3(2). That the powers have an administrative character is confirmed by
the JCHR in its Legislative Scrutiny, para. 2.10.
141 Janosevic, para. 68.
142 Öztürk, para. 53.
143 Ibid., para. 54.
144 The same subcriteria were considered in inter alia Benham, para 56; Janosevic, para. 68;
and Sergey Zolotukhin, para. 55.
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(a) Classification of the conduct in other Contracting States
To approximate how other European States parties to ECHR regulate the
conduct, as identified above, is a somewhat troublesome exercise, mainly
because UK has exceptionally extensive counter-terrorism legislation and to
investigate the existence, reach and content of equivalent provision in other
domestic legal orders would require far more than what would be feasible
within the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, some remarks will be made.
The recent adoption by the UNSC of resolution 2178 articulates the global
need for addressing the issue of foreign fighters and combating the
increased threat of terrorism that they portray. Among the measures called
for by the UNSC are the inhibition of “foreign terrorism fighter travel” and
the prevention of the movement of terrorists.145 In addition, all Member
States are required to establish serious criminal offences sufficient to
prosecute and punish inter alia “their nationals who travel or attempt to
travel to a State […] for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or
preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts, or the providing or
receiving of terrorist training”.146 Concerning the imposition of TEOs and
the measure’s compatibility with the UN resolution, Guy S. Goodwin-Gill
has emphasized that the latter’s focus is on travel from the country of
nationality or residences; hence, “what this resolution definitely does not do
is to authorise or to require that States deny their citizens their right to
return”.147
On the regional level, in turn, the Council of the European Union has,
following the adoption of UNSC res. 2178, issued a discussion paper
emphasising the need of amending the EU Framework Decision on
combating terrorism in order to keep up with the international and national
developments in the area. Without such an update, the Framework Decision
would “no longer be the yardstick for minimum required criminalization of
terrorism across the EU”.148 The discussion paper also acknowledges that a
number of EU Member States already has updated their national legislation
to address the challenge of foreign fighters.149 As to the Convention on the
Prevention of Terrorism, it obliges the Contracting States to establish certain
actions as criminal offences in their domestic legislation, namely to provoke
others to commit terrorist offences, to recruit others for terrorism and to
train others for terrorism.150 In addition, article 9 establishes the obligation
145 See the preamble, p. 2 and para. 2.
146 Ibid., para. 6(a).
147 Goodwin-Gill, para. 25.
148 Council of the European Union, Foreign fighters and returnees: discussion paper,
15715/2/14 REV 2, 2 December 2014, p. 2.
149 Ibid., pp. 2-3.
150 Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, No. 196, 16 May 2005,
art. 5 defines provocation as the “distribution, or otherwise making available, of a message
to the public, with the intent to incite the commission of terrorist offences”; art. 6 provides
that recruitment “means to solicit another person to commit or participate in the
commission of a terrorist offence, or to join an association or group, for the purpose of
contributing to the commission of one or more terrorist offences”; and art. 7 indicates that
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to ensure that the national criminal legislation proscribes certain ancillary
offences; thus, to participate as an accomplice, to organize or direct others
and to contribute to an offence as set forth in articles 5-7 should be
criminalized, as should the attempt to recruit or train others. The Convention
does not address the challenge posed by foreign fighters explicitly, which
might partly be due to the convention’s age – it was adopted in 2005, i.e. ten
years ago, when the threat posed by those terrorists was perhaps not as
imminent as it has become today. However, this does of course not mean
that the provisions do not apply to the ones choosing to travel for the
purpose of engaging in terrorist activities abroad.
Consequently, against these international and regional instruments, it seems
fair to conclude that there is a duty to take particular action in respect of
foreign fighters and that the main provisions should be encompassed by the
criminal law regime in the States. Whether this obligation has been
complied with in the Contracting States to the ECHR is another question to
be dealt with in future (most interesting) studies. Notwithstanding the
general obligation to establish criminal offences allowing the prosecution
and punishment of people who choose to travel (as encouraged in the UN
resolution), other, less restrictive measures might be an adequate resort prior
to reaching the threshold for applying the criminal law. In fact, in the fight
against terrorism such preventative measures are arguably the most vital
resource in order to obstruct fatal terrorist attacks.
(b) Towards whom are the powers directed?
To begin with, the rule on seizing and retaining a passport as expressed in
schedule 2, paragraph 2(1) of the CTS Act 2015 is directed towards “a
person at a port in Great Britain”. This could be anyone of ‘all citizens’ that
the constable has reasonable ground for suspecting that he or she will leave
the UK with intention to engage in terrorism-related activity while abroad.
Hence, the rule is of general application to all citizens, as opposed to a
specific group of persons with a special status.151 On the contrary, the
application of the rule governing the imposition of TEOs, has a slightly
narrower target, namely individuals with the right of abode in the United
Kingdom.152 Nonetheless, in my opinion, the specific group with the special
status of having ‘a right of abode’ in the UK is wide enough to deem the
‘offence’ to be criminal in nature; the ‘right of abode’- status is not
sufficiently specific as to allow the identification of the individuals
belonging to the group. The requirement for a TEO to be imposed that the
individual concerned has a ‘right of abode’ in the country, indicates
moreover that there is no distinction between nationalities; hence, a TEO
training means giving instructions in several techniques “for the purpose of carrying out or
contributing to the commission of a terrorist offence”.
151 See the reasoning in Öztürk, para. 53; Benham, para 56; Janosevic, para. 68; and Sergey
Zolotukhin, para. 55.
152 Subject to condition D as expressed in CTS Act 2015, s. 2(6).
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might be directed to a British or foreign citizen as long as he or she has the
right to live in the UK.153
Both the former Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Lord
Carlile, and his successor David Anderson, have noted that the width of the
definition of terrorism “grant unusually wide discretions” to the executive
authorities, discretions that become “wider still” by the application of more
recently introduced terms as ‘terrorism-related activity’.154 Thus, of
relevance for determining to whom the temporary restriction on travel
measures are intended to apply is to recognize the extent of the UK
definition of terrorism.
Having examined the definition as per Terrorism Act 2000, as amended,
Lord Carlile concluded that the definition of terrorism is of practical
importance since it, in itself, triggers several powers and describes
offences.155 Nonetheless, the definition has met with several critiques, the
central one being that it is too wide to meet the requirement of clarity in
criminal law. Lord Carlile himself comes to the same conclusion as
concerns the width of the definition: “many examples can and have been
cited of individuals who might fall inappropriately within the current
definition, if considered solely in strict legal terms”156; hence, the protection
against inappropriate application relies on the authorities’ discretion.157
Likewise, David Anderson has raised similar concerns, in particular, as
section 1(4)(d) of the CTS Act 2015 clarifies the target as inter alia any
government of whatever country in the world, the international reach of the
definition is “remarkably broad”.158 The extent of the protection in the UK
anti-terror legislation was also a key issue in the case of R v F.159 The
defendant – convicted in lower courts for possession of documents “likely to
be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism”160 –
claimed that the possession did not fell afoul of the terrorism legislation as it
targeted an oppressive government.161 Accordingly, the issue was whether
the ‘government’-requisite was limited to apply to actions taken against
“democratic or representative” governments.162 Replying to the defendant’s
assertion, Sir Igor Judge P stated:
153 In the Explanatory Notes the Government explains that according to section 2(1) of the
Immigration Act 1971, British citizens and certain Commonwealth citizens have a right of
abode in the UK, para. 78.
154 Anderson Q.C., David, The Terrorism Acts in 2012, Report of the Independent Reviewer
on the Operation of the Terrorism Act 2000 and part 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006, July
2013, paras. 4.3 (c-d).
155 The Definition of Terrorism, A report by Lord Carlile of Berriew Q.C., Independent
Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Cm 7052, March 2007, para. 12, p. 6.
156 Ibid., paras. 26 and 34.
157 Ibid., paras. 60 and 64. It must be noted that Lord Carlile approves of such a solution.
158 Anderson, 2013, para. 4.3(b).
159 R v F [2007] EWCA Crim 243.
160 Ibid., para. 4.
161 Ibid., para. 6.
162 Ibid., para. 19.
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No authority is needed for the proposition that democratic government
based on the consent of the people, and subject to the rule of law, is
the lodestar for modern civilised communities. […] That however is
far from saying that the only governments which can be included in
legislation which provides for protection against terrorism are to be
found in countries which adhere to the [European Convention on
Human Rights] or are governed in accordance with its principles.163
In conclusion, there was nothing in the legislation supporting a distinction
between different governments. Accordingly, the judges expressed that the
breadth of the definition of terrorism as a whole was “striking” and does not
exempt terrorism in a ‘just cause’; “terrorism is terrorism, whatever the
motives of the perpetrators”.164 For the temporary restrictions on travel
measures this means that the activity relating to terrorism which the
‘perpetrator’ commits, could take place anywhere in the world against any
government.
On the other hand, in the case of SSDH v DD165 where the primary concern
was whether to except the applicant from refugee status due to his
participation in the resistance against national and NATO forces in his home
country, the British court adopted a narrower interpretation. Lord Justice
Pill noted:
Serious violence against members of the government forces would
normally be designed to influence the government and be used for the
purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause, within
the meaning of those words in section 1 of the 2000 Act. On the other
hand, it is difficult to hold that every act of violence in a civil war, the
aim of which will usually be to overthrow a legitimate government, is
an act of terrorism within the 2000 Act. […] However, on the
authority of KJ [KJ (Sri Lanka) v Secretary of State for the Home
Department166, author’s note], military actions against the Afghan
Government, even if conducted by proscribed organisations, are not
necessarily terrorist in nature. If that is so, they are not, as terrorist
acts, contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter.167
Thus, the UK court appears to accept that the definition of terrorism does
not encompass attacks on all governments in the world; although, which
government should be singled out is not clear.
In the case of R v Gul (Mohammed)168, the UK Supreme Court was
concerned with the national definition of terrorism in comparison to the
standards of international instruments; more precisely, “whether
international law requiring domestic definition of terrorism to be read
163 R v F, para. 23.
164 Ibid., paras. 26-27.
165 SSDH v DD [2010] EWCA Civ 1407.
166 KJ (Sri Lanka) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA Civ 292.
167 SSDH v DD, paras. 55-56.
168 R v Gul (Mohammed) [2013] UKSC 64, [2013] 3 WLR 1207.
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down”.169 The defendant was convicted in lower courts for uploading onto
internet videos showing attacks on coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.
In his appeal, the defendant claimed that the definition in the Terrorism Act
2000, as amended, should be understood as not criminalizing actions taken
abroad, since it was not a criminal offence under international law.170 The
first issue before the Supreme Court was to determine whether the scope of
the UK definition includes military attacks by a non-state armed group
against the armed forces of a state or inter-governmental organization in the
context of a non-international armed conflict.171 The Supreme Court noted
that
28. As a matter of ordinary language, the definition [of terrorism in
the Terrorism Act 2000, as amended (author’s note)]  would seem to
cover any violence or damage to property if it is carried out with a
view to influencing a government or IGO in order to advance a very
wide range of causes. Thus, it would appear to extend to military or
quasi-military activity aimed at bringing down foreign government,
even where that activity is approved (officially or unofficially) by the
UK Government. […] It is neither necessary nor appropriate to
express any concluded view whether the definition of terrorism goes
that far, although it is not entirely easy to see why, at least in the
absence of international law considerations, it does not. For present
purposes it is enough to proceed on the basis that, subject to these
considerations, the definition of terrorism in section I in the 2000 Act
is, at least if read in its natural sense, very far reaching indeed. […].172
The Supreme Court concluded that ”unless the appellant’s argument based
on international law dictates a different conclusion, the definition of
terrorism […] is indeed as wide as it appears to be”.173 Subsequently, the
Supreme Court examined whether international law requires a narrower
interpretation of the definition; in determining that there is no rule obliging
a state not to go further in legislations than the international treaty, it found
that there was no reason to read down the meaning of section 1 of the
Terrorism Act 2000.174
The Supreme Court’s finding in R v Gul (Mohammed) means that to engage
in insurgencies where the people of a State demonstrates its dissatisfaction
with the governing authorities – as it has been during the Arabic Spring
revolutions, for instance – could be considered as involvement in terrorism-
related activity. Consequently, citizens of a State in change who decides to
return home to contribute to the revolution could be prevented from leaving
the UK or from returning back home when time comes.
169 R v Gul (Mohammed) 1207.
170 Ibid.
171 Ibid., 1210.
172 Ibid., 1220.
173 Ibid.
174 Of importance was also the fact that in the case the defendant was a UK national
convicted for having committed an offence within the country. Ibid., 1223-1224.
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However, before ending its judgment, the Supreme Court expressed as
obiter dictum its concern about the width of the definition of terrorism. As
the current legislation allows for far reaching powers incumbent upon
prosecutors as well as police and immigration officers in ports and at
borders depending on the discretion on their part, the Supreme Court
welcomed any “legislative narrowing” of the definition. The court stated
further:
While the need to bestow wide, even intrusive, powers on the police
and other officers in connection with terrorism is understandable, the
fact that the powers are so unrestricted and the definition of
“terrorism” is so wide means that such powers are probably of even
more concern than the prosecutorial powers to which the Acts give
rise.175
Another reason for the extraordinary width of the UK definition is the
‘influence’ threshold in section 1(1)(b), which sets a notably low bar in
comparison with inter alia the ‘unduly compel’-requirement in the
European Council Framework Decision on combating terrorism.176 The
Independent Reviewer David Anderson notes that the low bar not only
render the UK definition unusually wide, but that it also is “unduly
restrictive of political expression”.177 Activities with a political agenda, such
as demonstrations, marches and speeches, typically have the legitimate goal
of influencing the politicians; hence, the danger of classifying such activities
as acts of terrorism. Moreover, the imposition of the remarkably broad
powers to stop an individual at the ports and boarders of the United
Kingdom for investigating whether that person appears to be “concerned in
the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism [author’s
emphasis]”178 was questioned in the case of David Miranda v SSHD and
MPC.179 The case has been elaborated upon by the Independent Reviewer of
Terrorism Legislation, David Anderson, who ascertains “what the Miranda
judgment reveals is that the publication (or threatened publication) of words
may equally constitute terrorist action [bold omitted]”.180 Anderson adds the
“vast penumbra of ancillary offences” to the already wide definition of
terrorism, and highlights the possibility of resulting in a ‘chilling effect’. He
notices that the “publication of facts and opinions may itself be an act of
terrorism, on no other basis than that it is politically motivated and is
considered to endanger life or create a serious risk to public health or
safety”.181 The consequences of such an application could end up far beyond
175 R v Gul (Mohammed) 1225.
176 EU Council Framework Decision on combating terrorism, 2002/475/JHA, 13 June 2002,
art. 1(1); the criteria was reiterated in the preamble of the Council of Europe Convention on
the Prevention of Terrorism, No. 196, 16 May 2005. For additional comparisons, see also:
Anderson Q.C., David, The Terrorism Acts in 2013, Report of the Independent Reviewer on
the Operation of the Terrorism Act 2000 and part 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006, July 2014,
para. 10.36.
177 Anderson, 2014, para. 10.38.
178 Cf. The wording of Terrorism Act 2000, s. 40(1)(b) above.
179 David Miranda v SSHD and MPC [2014] EWHC 255 (Admin).
180 Anderson, 2014, para. 4.16.
181 Ibid., para. 4.20 and footnote 88.
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the protection of national security, although Anderson admitted that the risk
of such an extreme application was hardly a real one.182
Against this background, it appears as the suspicion of someone having an
intention to engage in ‘terrorism-related activity’ could potentially be based
on a myriad number of circumstances. Taking all of this into account, there
seem to be little, if any, distinction as to whom the temporary restriction on
travel powers target; in theory, anyone of all citizens could be suspected for
intending to be, or having been, involved in terrorism-related activity.
What is more, both the power to seize and retain passports as well as the
authority to impose a TEO, may be exercised in relation to children; neither
the Act itself nor the bill documents give account of any specific procedure
or regulation in connection to the treatment of minors suspected for (leaving
the country for) involvement in terrorism-related activity. Regarding
passport seizure, the Code of Practice emphasizes the need to take special
care when exercising the power “where it is evident that the person is a
child”; a child is “anyone who appears to be under the age of 18 in the
absence of clear evidence that he or she is older”.183 The duty to take special
care means that the constable is entitled to seize and/or retain the passport
from a child, regardless of whether he or she is travelling alone or in
company with an adult, but that when doing so the constable is obliged to
“have due regard to the vulnerability of the child”.184
To summarize, the extraordinary width of the UK definition of terrorism in
conjunction with the ‘terrorism-related activity’ requisite renders, in the
words of David Anderson, the potential suspect “at many removes, here,
from the man with the bomb”.185 By the very definition, it suffices that a
person intend to give support to or encourage the preparation or instigation
to an act defined as terrorism. The group towards whom the two powers are
targeted is neither limited in respect of nationality, nor with regard to the
age of the individual. Consequently, the rule is directed towards ‘all
citizens’ – except for the insignificant limitation of requiring a right to
abode for imposing TEOs – in similar manner as has been the case when the
ECtHR has considered offences to be ‘criminal’ in nature.
(c) The purpose of the sanctions
In finding that the offences were criminal in nature the ECtHR has put
emphasis on the punitive and deterrent character of the sanctions, as these
182 Anderson, 2014, para. 4.22. For an example of the extreme version, see paras 4.19-4.21.
183 Code of Practice, para. 27.
184 Ibid., para. 30. For natural reasons, no such instruction is given in relation to the
imposition of TEOs as a TEO may be imposed by the Secretary of State when a permission
of a court has been obtained, or in urgent cases without prior permission. It is also the
Secretary of State who gives instructions on the exercise of passport seizures, by virtue of
schedule 1, para. 18; hence, the redundancy of issuing a Code of Practice in relation to
TEOs.
185 Anderson, 2013, note 72.
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are “recognized as characteristic features of criminal penalties”.186 To
punish and to prevent have traditionally been considered as characteristics
of criminal penalties; the aim of punishing is primarily to achieve retribution
for the ‘bad’ that has been committed, while the preventative function is to
encourage the perpetrator and the general public to refrain from committing
crimes.187 On the other hand, in the Bonda case before the EU Court of
Justice, the purpose of the agricultural sanction was “essentially to protect
the management of European Union funds”, which led to the conclusion that
the offence was not criminal within the meaning of the ECHR.188 Thus, to
apply the same line of reasoning to the temporary restrictions on travel,
renders the imperative of determining whether the sanctions are deterrent or
punitive in character.
A passport may be retained on the authorization by a senior police officer,
as noted above in chapter 2.4.1, and the retention may continue while
consideration is given as to whether to (a) cancel the passport; (b) charge the
person with an offence; (c) subject the person to any measure connected to
the protection of the public from a risk of terrorism.189 Subsection 1(d) also
allows the retention to continue while steps to carry out any of these actions
are taken. Accordingly, the purpose of seizing and retaining passports is to
“facilitate further investigations in respect of [the] individual”.190 The main
purpose of imposing a TEO, in turn, is to manage and control the return of
an individual that might pose a threat against the public should he or she
come back into the country, rather than excluding the person – albeit the
latter is what first happens.191 Moreover, it has implicitly been indicated that
there is a preventive function in the TEOs as well, in the sense that the
knowledge about a potential exclusion will perhaps deter an individual from
going abroad to engage in activities that might be perceived as terrorism-
related activities.192
Consequently, the investigative aim of passports seizures is apparently not
intended to neither deter from nor punish the individual for being at a port
with the intent of leaving the UK. Such a solution would not only turn out
extremely irrational but also detrimental to the general interest of travelling,
whether in business, on vacation or whatever legitimate reason. On the
contrary, the purpose of imposing a TEO is arguably both deterrence from
leaving the UK with the intent of engaging in terrorism-related activity, or
186 Sergey Zolotukhin, para. 55. See also Janosevic, para. 68 and Öztürk, para. 53.
187 Frände, Dan, Allmän straffrätt, 4 ed., Forum Iuris, Helsingfors, 2012, pp. 17-18. A
somewhat simplified description of the characteristics of a criminal penalty provides that
(a) the convicted individual appreciate the penalty as something unpleasant and
unwelcome, (b) the punishment is intentionally enforced according to a plan, (c) those who
execute the punishment has a legal right to do so, and (d) the punishment is a direct
sanction for a breach of a legal norm, p. 1.
188 Bonda, para. 40
189 CTS Act 2015, schedule 1, para. 5(1).
190 JCHR, Examination of Witness: James Brokenshire MP, Q3.
191 Ibid., Q17. See also, Home Affairs Committee, Oral evidence: Counter-Terrorism and
Security Bill, Q138.
192 JCHR, Examination of Witness: James Brokenshire MP, Q20.
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for reasons that could be perceived as such an intent, and punishment for
having chosen to leave the country for such a reason. On this ground, it
might therefore be established that the imposition of TEOs is a ‘criminal’
procedure within the meaning of ECHR, although to exercise the power to
seize and retain a passport is not.
In conclusion, the two temporary restriction on travel powers are directed
towards ‘all citizens’; the purpose of imposing a TEO is arguably both
deterrent and punitive; and it could be advocated that international
instruments by which the UK is bound, require states to criminalize acts
such as travelling abroad with the intent of engaging in terrorism-related
activity. In respect of passport seizures, I find it difficult against these
findings to conclude that the measures amount to a ‘criminal charge’ within
the meaning of the ECHR. However, as noted above, the three Engel-criteria
are available for a cumulative application where an isolated approximation
of each of them does not suffice to deduce a ‘criminal’ nature.
Consequently, the next step is to examine the severity of the penalty in order
to determine whether my assumption that the temporary restriction on
travels measures are of a de facto criminal character is valid.
3.2.3 Severity of the penalty
The third criteria established by the Court in Engel and Others v Germany is
recognized as the most important one;193 albeit, its importance has been
disputed and its revocation advocated, except in circumstances where it
“becomes obvious that the disciplinary label is designed to mask a criminal
sanction”.194 Nevertheless, it was the criteria the Court was predominantly
occupied with in the Engel-case and that led the Court to divers ruling in
relation to the separate complainants. For the first and second applicant the
punishment was a “light arrest” that did not involve deprivation of liberty,
and “was of too short a duration to belong to the ‘criminal’ law”,
respectively. For the other three applicants, however, the charges “did
indeed come within the ‘criminal’ sphere since their aim was the imposition
of serious punishments involving deprivation of liberty”.195 This view has
been reiterated in the Court’s jurisprudence repeatedly, for instance in
Zolothukin:
As the Court has confirmed on many occasions, in a society
subscribing to the rule of law, where the penalty liable to be and
actually imposed on an applicant involves the loss of liberty, there is a
presumption that the charges against the applicant are “criminal”.196
193 See for instance, Ashworth and Zedner in Duff et al. (eds.), p. 75; and Emmerson and
Ashworth, p. 151.
194 Trechsel, p. 30.
195 Engel and Others, para. 85.
196 Sergey Zolotukhin, para. 56. See also Benham, para. 56 and Steel and Others, paras. 45
and 49.
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However, the involvement of deprivation of liberty is not mandatory for
considering an offence as ‘criminal’ within the meaning of the Convention.
In the case of Janosevic, the penalty at stake was tax surcharges of a
considerable amount. There was no possibility to convert the penalty into a
prison sentence in the event of default payment, but the Court, nevertheless,
judged the potential and actual penalty to be so severe that it further
evidenced the criminal character of the national provision.197
Similarly, in Welch v the United Kingdom198 the Court considered whether a
confiscation order imposed as a result of a conviction on drug-trafficking,
was ‘criminal’ for the purpose of applying article 7 of the Convention.
Although there was no deprivation of liberty at stake, the applicant “faced
more far-reaching detriment as a result of the order than that to which he
was exposed at the time of the commission of the offences for which he was
convicted”.199 Thus, in finding that the combination of punitive elements
made the confiscation order, in the circumstances of the case, amount to a
penalty, the Court reasoned that despite the preventative purpose of the
sanction
it cannot be excluded that legislation which confers such broad powers
of confiscation on the courts also pursues the aim of punishing the
offender. Indeed the aims of prevention and reparation are consistent
with a punitive purpose and may be seen as constituent elements of
the very notion of punishment.200
This case led Ashworth and Zedner to the conclusion that the purpose of the
sanction is important, but “if the effects of an order are sufficiently
burdensome or intrusive […] there comes a point at which they may fairly
be held to be punitive, irrespective of purpose”.201 Furthermore, the EU
Court of Justice has found ECHR, articles 6 and 13 to be applicable in a
case concerning the inclusion of individuals in so-called ‘blacklists’, which
resulted in them having their funds frozen.202 This finding indicates the EU
Court of Justice’s position that the severity of the penalty triggers the
application of the Convention’s protection, notwithstanding the fact that the
purpose of the sanction is to prevent acts causing serious harm from taking
place.
Thus, in accordance with this outline, the severity of the temporary
restrictions on travel as a form of sanction will be scrutinized. For sake of
197 Janosevic, para. 69.
198 Welch v the United Kingdom, Appl. No. 17440/90, 9 February 1995.
199 Ibid., para. 34.
200 Ibid., paras. 30 and 35. It is worth noting that the Court emphasized that the conclusion
was only in relation to the retrospective application of the relevant legislation (prohibited
by ECHR, article 7) “and does not call into question in any respect the powers of
confiscation conferred on the courts as a weapon in the fight against the scourge of drug
trafficking", para. 36.
201 Ashworth and Zedner in Duff et al. (eds.), p. 77.
202 C-402/05 and C-415/05, Kadi and Al Bakaraat International Foundation v Council of
the European Union, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) 3 September 2008, paras.
335-336.
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clarity, the rights at stake will be examined one by one; first, however, some
general remarks will be provided.
The exercise of the power to seize and retain a passport from an individual
at a port potentially infringes with several rights and liberties enshrined in
the ECHR as well as the ICCPR. The UK Government has acknowledged,
in its ECHR Memorandum, some of the rights at stake, but has avoided
mentioning others. One example is the right to freedom of movement
including the right to leave any country as the JC rightly noticed in its
legislative scrutiny.203 The explanation for failing to mention this right in
the ECHR Memorandum might be found in the fact that it is an ECHR
Memorandum. The right to freedom of movement is expressed in the ECHR
Protocol No. 4, article 2, the UK has, however, signed but not ratified the
protocol.204 On the other hand, the right is equally ensured by virtue of
ICCPR, article 12, to which the UK is a State Party.205
As regards the use of TEOs, the measure is more restrictive and triggers the
application of additional human rights provisions than a decision to seize
and retain a passport. At the outset, the JCHR recognized the controversial
character of the provision since “excluding UK nationals from their own
country, even temporarily, may be incompatible with an individual’s rights
under the ECHR which a UK national does not forfeit by travelling
abroad”.206 Albeit the failure to expressly indicate what ECHR rights the
Committee has in mind, two obvious candidates are the right to private and
family life in article 8 and the right not to be subjected to torture or inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment in article 3. Moreover, it appears as
the Government expected a potential violation of articles 2, 5 and 6,
although it disputed (as noted in chapter 2.2.2) the applicability of the entire
Convention.207 Thus, the Government reasoned that ECHR would not be
applicable extra-territorially and there would consequently not be any
infringement with the right to life, the protection against arbitrary
deprivation of liberty or the right to a fair trial.
This way of approaching the issue has been rigorously disputed by Professor
Guy S. Goodwin-Gill who stated in a submission to the JCHR that the
Government’s argument “is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of
the role of nationality and its link to jurisdiction”.208 Equally critical, the
JCHR concluded that the only possibility to return after a TEO has been
imposed is to obey by the conditions decided by the Secretary of State,
without any judicial involvement “apart from ex post facto judicial review
which, by definition, will have to be pursued from abroad”. Consequently,
203 JCHR, Legislative Scrutiny, para. 2.4.
204 See Council of Europe website:
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeTraites.asp?PO=UK&MA=999&SI=3&C
M=3&CL=ENG, 4 May 2015.
205 See UN website: http://indicators.ohchr.org/, 4 May 2015.
206 JCHR, Legislative Scrutiny, para. 3.4.
207 ECHR Memorandum, para. 10.
208 Goodwin-Gill, para. 6.
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to impose a TEO leads, in the Committee’s view, to a substantial risk of
human rights violations to the detriment of UK nationals.209
(a) Freedom of movement
According to ICCPR, article 12.1 shall “everyone lawfully within the
territory of a State […], within that territory, have the right to liberty of
movement and freedom to choose his residence”, and subparagraph 2
provides that “everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his
own”. However, this is not an absolute right, but a qualified one that might
be subjected to restrictions if in accordance with subparagraph 3 stating:
the above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any
restrictions except those which are provided by law, are
necessary to protect national security, public order (ordre
public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of
others, and are consistent with the other rights recognized in the
present Covenant.
In turn, the imposition of a TEO has potential to engage the right not to be
arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter one’s own country as provided for
by ICCPR, article 12.4. In contrast to the possible implications with article
12 stemming from the seizure and retention of a passport, it is not permitted
to subject the right to enter one’s country to any limitations. As evidenced
by the wording of subparagraph 3 – “the above-mentioned rights…” –
subparagraph 4 is not covered by the possibility to make an exception.210 In
response to the JCHR’s disquiet about the matter, the Immigration and
Security Minister, James Brokenshire, asserted, that the provision “is
concerned with ‘arbitrarily’ depriving a person of the right to enter his own
country. TEOs do not deprive the subjects of the ability to enter the UK, and
nor do they affect this ability ‘arbitrarily’”.211 The means to avoid
arbitrariness is, according to the Minister, the requirement that the Secretary
of State must be satisfied that the conditions as set out in section 2 of the
CTS Act 2015 are met and, additionally, the recourse to judicial review of
the decision.212 The judicial review the Minister refers to appears to be the
one provided for in section 11 of the Act; however, that option is only
available to individuals in the United Kingdom, i.e. excluded individuals
who have agreed to comply with the conditions in a permit to return. This
issue will be addressed further in chapter 4.
In this respect, it deserves to be noted that the UN Human Rights
Committee (HRC) has clarified that the term ‘arbitrarily’
209 JCHR, Legislative Scrutiny, para. 3.9.
210 This interpretation is confirmed by the UN Human Rights Committee in its General
Comment No. 27 (67) on the article, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9, 1 November 1999, para. 11.
According to ICCPR, article 4, it is, however, feasible to lodge a derogation notification
with respect to article 12 in its entirety.
211 Brokenshire, Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill: Legislative Scrutiny, p. 4.
212 JCHR, Examination of Witness: James Brokenshire MP, Q21.
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is intended to emphasize that it applies to all State action, legislative,
administrative, and judicial; it guarantees that even interference
provided for by law should be in accordance with the provisions, aims
and objectives of the Covenant and should be, in any event,
reasonable in the particular circumstances.213
The HRC “considers that there are few, if any, circumstances in which
deprivation of the right to enter one’s own country could be reasonable”.214
Obviously, the situation in the world has changed since this comment was
published in 1999, but the necessity of adhering to the aims and objectives
of the ICCPR and the requirement of reasonableness are still well-founded.
In furtherance, the EU Freedom of Movement Directive215 reinforces this
right as article 4 entails a right to “all Union citizens with a valid identity
card or passport […] to leave the territory of a Member State to travel to
another Member State”, and article 5 requires Member States to “grant
Union citizens leave to enter their territory with a valid identity card or
passport”. Article 27, however, permits the Member States to restrict the
freedom of movement on grounds of public policy, public security and
public health; by virtue of subparagraph 2, such a restriction must be
proportionate and based on the personal conduct of the concerned
individual. The conduct, in turn, “must represent a genuine, present and
sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of
society”. Justifications for restricting the freedom that rely on
“considerations of general prevention shall not be accepted”.216
Thus, should there be reasonable grounds to suspect an intention of
engaging in terrorism-related activity justifying the seizure and retention of
an individual’s passport, the inevitable intrusion with the right to freedom of
movement might be perfectly legitimate and in compliance with the UK’s
international duties. However, whether the conduct of the concerned
individual constitutes a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat is
less obvious, but will have to be determined in consideration of the
circumstances of each specific case. As repeatedly emphasized, albeit
disputed, the overarching purpose for introducing the powers is to protect
the public against terrorist acts, and the necessity stems from a gap in the
existing legislation (as elaborated upon above in chapter 2.4.1). The
necessity of the powers will not be studied in more detail here; in relation to
the severity of the penalty criteria it suffices to note that there is a potential
breach of the right to freedom of movement stemming from the imposition
of the sanction, i.e. seizing and retaining a passport.217 On the other hand,
213 UN HRC, GC 27 (67), para. 21.
214 Ibid.
215 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, on the right of
citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the
territory of the Member States, 29 April 2004.
216 See, Directive 2004/38/EC, article 27.2.
217 As noted above, in Janosevic, para. 69, the ECtHR took into account the severity of both
the potential and actual penalty imposed, which is in line with the Court’s statement in
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the imposition of a TEO might be legitimate under the Freedom of
Movement Directive on the same grounds as a decision to seize and retain a
passport, but such arrangement risks violating the UK’s obligations under
ICCPR, article 12.4.
(b) The right to private and family life
To exercise the temporary restriction on travel powers equally triggers the
application of the right to private and family life contained in ECHR, article
8, as the UK Government appreciated in the ECHR Memorandum.218 The
extensive scope of the article is reflected by the amount of case law in which
the ECtHR has decided in a matter connected to the right to lead a private
and family life.219 In one of the first judgments, the Court noted that the
article contains both a negative obligation to refrain from interfering with
the right therein, as well as a positive obligation to realize an effective
enjoyment of the right, meaning that the state must to some extent stop
others from interfering.220 Consequently, it is unquestionable that seizing the
passport from an individual will contravene the right to private life, as the
measure authorizes inter alia the constable to search a person and his or her
possessions, and the right to family life due to obstruction of travel plans
whatever their motive. Still, the right to private and family life might also be
subjected to limitations by virtue of the second subparagraph, which
requires an intrusion to be in accordance with law, necessary in a
democratic society and in the pursuit of a legitimate aim (such as the interest
of public safety for instance). Due to the ‘margin of appreciation’ allowing
states to regulate lawful interferences with ECHR, article 8, it is not possible
to determine in a generalized, sweeping manner that every seizure and
retention of a passport will be violating the individual’s human rights as
protected by the Convention.221 Nevertheless, some general remarks will be
made.
In the case of Sabanchiyeva and Others v Russia, among others, the ECtHR
deliberated on the margin of appreciation and noted that the extent of the
national authorities’ discretion depends on various factors and thus differs
from case to case. It also reiterated its awareness in preceding cases of the
particular challenges the States face when confronting terrorism and terrorist
violence.222 The matter to deal with in the case was the application of
domestic anti-terror provisions depriving the applicants of the right to
Engel, para. 85, that “the final outcome of the appeal cannot diminish the importance of
what was initially at stake”.
218 ECHR Memorandum, paras. 3 and 14.
219 See for instance Sabanchiyeva and Others v Russia, Appl. No. 38450/05, 6 June 2013,
para. 117, with further references.
220 Airey v Ireland, Appl. No. 6289/73, 9 October 1979, para. 32. See also Arai-Takahashi,
Yutaka, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in the
Jurisprudence of the ECHR, Intersentia, Antwerpen – Oxford – New York, 2002, p. 60.
221 The inquiry whether some human rights are fundamentally inherent by the mere fact of
being ’human’, i.e. regardless of the codification of the rights in some instrument, might
come into play here, but that is for someone else to consider. For a comprehensive review
of the margin of appreciation in relation to article 8, see Arai-Takahashi, chapter 4.
222 Sabanchiyeva and Others, para. 134.
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participate in the internment of their deceased relatives; the latter were
terrorists as defined in national laws and had been killed during
confrontation with state forces. The Court observed that the infringement
with the applicants’ right to private and family life was severe as they were
completely precluded from any participating in the funerals and were not
allowed to know about the location of the graves.223 With regard to the
Russian government’s interest in preventing further disturbances associated
with the terrorist activities the deceased had been engaged in, the Court
stated that it could “in principle, accept that […] the authorities could be
reasonably expected to intervene”. Furthermore, it accepted that
in organising the relevant intervention the authorities were entitled to
act with a view to minimising the informational and psychological
impact of the terrorist act on the population and protecting the feelings
of relatives of the victims of the terrorist acts.224
On the other hand, these goals were not sufficient to justify the denial of
participation in the funerals and the opportunity to pay their respect to the
deceased relatives to the detriment of the applicants. Thus, the government’s
automatic application of the domestic laws, lacking of consideration of the
individual circumstances of each applicant, the Court ruled that the State
had failed to strike a fair balance between the conflicting interests and the
margin of appreciation was overstepped.225
Equally appreciating the special difficulties for States facing the threat
posed by terrorism, the Court admitted in the case of Brogan and Others v
the United Kingdom226 that even the fundamental protection against
arbitrary deprivation of liberty enshrined in ECHR, article 5 could be
subjected to special treatment. Thus, the period of detention before bringing
the person before a judicial authority could be prolonged if the individual
was suspected for serious terrorist offences.227 However, the scope for
flexibility in the interpretation of the term ‘prompt’ in article 5.3 is limited
and, albeit inspired by the aim of protecting the public from terrorism, the
‘promptness’ was exceeded in the circumstances of the case.228
Taking into account the Court’s respect for the particular challenges States
face in the fight against terrorism, the margin of appreciation accorded to
the States when interfering with the right to private and family life is
arguably wider still than what could otherwise be accepted. Nevertheless,
the requirements in subparagraph 2 persist, and, in relation to passport
seizure and retention, the UK Government suggested that “where the
exercise of the power is reasonably foreseeable and circumscribed by
adequate safeguards so that it cannot be used arbitrarily or otherwise
223 Sabanchiyeva and Others, para. 138.
224 Ibid., paras.  141-142.
225 Ibid., paras. 143-146.
226 Brogan and Others v the United Kingdom, Appl. Nos. 11209/84; 11234/84; 11266/84;
11386/85, 29 November 1988.
227 Ibid., para. 61.
228 Ibid., para. 62.
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misused, there are strong arguments that the legislation itself is compliant
with Article 8”.229 The adequacy of the safeguards will be addressed further
in the subsequent chapter. Regarding the foreseeability of the provision, it is
questionable since the intelligence giving reasonable grounds to suspect that
the individual has an intention to engage in terrorism-related activity while
outside the UK is most likely classified information. The individual might
therefore be unaware of the suspicions making it impossible to foresee the
exercise of the powers. Concerning article 8, the Government accepted that
to temporary exclude someone from the UK would interfere with the right
to enjoy private and family life within the country, although the individual
him or herself is able to bring that interference to an end by agreeing to the
conditions of a permit to return. Hence, the interference is “capable of being
necessary and proportionate, subject to consideration of the facts of each
case”.230
(c) The right to not be subjected to torture or inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment
As the right to freedom of movement and the right to private and family life
are qualified rights that might legitimately be limited for the purpose of
protecting the public, it has to be ascertained in each individual case
whether a potential breach of the provisions is at stake in the sense that the
measure is to be understood as a severe sanction amounting to a ‘criminal’
punishment. Yet, the UK Government has identified another right at stake,
namely “[i]f the power is exercised in respect of a person who is not a UK
resident, such as a person who is a transit passenger, stopping off in the UK
en route to another destination, then there is potentially an Article 3
interference too”.231 This acknowledgement is more troublesome since the
prohibition of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment in article 3 is
absolute and cannot be subjected to any limitations.232 The potential
interference would derive from the circumstance that the individual
concerned might be rendered destitute if he or she has “nowhere to stay in
the UK for the period during which his travel documents are retained, and
has no source of funds in the UK to sustain him [or her] for that period”.233
Should this risk be realized, the measure would not only breach the UK’s
international obligations to abstain from subjecting the individual to
inhuman treatment, but it would also mean that the severity of the penalty
(the potential risk of being subjected to inhuman treatment) most likely
situates the measure within the criminal law regime.
The risk of an article 3 violation taking place is even more imminent in the
TEO circumstances; the individual, stranded in a country abroad – perhaps
229 ECHR Memorandum, para. 4.
230 Ibid., para. 15.
231 Ibid., para. 3.
232 In Sabanchiyeva and Others the Court confirmed the absolute character of article 3 in
stating that that “even in the most difficult circumstances, such as the fight against terrorism
or organized crime, the Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment”, para. 104.
233 ECHR Memorandum, para. 3.
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where the practice of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment is more
commonly resorted to – is likely to be singled out as a ‘terrorist’ and thus
subjected to reprisals of varying kind.234 In Chahal v the United Kingdom235,
the ECtHR deliberated upon a situation where the UK Government had
decided to expel the applicant for reasons of national security – the applicant
was suspected for having committed terrorist acts.236 The Court confirmed
the non-refoulment principle and the absolute character of article 3 in
expressing that
[t]he Court is well aware of the immense difficulties faced by States in
modern times in protecting their communities from terrorist violence.
However, even in these circumstances, the Convention prohibits in
absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment, irrespective of the victim’s conduct.237
By analogy, if the absolute prohibition to subject a person to torture or
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment frustrates the expulsion by a
non-national to his or her country of origin, the decision to negate the return
of a citizen who is outside the state must be equally prohibited,
notwithstanding any reasonable suspicion of involvement in terrorism-
related activity abroad.238 Following the same reasoning, it is equally
plausible that imposing a TEO potentially triggers the application of the
right to life in article 2; an individual rendered stranded and destitute in a
state in turmoil is at danger to be killed in the disturbances. In such
circumstances, the UK could be deemed liable for not taking action to
protect the life of the individual in breach of its positive obligation under the
article. Alternatively, or additionally, the negative obligation to refrain from
acting in a way that could result in the loss of life is breached due to the
concrete, factual decision to impose a TEO.
The possible implications on the right to freedom of movement, the right to
private and family life, and the right not to be subjected to torture or
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment to the detriment of a person
who is subjected to a temporary restriction on travel measure are, separately
or at least cumulatively, severe enough to amount to a criminal penalty in
the meaning of the ECHR. Despite that, one additional consequence has to
be considered in relation to the imposition of a TEO.
234 The concern about article 3 implications was raised during the passage of the Bill, see
CTS Bill 2014-15 Parliamentary stages, SN/HA 07073, 10 February 2015, p. 11; and has
equally been uttered by Liberty, para. 21.
235 Chahal v the United Kingdom, Appl. No. 22414/93, 15 November 1996.
236 Ibid., paras. 23-24 and 75.
237 Ibid., para. 79.
238 For an ample account of the non-refoulment principle and its relation to the national
security of states, see Bruin, Rene and Wouter, Kees, “Terrorism and the Non-derogability
of Non-refoulement” in Samuel, Katja L.H. and White, Nigel D. (eds.), Counter-Terrorism
and International Law, Ashgate, Farnham, 2012, pp. 377-401.
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(d) Statelessness
During the passage of the Bill, it has been argued that TEOs will render the
targeted individual stateless. This is not at all an uncontroversial suggestion;
the positions on the matter differ greatly. The Government, through the
Minister James Brokenshire, reassured the JCHR that the measure is not
intended to nor has the effect of making someone stateless, because the
affected persons may return.239 On the opposite side stands Liberty,
claiming that during the time passing from the moment a TEO is imposed –
which automatically means that the individual’s passport is invalidated – up
until the date of conditional return, the individual is in practice stripped of
citizenship.240 The president of Liberty, Shami Chakrabarti, expressed her
view to the Home Affairs Committee when giving oral evidence on the Bill:
To tell British citizens that they may not return to their country unless
they accept a form of punishment without trial, which is a TPIM or a
control order or whatever you want to call it, is de facto statelessness.
[…] It is de facto statelessness to say to somebody that you can only
come back if you agree effectively to punishment without trial, which
is what TPIMs and control orders are.241
A perhaps more neutral opinion is delivered by Goodwin-Gill, who does not
expressly state that the imposition of a TEO is in practice rendering the
individual stateless; nonetheless, he refers to his earlier contributions to the
debate on the topic and stresses “the citizen’s right to return to his or her
own country and the State’s duty to admit its citizens”.242
To approximate the inquiry, it is, at the outset, relevant to identify what is
meant by the term ‘stateless’. The UN Convention relating to the Status of
Stateless Persons, adopted in 1954, defines a ‘stateless person’ as
a person who is not considered as a national by any State under the
operation of its law.243
The crux is thus to determine whether the individual subjected to a TEO
could be deemed as not considered a UK national under the operation of the
UK law. To begin with, the CTS Act 2015 states explicitly in section 4(9)
that “at the time when a temporary exclusion order comes into force, any
British passport held by the excluded individual is invalidated”. From this
perspective, when the individual is stuck abroad without a valid passport, it
appears as if the individual will face problems in availing him or herself of
the protection offered by UK laws. On the other hand, the Minister for
Security and Immigration asserted to the JCHR
239 JCHR, Examination of Witness: James Brokenshire MP, Q19.
240 Liberty, para. 26.
241 Home Affairs Committee, Oral Evidence: Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill, Q82
and Q112.
242 Goodwin-Gill, para. 2.
243 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, 28 September
1954, article 1.1.
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certainly British citizens are entitled to appropriate support from our
consular network and, indeed, our embassies. Therefore [sic!] in terms
of the principle of British citizenship […] obviously connection and
contact with the British embassy would potentially be available.244
The notion of de facto statelessness, in turn, has been defined as “a person
...who ...is unable or unwilling to avail himself of the protection of the
Government of his country of nationality or former nationality”.245 How an
individual – stranded in a State in turmoil, perhaps where no British
consulate or embassy is located – could, in practice, avail him- or herself of
this support when such a support is reliant on the individual travelling to
another state where there is a consulate or an embassy, is an unanswered
question. Moreover, there might be practical obstacles to even apply for a
permit to return, giving further reasons to fear that this person would be
unable to enjoy the UK Government’s protection. Thus, there seem to be
grounds for Shami Chakrabarti’s worries about imposing TEOs is, at least in
some instances, equivalent to rendering the person in a state of de facto
statelessness.
Whether the TEOs in fact constitute a mean to render someone stateless or
not depends in the end on one’s political stance. For the present purpose,
however, it is enough to point out that the imposition of such an order has
the potential to render someone stateless; hence, the severity of the penalty
at stake. What is more, a TEO is according to section 4(3)(b) valid for two
years (“unless revoked or otherwise brought to an end earlier”), making the
harsh consequences endure for a considerable period in time.
From this rather extensive excursion on what is at stake when temporary
restrictions on travel measures are imposed, it becomes clear that the
sanctions have potential to amount to  criminal penalties. Although there is
no deprivation of liberty involved, the danger of subjecting the individual to
a measure that triggers the application of either the prohibition of torture or
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, or the right to life, is more
than enough to deem the provisions ‘criminal’ within the meaning of the
Convention. Even more, when the risk of rendering the person stateless and
the inevitable intrusion of the individual’s private and family life are added;
the threshold of severity is, in my opinion, undoubtedly reached.
244 JCHR, Examination of Witness: James Brokenshire MP, Q23.
245 UN Ad Hoc Committee on Refugees and Stateless Persons, A Study of Statelessness,
United Nations, August 1949, Lake Success - New York, 1 August 1949, E/1112;
E/1112/Add.1, section III, para. 2.
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3.3 The character of temporary restrictions on
travel: conclusion
To really determine the compatibility of the temporary restriction on travel
powers with the UK’s international obligations, in particular to respect
human rights, must be made on a case-by-case basis while taking into
account the specific circumstances of each case. The lawfulness and
proportionality of employing the powers of seizing and retaining passports
and imposing TEOs depends, in the end, on the intelligence upon which the
decisions are made. Such intelligence is more often than not confidential
information due to security concerns, and might not even be displayed
during judicial processes in relation to the individual. Nonetheless, it is
possible to ascertain the character of the measures in general terms with the
aim to establish whether they are de facto criminal sanctions that should be
circumscribed by the procedural safeguards inherent in the criminal law
regime.
Accordingly, the three criteria used to assess whether a national provision
belongs to the ‘criminal’ law in the meaning of the ECHR, as established by
the ECtHR in the case of Engel and Others v the Netherlands, are (I) the
label in national laws; (II) the nature of the offence; and (III) the severity of
the penalty
In the foregoing application of these criteria to the temporary restriction on
travel measures, it has been established:
(I) In the UK legal order, the measures are purely administrative as it
is the executive authority – a constable at a port or the Secretary of
State – who decides whether to subject an individual to any of these
powers. It has been suggested that measures of this kind should be
approached as ‘civil preventive hybrid orders’ since the non-
compliance with the sanctions becomes a criminal offence with
quite severe punishments. In any event, the measures are not
labelled criminal in the domestic legislation.
(II) Both the power to seize and retain a passport and/or travel
documents and  to impose a TEO are directed towards all citizens
in the United Kingdom, apart from the insignificant limitation of
requiring a right to abode for the use of a TEO. The width of the
definition of terrorism further extends the targeted group. The
purpose of the sanction is to facilitate investigations as concerns
passport seizures, but arguably deterrent and punitive in respect of
TEOs. Finally, the classification of similar measures in other
ECHR States falls outside the scope of this thesis, but international
instruments, particularly in UNSC res. 2178, requires
criminalization of travels for terrorist purposes.
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(III) The potential consequences of seizing and retaining a passport
and/or travel documents and of imposing a TEO are serious
infringements with several of the affected individual’s human
rights. Most disturbingly, both powers risks contravening
unqualified rights, in addition to the qualified rights at stake.
In conclusion, the label in national law is clearly not decisive for deeming
the temporary restrictions on travel measures as ‘criminal’; hence the
necessity to proceed to the other two criteria. Should the nature of the
offence also be insufficient, the severity of the penalty is what makes it
abundantly clear that the measures reach the threshold for being ‘criminal’
within the meaning of the Convention. In addition, a cumulative approach is
accepted; in considering the nature of the offence together with the severity
of the penalty, there seem to be little, if any, room for judging the measures
as purely administrative. The fact that few, if any, cases concerned with
national provisions imposing sanctions as a consequence of an
administrative or civil offence results in the ruling that the considered
provision is not criminal in nature246, further supports this conclusion. It
must be deemed viable that the Court would find the temporary restrictions
on travel to be ‘criminal’ in nature for the purpose of applying the
Convention.
246 Trechsel, p. 30.
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4 Implications for the inclusion
of procedural safeguards
Initially, it must be reiterated that the following chapter will not give an
exhaustive account of the components of the right to a fair trial, nor of all
issues related to the elements mentioned. Rather, in this chapter I will
deliberate upon the right to a fair trial and related matters in those parts that
are affected by the use of the temporary restrictions on travel measures.
4.1 The notion of a fair trial
The main provision of the ECHR addressing the judicial procedures in the
determination of a person’s “civil rights and obligations or of any criminal
charge” against him or her, is article 6, entailing “the right to a fair trial”.
When a Contracting State decides to bring a charge against someone
because of the commission of a criminal offence, that person is, according to
subsection 1, entitled to a “fair and public hearing within a reasonable time
by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law”. Furthermore,
subsection 3 of the article establishes the minimum standards that have to be
met, and includes inter alia a right to be informed promptly in a language
the person understands, to be able to prepare the defence, to have legal
assistance and to examine witnesses. In the context of a criminal charge the
presumption of innocence, provided for by subsection 2, is likewise
triggered.
The purpose for adopting an autonomous understanding of the term
‘criminal’ was plainly expressed by the ECtHR in the case of Engel and
Others v the Netherlands:
If the Contracting States were able at their discretion to classify an
offence as disciplinary instead of criminal, or to prosecute the author
of a "mixed" offence on the disciplinary rather than on the criminal
plane, the operation of the fundamental clauses of Articles 6 and 7
(art. 6, art. 7) would be subordinated to their sovereign will. A latitude
extending thus far might lead to results incompatible with the purpose
and object of the Convention.247
Similarly, in relation to what could be regarded as ‘minor’ offences, in
Öztürk v Germany, the Court stated:
Furthermore, it would be contrary to the object and purpose of Article
6 (art. 6), which guarantees to "everyone charged with a criminal
offence" the right to a court and to a fair trial, if the State were
allowed to remove from the scope of this Article (art. 6) a whole
247 Engel and Others, para. 81.
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category of offences merely on the ground of regarding them as
petty.248
The procedural protection offered by the Convention aims at impeding an
arbitrary exercise of national powers, whether classified in the domestic
legal order as administrative, disciplinary, civil or criminal. Any measure
interfering with an individual’s rights and liberties is thus supposed to be
“predictable, ordered, and fair”.249 In addition, the concept of autonomy is
vital to ensure uniformity of the application of the Convention in relation to
every individual, notwithstanding the scope of the terminology in the
national legal systems.250
Likewise, the ECtHR has established that with respect to the term ‘charge’
an autonomous approach should be adopted; hence, the right to a fair trial in
its entirety, is applicable already prior to the actual proceedings before a
judicial authority if the “situation of the [suspect] has been substantially
affected”.251
As to the presumption of innocence expressed in article 6.2, it is a
fundamental principle in the criminal law regime, the respect of which
generates at least an impression of a fair justice system free from
authoritarian suppression by the judicial entities. The significance of the
presumption has two facets. It requires the responsible authorities to realize
a thorough investigation into the suspicion of an individual having
committed a criminal offence, which is capable of constituting the
foundation to a subsequent trial and, as it may be, conviction.252 Moreover,
the presumption encompasses the requisites for considering the trial ‘fair’
and is closely related to the principle of ‘equality of arms’; the recognition
of the former assists the accused in facing the advantage of the investigating
authorities in terms of resources and intelligence.253 Consequently, it is not
plausible to draw a firm line between the different components of the
concept of a fair trial, conversely, to be presumed innocent until proven
guilty necessitates the tribunal to be independent and impartial and the
process to respect the equality of arms.254
The presumption also includes a duty to refrain from anticipating the
outcome of the judicial proceedings. It is primarily the personnel involved
in the criminal proceedings that must respect the presumption (such
obligation is to some extent incumbent on the media as well), meaning that
they should not make statements or otherwise act as if they consider the
person guilty prior to the final ruling of a court.255 To determine whether the
presumption has been breached, the relevant considerations concern (i)
248 Öztürk, para. 53.
249 Ashworth and Zedner in Duff et al., p. 82.
250 Emmerson and Ashworth, p. 75.
251 Deweer v Belgium, Appl. No. 6903/75, 27 February 1980, para. 46.
252 Nowak, pp. 49-50
253 Ibid., p. 50.
254 See ibid., p. 107.
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whether the statements on the individual’s guilt anticipate the outcome of
the court; (ii) whether the statements menace the impartiality of the court;
and (iii) whether the public regards the individual as guilty because of the
statements.256 As regards the temporary restriction on travel measures, the
third criterion is of interest.
At the outset, the instigation of the criminal charge must be established
since the presumption of innocence applies to “everyone charged with a
criminal offence”. It is evident from the ECtHR’s jurisprudence that the
presumption is applicable even to those judicial proceedings that are
classified as administrative in the national laws as long as the individual’s
situation is substantially affected, since the notion of ‘criminal charge’
should be interpreted autonomously for the purpose of the Convention. For
instance, in Janosevic v Sweden the Court considered an alleged violation of
article 6.2 in relation to (i) the burden of proof inflicted upon the applicant,
and (ii) the premature enforcement of the sanction, notwithstanding the non-
criminal nature of the tax surcharges in domestic law.257 Accordingly, when
a passport is retained or a TEO has been imposed, the individual’s situation
is substantially affected due to the severe consequences the measures bring
(as discussed in chapter 3.2.3), and the use of the powers implies inevitably
the suspicion that the person is a terrorist. The pejorative and stigmatized
nature of the word ‘terrorist’ risks condemning the individual in the eyes of
the public already prior to the commencement of investigations into the
individual’s involvement in terrorism-related activity, and certainly in
anticipation of a court’s sentence. Hence, the use of the temporary
restriction on travel measures puts the presumption of innocence at peril
and, depending on the circumstances in each case of course, potentially
violates the Convention.258
As concerns the legitimacy of interfering with ECHR, article 8, the ECtHR
deliberated upon the matter in the case of Gillan and Quinton v the United
Kingdom. At the outset, the Court noted that the requisite in article 8.2, that
an interference with the private and family life of a person must be ‘in
accordance with law’, entails a requirement of accessibility and
foreseeability of the law. This means that the law must be “formulated with
sufficient precision to enable the individual – if need be with appropriate
advice – to regulate his conduct”.259 This, in turn, renders the State’s duty to
“afford a measure of legal protection against arbitrary interferences by
public authorities with the rights safeguarded by the Convention”.260
Consequently, the Court judged the safeguards circumscribing the stop and
256 Nowak, p. 302. Having examined various cases from the ECtHR, Nowak detect these
three criteria as being the relevant ones and notes that they can coincide; it is not necessary
that all of them are met for determining a breach of the Convention.
257 Janosevic, para. 99.
258 The application of the presumption of innocence is far from as straightforward as it
might seem from this brief excursion. Nowak has identified several unresolved questions
stemming from the case-law of the ECtHR, see for instance p. 135 and p. 302. Regrettably,
the extent of this thesis do not allow for a deeper examination of the issue.
259 Gillan and Quinton, para. 76.
260 Ibid., para. 77.
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search powers provided for by the Terrorism Act 2000 as not constituting “a
real curb” on the executive’s wide powers.261 Albeit the safeguards
connected to the temporary restriction on travel powers are more rigorous
than the ones scrutinized in the Gillan and Quinton-case – there must be a
reasonable suspicion and, as concerns TEOs, the Secretary of State must
reasonably consider it necessary to impose an order262 – the foreseeability of
the law is nevertheless questionable. Due to the wide application against
practically all citizens of whom there might be a reasonable suspicion in
combination with the need to keep undisclosed the intelligence instituting
that suspicion, there is a small chance that the concerned individual can
foresee the application of the law in a way that he or she can regulate his or
her conduct. Hence, the need for adequate safeguards protecting against
arbitrary use of the powers.
Besides the vital role of the right to a fair trial within the scope of the
ECHR, it is equally a fundamental principle of the European Community
“which must be guaranteed even in the absence of any rules governing the
procedures in question” in “all proceedings initiated against a person which
are liable to culminate in a measure adversely affecting that person”.263
Likewise, the EU Court of Justice stated in Kadi and Al Bakaraat
International Foundation v Council of Europe
[a]ccording to settled case-law, the principle of effective judicial
protection is a general principle of Community law stemming from the
constitutional traditions common to the Member States which has
been enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR.264
It is therefore understandable that the lack of sufficient involvement of
judicial authorities has been an issue of constant concern during the passage
of the CTS Bill. The main obstacle for enjoying the protection of judicial
review differs between the two elements of the powers to impose temporary
restrictions on travel; hence, their separate assessment.
4.2 Passport seizure and retention
With regard to the seizure and retention of passports, the Government
acknowledged the necessity of observing ECHR, article 6 within the context
of judicial scrutiny, including the requirement of informing the individual of
the grounds for interference with his or her rights.265 Hence, the CTS Act
2015 provides in schedule 1, paragraph 8, for the involvement of a judicial
authority when there is a need to prolong the initial retention period of 14
days. In addition, the Government ascertains that “the exercise of the power
261 Gillan and Quinton., para. 79.
262 Cf. ibid., paras. 80 and 83.
263 T-228/02, Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council of the European
Union, 12 December 2006, para. 91.
264 Kadi and Al Bakaraat International Foundation, para. 335.
265 ECHR Memorandum, para. 7.
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would be susceptible to judicial review and emergency injunctive challenge
where appropriate”.266 However, the JCHR notes that “the availability of
judicial review alone […] is not sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the
right to a fair hearing”. The supervisory function of the court at this point –
the mandate is, as noted previously in chapter 2.2.1, to judge the diligent
and expeditious work by the police and other relevant persons – does not
allow the individual to challenge in substance the reasonable grounds for
suspecting that he or she intends to travel for engaging in terrorism-related
activity.267
A key issue in relation to the supervisory function of the judicial authority is
the notion of ‘judicial review’, i.e. what is to be understood by the
terminology. By definition, a judicial review of an administrative decision is
focused upon its legality, not with the merits of the decision; thus, “the task
of the judges is to ensure that the exercise of any power which has been
delegated to ministers and administrative and adjudicatory bodies is lawful
according to the power given to that body by Act of Parliament”.268 By
virtue of sections 6(1) and 7 of the Human Rights Act 1998, the lawfulness
of British laws has to be judged in consideration of the ECHR.
Consequently, the review performed by the judicial authority with regard to
a potential prolongation of a passport retention should include
considerations of whether the affected individual’s rights under the
Convention has been infringed and, in that case, whether the infringement
was justified. Such a control does not appear to be what the legislature
intended since the function of the court is limited to supervise the diligence
and expeditiousness of the relevant persons.
Besides, according to schedule 1, paragraph 8(4) the judicial authority is
under a duty to extend the retention period if it considers that the relevant
persons have been acting diligently and expeditiously. Indeed, the Code of
Practice indicates the court’s function:
[a]t the hearing, the court will neither examine the merits of the
exercise of the power nor review the officer’s decision to exercise it.
The court will instead consider whether persons responsible for
considering the possibility of taking additional disruptive action (and
taking steps in relation to that) have been acting diligently and
expeditiously in the investigation. If the court concludes that they
have been, then it must grant an extension.269
Such a limitation is obviously troubling in the assessment of the adequacy
of judicial involvement.
266 ECHR Memorandum, para. 7.
267 JCHR, Legislative Scrutiny, para. 2.20. See also Walker, 2014, para. 5.
268 Barnett, Hilaire and Jago, Robert, Constitutional and Administrative Law, 8 ed.,
Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, London and New York, 2011, p. 722.
269 Code of Practice, para. 62.
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4.2.1 Access to court within a reasonable time
In the context of passport seizure and retention, the moment when the
situation substantially affects the individual is when the senior police officer
decides to approve retention for an initial period of 14 days. This decision
is, accordingly, what triggers the application of the safeguards in ECHR,
article 6 and, in particular, the right to trial “within a reasonable time” in
subparagraph 1. The late entrance of judicial scrutiny, i.e. first after 14 days
when there is an obligation to demand judicial authority to prolong the
retention, has been questioned during the passage of the Bill as it is a
“considerably longer period” than in relation to other counter-terrorism
measures.270 In the ample scope of article 6, 14 days before judicial
involvement is in no way extreme or even worth reacting to. Nonetheless,
the reasonableness is relative depending on the circumstances in each case;
the complexity of the case is one factor to take into account.271 Given the
fact that, as far as cash are concerned, the executive authorities must obtain
permission from a court for retention within 48 hours, there seem to be little
reason for needing 14 days before such an application can be made in
relation to passport retention; in my opinion, the complexity at this point
does not justify that need.
On the contrary, the Minister of Security and Immigration, James
Brokenshire, argued that should the judicial review take place earlier, it
would undermine the efficiency of the safeguard since the evidence
provided at the hearing would be unlikely to differ from case to case;
instead, the prolonged 30 days period is intended to ensure a proportionate
use of the power.272 Nonetheless, the possibility to retain a passport for 14
days without any involvement of a judicial authority provokes an extensive
period of restrictions on the individual’s right to freedom of movement and
the right to leave a country protected by ICCPR, article 12, as well as the
right to private and family life as per ECHR, article 8. Even more troubling
is the extensive period of intrusion with article 3, should the affected
individual be rendered destitute. In relation to article 8, the UK Government
emphasized the need to circumscribe the use of the powers with adequate
safeguards in order to avoid an arbitrary application.273 These safeguards
referred to could reasonably be the involvement of a judicial authority,
giving reasons for advocating an earlier entrance of such.
270 The example given is the power to seize cash under the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and
Security Act 2001 subjected to judicial review after 48 hours. See JCHR, Legislative
Scrutiny, paras. 2.25-2.26; Walker, 2014, p. 3; Independent Reviewer of Terrorism
Legislation, David Anderson in Home Affairs Committee, Oral Evidence: Counter-
Terrorism and Security Bill, Q151.
271 Arai-Takahashi, p. 51.
272 Brokenshire, Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill: Legislative Scrutiny, p. 2.
273 ECHR Memorandum, para. 4. See above in chapter 3.2.3.
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4.2.2 Right to information
The requirement to give information is equally judged an insufficient
safeguard, as the duty is limited to inform about the statutory basis upon
which the decision is taken, i.e. the suspicion of the person’s intent to leave
the country for terrorist-purposes, rather than the factual reasons underlying
that suspicion.274 The JCHR touched upon the matter in the examination of
James Brokenshire, who ensured the committee that “it is intended that
there will be some means of informing the individual as to why the power
had been used”.275 That intention has subsequently been codified in the
Code of Practice, which requires the police to issue a notification containing
inter alia information, “as fully as possible”, on the reasons why the travel
documents were seized and retained. The information is intended to enable
the understanding of why a person is subject to investigation and from that
consider whether the investigation is carried out diligently and
expeditiously, but limited due to national security concerns.276
In the light of jurisprudence by both the ECtHR and the EU Court of Justice,
the contrasting positions advanced by the Government on the one side and
JCHR, among others, on the other, are typical in the balancing between
protecting the public against terrorism and the respect for an individual’s
human rights and liberties. One example is the case of Organisation des
Modjahedines du people d’Iran v Council of the European Union where the
applicants asserted that their right to a fair hearing had been disregarded
when the Organisation was included in a ‘blacklist’ resulting in a freezing of
their assets. The EU Court of Justice did not make explicit reference to the
Engel-criteria in scrutinizing the challenged provisions, but considered
nonetheless that the applicants were entitled to the protection of the right to
a fair hearing. This right encompasses, according to the court, two main
features, namely (i) “the party concerned must be informed of the evidence
adduced against it to justify the sanction” and (ii) the party must be
“afforded the opportunity to effectively make known his view on that
evidence”.277 However, the right to a fair hearing and its equivalent in the
ECHR terminology, the right to a fair trial, might be subjected to
restrictions, in particular in the context of combating terrorism as
overriding considerations concerning the security of the Community
and its Member States, or the conduct of their international relations,
may preclude the communication to the parties concerned of certain
evidence adduced against them and, in consequence, the hearing of
those parties with regard to such evidence, during the administrative
procedure.278
274 JCHR, Legislative Scrutiny, para. 2. 31.
275 JCHR, Examination of Witness: James Brokenshire, MP, Q4.
276 Code of Practice, para. 75.
277 Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran, para. 93.
278 Ibid., para. 133. See also ECtHR’s judgment in Chahal v the United Kingdom, para. 131
where the Court acknowledged that confidential use of evidence may be necessary in cases
dealing with national security issues, but proceeded to determine that to assert such an issue
does not mean that the national authorities are relieved of any judicial control.
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Accordingly, in circumstances where giving information to an individual
could jeopardize the effect of subjecting an individual to a measure in
connection to protecting the public from acts of terrorism, this element of
the right to a fair trial could be limited. It must, however, be noted that this
approach has been adopted in circumstances where giving prior information
to the subjected individual would jeopardize the effectiveness of the
counter-terrorism measure as the element of surprise is fundamental.279
Nevertheless, in Kadi and Al Bakaraat International Foundation the EU
Court of Justice judged that the circumstances surrounding the inclusion of
the appellant’s name in a so-called ‘blacklist’ did not respect the right to
defence, particularly the right to be heard, and the right to effective judicial
review.280
Thus, to withhold information from the individual to whom that information
relates could be justified for public security reasons, particularly where the
disclosure of such would jeopardize the measures efficiency or the security
of other persons and/or investigations. However, for the concerned
individual to be able to defend him or herself against suspicions of
involvement in terrorism-related activities it is crucial that at least some
information about the material grounds for that suspicion is provided.
4.3 Temporary Exclusion Orders
Turning to the imposition of a TEO, there is, in less urgent circumstances, a
requirement of court involvement already prior to the relevant decision (as
noted above in chapter 2.2.2). It is evident that the aim is to make sure that
the Secretary of State does not decide to impose a TEO arbitrarily, without
sufficient grounds for such a decision. The court should thus determine
whether the Secretary of State has obviously erred in deciding (A) that there
are reasonable grounds to suspect that the individual is, or has been,
involved in terrorism-related activity; (B) it is necessary, for purposes
connected with protecting the public in the UK from a risk of terrorism, for
a TEO to be imposed; (C) it could reasonably be considered that the
individual is outside the UK; and (D) that the individual has a right of abode
in the UK.281 In order to fulfil this function, the court must reasonably
consider the merits of the decisions, at least to some extent. However, it has
not been indicated during the passage of the CTS Bill, what errors make the
Secretary of State’s decisions ‘obviously flawed’. Consequently, the
threshold will have to be established by the UK courts whilst considering
giving permission for a TEO. Such solution renders the legislation less
foreseeable and accord great powers to the courts’ discretion, threatening
the individual’s protection.
279 See also, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation, paras. 339-340.
280 Ibid., para. 334.
281 See CTS Act 2015, s. 3 and above in chapter 2.2.2.
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In addition, the individual’s possibility to give his or her view on the matter
and the material presented as a justification for the relevant decisions is
limited by section 3(3-4) of the CTS Act 2015, which provides:
The court may consider the application (a) in the absence of the
individual, (b) without the individual having been notified of the
application, and (c) without the individual having been given an
opportunity (if the individual was aware of the application) of making
any representations to the court.
Thus, on the authority of inter alia the case of Organisation des
Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran, it is plausible that such a review do not
satisfy the standards of giving the individual the “opportunity to effectively
make known his view on that evidence”. As noted above, in chapter 2.4.2,
the Minister for Security and Immigration, James Brokenshire, admitted the
risk that it might not always be viable to notify the subjected individual
directly about the imposition of a TEO, which is reasonably one of the
explanations for allowing the court to consider an application in the absence
of the person. In this respect, the CTS Act 2015 states in section 4 that the
Secretary of State must give notice of the TEO to the individual, but section
13(2) indicates that notice might “be deemed to have been given”. This
means that, if a notification is deemed to have been given because it has
been sent to the latest known address in the UK, the excluded individual
abroad might not be aware of the imposition of the TEO.  Consequently, the
person has no opportunity to give his or her view on the case or to defend
him or herself against the exclusion, nor is the person informed of the
accusation against him.282 In other words, the procedural safeguards in
article 6.3 that should apply within the ambit of a court review of a criminal
charge are neglected.
The necessity of deciding whether conditions A-D are fulfilled prior to the
imposition of a TEO is intended to protect from an arbitrary use of the
power; indeed, their existence demand certain considerations and as such
impedes a negligent use of TEOs. Furthermore, the CTS Act 2015, section
2(8) obliges the Secretary of State to keep under review whether to
temporary exclude a person is necessary for protecting the public from
terrorism (condition B). Despite this, the requirement of keeping condition
B under review is not an adequate safeguard since there is no concrete
instruction on the frequency of this review; in other words, the Secretary of
State must review the decision but is entrusted with the discretion to decide
how soon and how often. The same critique applies to the failure to
designate the limits of the ‘reasonable period’ within which the Secretary of
State must issue a permit to return upon application from the excluded
individual (see above, chapter 2.2.2). This shortcoming leaves the individual
in a state of uncertainty and anxiety as he or she has no possibility to know
when the person will be allowed to return home. Additionally, it creates
difficulties to challenge the permit to return-procedure since there are no
282 The meaning of the term ’accusation’ triggering the protection of article 6.3(a) is not
entirely clear, for a discussion on the topic, see Trechsel, p. 196.
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concrete instructions against which the exercise of the powers can be
contrasted and the individual will be stuck abroad during the process.
Another protection against arbitrary use of TEOs, envisaged by the Minister
for Security and Immigration, is the possibility to challenge the TEO
through a judicial review.283 This option is available to an excluded
individual who has accepted the conditions in a permit to return in order to
return to the UK, i.e. when the individual is within the UK.284 Obviously,
the fact that the resort to judicial review is only available to an individual in
the UK is troubling from a human rights perspective. The rights and liberties
of the affected person have already been restricted by the imposition of the
TEO and the subsequent conditions in the permit to return; hence, the
protection afforded by the judicial review of the decision comes into play
too late.
4.3.1 Access to court
A significant obstacle for an individual subjected to a TEO is the de facto
possibility to challenge the decision while stranded abroad. The Independent
Reviewer on Counter-Terrorism Legislation David Anderson asserted, “if
you are [abroad] with one of these orders served on you, I would suggest
that the practicalities of bringing a case for judicial review in London are
pretty difficult”.285 On the contrary, the Minister for Security and
Immigration, James Brokenshire, contended that it would not be a bar or
even an inhibition to someone outside the country to challenge the decision
to impose a TEO, as individuals overseas have successfully exercised such
rights in the past.286 In addition, the Minister ensured the JCHR while giving
evidence that the individual will have consular assistance and “connection
and contact with the British embassy would potentially be available”.287
Nonetheless, when a person is subjected to a TEO because of reasonable
suspicion that he or she is, or has been, involved in terrorism-related
activity, it must reasonably be rather difficult to insist on court review from
where he or she is stranded. Even if the possibility exists in theory, the
feasibility in practice seems remote, especially when taking into account the
pejorative nature of the word ‘terrorist’ and the stigmatization such a label
brings. To be excluded from the home country and thus singled out as a
terrorist fosters undoubtedly practical obstacles for availing oneself of the
rightful protection of the Convention.
283 JCHR, Examination of Witness: James Brokenshire MP, Q21.
284 See CTS Act 2015, s. 11 and above, chapter 2.2.2.
285 Home Affairs Committee, Oral evidence: Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill, Q141.
286 JCHR, Examination of Witness: James Brokenshire MP, Q22.
287 Ibid., Q22 and Q23.
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4.3.2 Legal representation
Schedule 3, paragraph 10, of the CTS Act 2015 allows for the appointment
of a special advocate, whose function is to represent the interests of the
individual when he or she and the legal representative have been excluded
from the proceedings. Whether this applies also in a situation when it has
not been possible to notify the person about a TEO, or only when the court
decides to exclude the person from the proceedings, is not entirely clear
from the provision itself. On the one hand, paragraph 10(1) refers to “any
TEO proceedings”, which according to paragraph 1(a) includes the situation
when the court considers an application for permission to impose a TEO. On
the other hand, paragraph 10(1) also refers to proceedings “from which the
party (and any legal representative of the party) is excluded”, which is not
necessarily the reason for the absence of an individual during a ‘prior
permission of the court’-procedure. Consequently, it appears to be for the
“appropriate law officers” to guarantee the appointment of a special
advocate in the interest of the subjected individual, when such an
arrangement is necessary. To leave such an important safeguard to the
discretion of the appropriate law officer is unfortunate from a human rights
perspective and could potentially violate the right to legal assistance in
article 6.3(c).
4.3.3 Right to appeal
In addition, the right of appeal against a court decision on the matter is
awarded only to the Secretary of State and limited to questions of law;
hence, an individual against whom a TEO is imposed may not appeal
against the court’s ruling.288 As the relevant decision that substantially
affects the individual’s situation is the permission to impose a TEO, the
autonomous approach to the term ‘charge’ renders the application of the
right to appeal in article 2 of Protocol No. 7 to the ECHR.289 Yet, the article
guarantees to everyone convicted of a criminal offence the right to appeal;
hence, the decision to impose a TEO must be equated to a ‘conviction’. Due
to the severe implications for the individual – i.e. the severity of the penalty
at stake, in the terminology of the Engel-criteria – the issuance of a TEO
amounts to imposing a criminal penalty (as concluded in chapter 3), which
renders the decision equal to a conviction. Accordingly, to protect the
individual, the right to appeal applies and should be respected by means of
allowing the subjected individual to challenge the court’s decision to give
permission to the Secretary of State to impose a TEO.
Consequently, as the imposition of a TEO creates practical difficulties for
the affected individual to challenge the decision before a judicial authority,
the need for legal representation during the ‘prior permission by a court’-
proceedings is vital. Equally important is the possibility for the individual to
288 CTS Act 2015, s. 3(9).
289 That the term ‘criminal offence’ in article 2 of Protocol No. 7 has the same meaning as
in article 6 is “perhaps […] legitimate to expect”, Trechsel, p. 363.
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appeal against the imposition of such an order, something that is not
provided for by the CTS Act 2015. The resort to judicial review when the
individual has returned to the UK, i.e. has accepted the conditions of a
permit to return, does not compensate for the lacking possibility of appeal.
Such a late entrance of the court means that the individual’s human rights
have already been violated during the time passed since the imposition of
the TEO.
4.4 Interference with the right not to be
subjected to torture or inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment
The role of the judicial authority is apparently to safeguard against arbitrary
interferences with the individual’s human rights and liberties. With respect
to article 3, however, its absolute nature does not permit any interference at
all. In judging the delicate situation of the applicant in Chahal v the United
Kingdom the Court stated “it should not be inferred […] that there is any
room for balancing the risk of ill-treatment against the reasons for expulsion
in determining whether the State’s responsibility under Article 3 (art.3) is
engaged”.290 By the same token, it must be understood that any exclusion of
an individual leaving him or her stranded abroad in a situation at risk of
being subjected to ill-treatment engages the UK’s responsibility. In the
event of passport retention rendering the individual destitute in a situation
amounting to inhuman or degrading treatment in the UK, this is certainly the
case. Thus, the involvement of a court is even more crucial in its function to
guard against an unlawful treatment in breach of article 3. At minimum, in
compliance with ECHR, article 13 taken in conjunction with article 3, the
UK is obliged to offer an effective remedy to review a complaint concerning
the risk of being subjected to such a treatment. The comprehensive
examination of the merits of the case the Court performed in the Chahal-
case further evidences the importance of a rigorous judicial review. The
Court stated:
Indeed, in cases such as the present the Court's examination of the
existence of a real risk of ill-treatment must necessarily be a rigorous
one, in view of the absolute character of Article 3 (art. 3) and the fact
that it enshrines one of the fundamental values of the democratic
societies making up the Council of Europe.291
Respecting the principle of subsidiarity292, the national review system must
equally perform a rigorous examination of the existence of a risk of ill-
290 Chahal, para. 81.
291 Ibid., para. 96.
292 The concept of subsidiarity was explained by the Court in connection to the exhaustion
of domestic remedies in Demopoulos and Others v Turkey, Appl. Nos. 46113/99; 3843/02;
13751/02; 13466/03; 10200/04; 14163/04; 19993/04; 21819/04, Decision on admissibility,
1 March 2010, para 69.
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treatment, which postulates the involvement of an external, objective
authority, preferably a judicial one.
In relation to the right to an effective remedy provided for by article 13 of
the Convention, the ECtHR has expressed its position that it suffices that the
remedy is “as effective as it can be” in circumstances where disclosure of
information is obstructed by national security considerations. Yet, this
assertion was stated in relation to potential interferences with ECHR,
articles 8 and 10; on the contrary, when a breach of article 3 was at stake,
the Court reasoned that such an approach is not appropriate since “the issues
concerning national security are immaterial”.293 Accordingly, by analogy, if
a decision to withhold information for the purpose of protecting national
security is contrary to the requirements of an effective remedy in expulsion
cases, it would equally be contrary to the requirements of an effective
remedy intended to consider an order that has the effect of not allowing an
individual to re-enter the country. It follows from this approach that, for the
TEO procedure to comply with the requirements of the Convention as
interpreted by the Court, the intelligence relied on for imposing a TEO must
be displayed to such an extent that an independent scrutiny of an alleged
breach of article 3 is viable.
4.5 Temporary restrictions on travel in relation
to the right to freedom of movement
The EU Freedom of Movement Directive also requires attention to
procedural safeguards when the right to freedom of movement is restricted.
In the case of Sison v Council of the European Union294, the applicant had
turned to the EU Court of Justice to challenge a decision to freeze his funds,
which resulted from his inclusion on the EU ‘blacklist’ designating him as a
suspected terrorist. In one of several pleas, the applicant alleged that the
decision interfered with his right to a fair trial, the rights of defence and the
presumption of innocence.295 The EU Court of Justice noticed
according to settled case-law, individuals must be able to avail
themselves of effective judicial protection of the rights they have
under the Community legal order, the right to such protection forming
part of the general legal principles deriving from the constitutional
traditions common to the Member States and being enshrined in
Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR.296
Admittedly, the EU Court of Justice proceeded to state that “[t]hat applies in
particular to measures to freeze funds of persons or organisations suspected
of terrorist activities”. However, as the freedom of movement is considered
293 See Chahal, para. 150 with further references.
294 T-47/03, Sison v Council of the European Union, 11 July 2007.
295 See the fifth plea, ibid., para. 86.
296 Ibid., para. 157.
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as “one of the fundamental freedoms of the internal market”297 there is no
reason to assume that this approach would not be applicable also to this
right. The Directive requires, in article 30, notification in writing of any
decision restricting the freedom of movement298, and article 31 contains the
procedural safeguards attached to such a decision. The person concerned
enjoys the right to “have access to judicial and, where appropriate,
administrative redress procedures in the host Member State to appeal
against or seek review”. The reference to ‘host Member State’, indicates that
the Directive addresses a situation where an EU citizen is within the
territory of another EU Member State than his or her State of nationality. It
is thus applicable in circumstances where the UK authorities exercise the
temporary restriction on travel measures against a non-British citizen.
Considering what has been asserted previously in connection with the
alleged statelessness – in particular Goodwin-Gill’s contribution in the
matter299 – it can reasonably be expected that the same responsibility apply
in relation to the citizens of the UK as to citizens of other EU Member
States at current within the UK. Consequently, in accordance with article 31
of the Freedom of Movement Directive an individual subjected to any
temporary restriction on travel measure should have access to judicial
review of the decision. Such redress shall, according to article 31.3 “allow
for an examination of the legality of the decision, as well as of the facts and
circumstances on which the proposed measure is based”; it must also
consider the proportionality of the decision. The involvement of a judicial
authority on the application for prolonging the period of retention of a
passport, when the court considers whether the relevant personnel has acted
diligently and expeditiously, does therefore not satisfy the requirements of
the Directive. Neither does the judicial role of giving permission to
imposing a TEO, or the possibility to appeal against such permission, as
none gives the concerned individual the chance to have the facts and
circumstances on which the decision is taken examined. Hence, the
safeguards in the CTS Act 2015 do not satisfy the standard required by the
Freedom of Movement directive either.
297 See the second section of the preamble.
298 The notification must provide the concerned person with precise and full information
about the grounds on which the decision has been taken, unless it is contrary to the interest
of public security, see article 30.2.
299 See Goodwin-Gill, p. 3. Further supporting the application of the Directive is the EU
Court of Justice’s finding that in deliberating on the right to effective judicial protection
“inspiration may be drawn from the provisions of Directive 2004/38”, Sison, para. 204.
70
5 Conclusion
Rosalyn Higgins asked, “Is our study about terrorism the study of a
substantive topic, or rather the study of the application of international law
to a contemporary problem?”300 My approach is the latter; I apply existing
rules and principles of criminal law to the provisions confronting the
contemporary problem posed by foreign fighters.
The rationale behind the introduction of the CTS Act 2015 was to address
the challenges posed by people who chose to travel outside the UK for
engaging in terrorism, who upon return pose a serious threat against the
public in the UK. The legislation was thus intended to fill gaps in the
previous counter-terrorism legislation, making it feasible to put a spoke in
the wheel for their plans. The method chosen by the UK Government was to
(i) prevent persons from travelling abroad in the first place by means of
seizing and retaining their passports; and (ii) obstruct and subsequently
control their return once they have travelled outside the country. At the
outset, it must be kept in mind that these temporary restrictions on travel are
just one part of a much more comprehensive framework addressing the
disquiet about terrorism and terrorists; hence, the efficiency of the British
counter-terrorism strategy should be evaluated in full with regard not only to
one isolated element but to all components taken together. Nevertheless, it
stems from the analysis performed in this thesis that the appropriateness of
the temporary restriction on travel powers is questionable.
I began this thesis by stating my proposition that the imposition of the
temporary restriction on travel measures is equivalent to subjecting the
individual to a criminal punishment. This proposition was founded on the
mere impression that the consequences following the use of the powers are,
from a human rights perspective, extremely stringent.  Having examined the
three Engel-criteria established by the ECtHR for the purpose of assessing
the de facto character of national provisions as they should be regarded for
the protection of the ECHR, I came to the following conclusion.
In national law, the temporary restrictions on travel are labelled as
administrative powers meaning that the discretion to decide when to impose
such a measure is entrusted to the executives. The decision to seize a
passport and/or travel document is for a port constable to take, and the
authority to decide whether to retain the passport and/or travel document is
accorded to a senior police officer. Likewise, the Secretary of State enjoys
the power to decide the relevant decisions needed for the issuance of a TEO
albeit a court takes the final decision whether to give permission to such an
order. The relevant decisions that substantially affects the individual’s
situation are, accordingly, the ones taken by the senior police officer and the
court respectively.
300 Higgins, Rosalyn, “The general international law of terrorism” in Higgins, Rosalyn and
Flory, Maurice (eds.), Terrorism and International Law, Routledge, London and New
York, 1997, pp. 13-29, p. 13.
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Next, international and regional instruments concerned with terrorism and
foreign fighters, in particular, indicate an obligation to take action to
challenge this threat and that the main provisions should be encompassed by
the criminal law regime. This serves as a background to how the conduct
might be classified in other jurisdictions. The temporary restrictions on
travel provisions are directed against all citizens without distinction with
regard to nationality or age – albeit in relation to TEOs, the individual must
have a right of abode in the UK. The extraordinarily width of the UK
definition of terrorism, which is extended further by the notion of terrorism-
related activity, promotes the inclusion of everyone as potential suspects.
Moreover, the deterrent and punitive purpose with imposing a TEO suggests
that at least this element of the temporary restrictions on travel is criminal in
nature. As regards the seizure and retention of a passport and/or travel
document, the main purpose is to facilitate investigations in relation to the
concerned individual, rendering difficulties to conclude that this measure is
criminal in nature on this ground.
Lastly, the temporary restrictions on travel cause severe intrusions with the
affected individual’s human rights and liberties. Both measures put the right
to private and family life, as protected by ECHR, article 8, and the right to
freedom of movement, as per ICCPR, article 12, at stake; the EU Freedom
of Movement Directive equally protects the latter. In addition, and more
troubling, are the potential interferences with the absolute right not to be
subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,
codified in ECHR, article 3. Furthermore, whether the imposition of a TEO
situates the person in a state of de facto statelessness or not is a disputed
matter, but due to the invalidation of the individual’s passport while a TEO
is in force, there is at least a risk that the person is deprived of the rights a
citizen is entitled to.
In my opinion, the use of the temporary restriction on travel powers cause
intrusions severe enough to conclude that the measures are indeed criminal
in nature. As the Court has accepted a cumulative approach to the three
criteria, this is further evidenced by the nature of the offences. Because of
the UK’s classification of the measures as administrative, the CTS Act 2015
lacks safeguards proper to their criminal character. This is mainly because
of the late entrance of judicial supervision in relation to passport seizure and
retention, and because of the judicial authority’s limited function. In relation
to TEOs, the main obstacle for judicial control is the fact that the concerned
individual is outside the UK, perhaps in a country where practicalities
hampers the ability to get to a British consular or embassy to avail him or
herself of the right to judicial review. To be able to return, the individual
must obey to the conditions in a permit to return, the issuance of which is at
the discretion of the Secretary of State and without the involvement of a
judicial authority, notwithstanding the restrictive conditions that may be
imposed.
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Admittedly, to seize and retain a passport appears advantageous in
comparison to a deprivation of liberty alternative, should it be urgent to
prevent the person from leaving the UK for purposes connected to
protecting the public. Liberty argues that to detain and release the person on
bail is a better option as this would require criminal law safeguards to apply.
With this, I agree, although to deprive someone of liberty because of
reasonable grounds to suspect that he or she will be involved in terrorism-
related activity seem to fall foul of the proportionality and least restrictive
means-principles. One solution to this problem is to acknowledge the ‘civil
preventive hybrid order’ as Ashworth and Zedner advocates, which could
make it possible to act preventively – i.e. before the criminal law threshold
for suspecting someone is reached – but nonetheless require rigid safeguards
to apply. The fact that a failure to hand over the documents or to respect a
TEO or a permit to return constitutes criminal offences making the
individual liable for penalties of up to five years imprisonment, supports this
approach. That a potential penalty is deprivation of liberty for five years is,
in the light of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, more than sufficient for regarding
the offence as criminal. In my view, the offences embrace the whole process
and the criminal character thus extends to the use of the powers in the first
instance, i.e. when the individual’s situation is substantially affected. It goes
without saying that proper judicial scrutiny is vital irrespective of the option
chosen.
As to the imposition of TEOs, I strongly oppose to using powers that
effectively excludes an individual from his or her home country. The
efficiency of this measure has been oppugned, and I agree with that
criticism. I struggle to see how to exclude someone will prevent this person
from being involved in terrorism-related activity. On the contrary, finding
yourself destitute in a State in turmoil, perhaps where a terrorist
organization indeed operates, will not provide incentives for you to obey by
the rules and conditions instituted by the one who excludes you, but rather
nurture your resistance against the governing authorities. This risk is
particularly imminent if the concerned person already is in a vulnerable
position thinking about joining extremists. I do agree with the Independent
Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, David Anderson, in his assertion that to
control the return of young and vulnerable persons has potential to provide
better results in preventing them from adhering to terrorism or criminality.
However, the TEOs as they stand, do not serve that purpose. A favourable
option is the notification of return order advocated by the JCHR, which
could catch young, vulnerable people upon their return to the UK without
leaving them stranded abroad where they become easy targets for terrorist
recruitment. This would also remedy the potential breach of ECHR, article
3, as their treatment would be for the UK authorities to cater for. As I see it,
the instructions on when and how to return to the UK could equally be
attached to a notification of return order, making the Minister for Security
and Immigration, James Brokenshire’s counter-argument about their
inefficiency unfounded. Obviously, to impose a notification of return order
necessitates the involvement of judicial authorities as well, even if the
human rights implications are less alarming.
73
It is evident from the studied cases that there is a tendency to reduce the
protection against intrusions with an individual’s human rights, for the
benefit of public security in the fight against terrorism. This is revealed from
both the innovative ways in which States try to circumvent their obligations
under human rights instruments and from the ECtHR’s indulgence to States
in these matters. Hence, the right to information, for instance, is limited
when national security concerns require so, or the proportionality
assessment in relation to the right to private and family life may approve for
more restrictive interferences than what would otherwise be accepted. The
circumstances and context of each individual case is thus what determines in
the end whether the use of a counter-terrorism measure complies with
human rights standards; although, such concerns are immaterial in
connection to the absolute prohibition of torture or inhuman or degrading
treatment.
It must be emphasized, that I reckon the potential of the temporary
restrictions on travel measures to serve their purpose when it actually is a
terrorist captured in the net. To stop someone from travelling could prevent
that person from gaining experience in terrorism-related activity, which
might chill the conviction about the good purpose and benefits of such
activities. Equally, to prevent someone from returning after having gained
experience could potentially avoid an act of terrorism from taking place in
the UK. However, the question is to what cost these potentially desirable
effects are obtained. The disadvantages of the measures are too palpable to
justify their use. The risk of targeting an innocent is obvious, but even if the
affected individual is not entirely innocent, that person still enjoys the right
to be protected against an arbitrary interference with his or her human rights
and liberties; such protection cannot be sacrificed just because the person is
a suspected terrorist. Taking into account the Court’s condemnation in the
Gillan and Quinton-case of the lack of safeguards attached to the stop and
search powers, it is satisfying to see that the UK Government has included
the requisite of reasonable suspicion as a requisite for using the powers,
albeit this does not compensate for the absence of judicial scrutiny.
Throughout the work with this thesis, several areas for future studies have
been revealed. One apparent candidate is to perform a comparative study of
counter-terrorism measures addressing the threat posed by foreign fighters
in various countries. Such studies would enable an analysis of the
efficiency, proportionality and adequacy of different methods to approach
the issue and thus an approximation to the most advantageous one.
Additionally, empirical studies of the factual use of the temporary
restrictions on travel would allow an assessment of their efficiency
alongside an examination of whether the prohibition of discrimination in
ECHR, article 14 is at peril. Besides, my decision to study the temporary
restrictions on travel provisions should not be understood as diminishing the
significance of the other parts of the CTS Act 2015. On the contrary, the
scrutiny of the remaining measures, as well as prior counter-terrorism
legislation, is of highest relevance in order to comprehensively analyse the
British approach to the balancing between the protection against terrorism
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on the one hand and the individual’s human rights and liberties on the other.
Furthermore, as I noted in chapter 3.2.2, the temporary restriction on travel
powers may be used against all citizens, i.e. without regard to the age of the
targeted individual. Thus, how the measures are used against children and
whether due regard to the age of the individual is taken is particularly
relevant to examine alongside the powers’ capability to comply with the
UK’s international obligations to act in accordance with the best interests of
the child-principle.
To conclude, this thesis is a contribution to the debate about the far-reaching
and restrictive counter-terrorism powers available to the executives in the
United Kingdom today; as such, it is just one piece in the bigger picture.
Nevertheless, my analysis reveals with all desirable clarity the tremendous
need to maintain the respect for human rights by guaranteeing proper
safeguards; after all, an arbitrary exercise of the governing authorities’
powers is what the international human rights instruments were agreed upon
to fetter.
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Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015
2015 CHAPTER 6
PART 1
TEMPORARY RESTRICTIONS ON TRAVEL
CHAPTER 1
POWERS TO SEIZE TRAVEL DOCUMENTS
1 Seizure of passports etc from persons suspected of involvement in terrorism
(1) Schedule 1 makes provision for the seizure and temporary retention of travel
documents where a person is suspected of intending to leave Great Britain or the
United Kingdom in connection with terrorism-related activity.
(2) In Schedule 1 to the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012
(civil legal services)—
(a) in Part 1 (services), after paragraph 45 insert—
“Extension of time for retention of travel documents
45A (1) Civil legal services provided in relation to proceedings under
paragraph 8 of Schedule 1 to the Counter-Terrorism and Security
Act 2015.
Exclusions
(2) Sub-paragraph (1) is subject to the exclusions in Parts 2 and 3 of
this Schedule.”;
(b) in Part 3 (advocacy: exclusion and exceptions), after paragraph 22 insert—
“22A Advocacy in proceedings before a District Judge (Magistrates’
Courts) under paragraph 8 of Schedule 1 to the Counter-Terrorism
and Security Act 2015.”
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(3) In Schedule 2 to the Access to Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2003 (S.I. 2003/435
(N.I. 10)) (civil legal services: excluded services), in paragraph 2(d) (proceedings in
court of summary jurisdiction in relation to which funding for representation may be
provided), after paragraph (xx) insert—
“(xxi) under paragraph 8 of Schedule 1 to the Counter-Terrorism
and Security Act 2015;”.
CHAPTER 2
TEMPORARY EXCLUSION FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM
Imposition of temporary exclusion orders
2 Temporary exclusion orders
(1) A “temporary exclusion order” is an order which requires an individual not to return
to the United Kingdom unless—
(a) the return is in accordance with a permit to return issued by the Secretary of
State before the individual began the return, or
(b) the return is the result of the individual’s deportation to the United Kingdom.
(2) The Secretary of State may impose a temporary exclusion order on an individual if
conditions A to E are met.
(3) Condition A is that the Secretary of State reasonably suspects that the individual is, or
has been, involved in terrorism-related activity outside the United Kingdom.
(4) Condition B is that the Secretary of State reasonably considers that it is necessary,
for purposes connected with protecting members of the public in the United Kingdom
from a risk of terrorism, for a temporary exclusion order to be imposed on the
individual.
(5) Condition C is that the Secretary of State reasonably considers that the individual is
outside the United Kingdom.
(6) Condition D is that the individual has the right of abode in the United Kingdom.
(7) Condition E is that—
(a) the court gives the Secretary of State permission under section 3, or
(b) the Secretary of State reasonably considers that the urgency of the case
requires a temporary exclusion order to be imposed without obtaining such
permission.
(8) During the period that a temporary exclusion order is in force, the Secretary of State
must keep under review whether condition B is met.
3 Temporary exclusion orders: prior permission of the court
(1) This section applies if the Secretary of State—
(a) makes the relevant decisions in relation to an individual, and
Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (c. 6)
PART 1 – Temporary restrictions on travel
CHAPTER 2 – Temporary exclusion from the United Kingdom
Document Generated: 2015-05-05
3
Status: This is the original version (as it was originally enacted).
(b) makes an application to the court for permission to impose a temporary
exclusion order on the individual.
(2) The function of the court on the application is to determine whether the relevant
decisions of the Secretary of State are obviously flawed.
(3) The court may consider the application—
(a) in the absence of the individual,
(b) without the individual having been notified of the application, and
(c) without the individual having been given an opportunity (if the individual was
aware of the application) of making any representations to the court.
(4) But that does not limit the matters about which rules of court may be made.
(5) In determining the application, the court must apply the principles applicable on an
application for judicial review.
(6) In a case where the court determines that any of the relevant decisions of the Secretary
of State is obviously flawed, the court may not give permission under this section.
(7) In any other case, the court must give permission under this section.
(8) Schedule 2 makes provision for references to the court etc where temporary exclusion
orders are imposed in cases of urgency.
(9) Only the Secretary of State may appeal against a determination of the court under—
(a) this section, or
(b) Schedule 2;
and such an appeal may only be made on a question of law.
(10) In this section “the relevant decisions” means the decisions that the following
conditions are met—
(a) condition A;
(b) condition B;
(c) condition C;
(d) condition D.
4 Temporary exclusion orders: supplementary provision
(1) The Secretary of State must give notice of the imposition of a temporary exclusion
order to the individual on whom it is imposed (the “excluded individual”).
(2) Notice of the imposition of a temporary exclusion order must include an explanation
of the procedure for making an application under section 6 for a permit to return.
(3) A temporary exclusion order—
(a) comes into force when notice of its imposition is given; and
(b) is in force for the period of two years (unless revoked or otherwise brought
to an end earlier).
(4) The Secretary of State may revoke a temporary exclusion order at any time.
(5) The Secretary of State must give notice of the revocation of a temporary exclusion
order to the excluded individual.
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(6) If a temporary exclusion order is revoked, it ceases to be in force when notice of its
revocation is given.
(7) The validity of a temporary exclusion order is not affected by the excluded individual
—
(a) returning to the United Kingdom, or
(b) departing from the United Kingdom.
(8) The imposition of a temporary exclusion order does not prevent a further temporary
exclusion order from being imposed on the excluded individual (including in a case
where an order ceases to be in force at the expiry of its two year duration).
(9) At the time when a temporary exclusion order comes into force, any British passport
held by the excluded individual is invalidated.
(10) During the period when a temporary exclusion order is in force, the issue of a British
passport to the excluded individual while he or she is outside the United Kingdom is
not valid.
(11) In this section “British passport” means a passport, or other document which enables or
facilitates travel from one state to another (except a permit to return), that has been—
(a) issued by or for Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom, and
(b) issued in respect of a person’s status as a British citizen.
Permit to return
5 Permit to return
(1) A “permit to return” is a document giving an individual (who is subject to a temporary
exclusion order) permission to return to the United Kingdom.
(2) The permission may be made subject to a requirement that the individual comply with
conditions specified in the permit to return.
(3) The individual’s failure to comply with a specified condition has the effect of
invalidating the permit to return.
(4) A permit to return must state—
(a) the time at which, or period of time during which, the individual is permitted
to arrive on return to the United Kingdom;
(b) the manner in which the individual is permitted to return to the United
Kingdom; and
(c) the place where the individual is permitted to arrive on return to the United
Kingdom.
(5) Provision made under subsection (4)(a) or (c) may, in particular, be framed by
reference to the arrival in the United Kingdom of a specific flight, sailing or other
transport service.
(6) Provision made under subsection (4)(b) may, in particular, state—
(a) a route,
(b) a method of transport,
(c) an airline, shipping line or other passenger carrier, or
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(d) a flight, sailing or other transport service,
which the individual is permitted to use to return to the United Kingdom.
(7) The Secretary of State may not issue a permit to return except in accordance with
section 6 or 7.
(8) It is for the Secretary of State to decide the terms of a permit to return (but this is
subject to section 6(3)).
6 Issue of permit to return: application by individual
(1) If an individual applies to the Secretary of State for a permit to return, the Secretary
of State must issue a permit within a reasonable period after the application is made.
(2) But the Secretary of State may refuse to issue the permit if—
(a) the Secretary of State requires the individual to attend an interview with
a constable or immigration officer at a time and a place specified by the
Secretary of State, and
(b) the individual fails to attend the interview.
(3) Where a permit to return is issued under this section, the relevant return time must fall
within a reasonable period after the application is made.
(4) An application is not valid unless it is made in accordance with the procedure for
applications specified by the Secretary of State.
(5) In this section—
“application” means an application made by an individual to the Secretary
of State for a permit to return to be issued;
“relevant return time” means—
(a) the time at which the individual is permitted to arrive on return to the
United Kingdom (in a case where the permit to return states such a time),
or
(b) the start of the period of time during which the individual is permitted
to arrive on return to the United Kingdom (in a case where the permit
to return states such a period).
7 Issue of permit to return: deportation or urgent situation
(1) The Secretary of State must issue a permit to return to an individual if the Secretary
of State considers that the individual is to be deported to the United Kingdom.
(2) The Secretary of State may issue a permit to return to an individual if—
(a) the Secretary of State considers that, because of the urgency of the situation,
it is expedient to issue a permit to return even though no application has been
made under section 6, and
(b) there is no duty to issue a permit to return under subsection (1).
(3) Subsection (1) or (2) applies whether or not any request has been made to issue the
permit to return under that provision.
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8 Permit to return: supplementary provision
(1) The Secretary of State may vary a permit to return.
(2) The Secretary of State may revoke a permit to return issued to an individual only if—
(a) the permit to return has been issued under section 6 and the individual asks
the Secretary of State to revoke it;
(b) the permit to return has been issued under section 7(1) and the Secretary of
State no longer considers that the individual is to be deported to the United
Kingdom;
(c) the permit to return has been issued under section 7(2) and the Secretary of
State no longer considers that, because of the urgency of the situation, the
issue of the permit to return is expedient;
(d) the Secretary of State issues a subsequent permit to return to the individual; or
(e) the Secretary of State considers that the permit to return has been obtained
by misrepresentation.
(3) The making of an application for a permit to return to be issued under section 6
(whether or not resulting in a permit to return being issued) does not prevent a
subsequent application from being made.
(4) The issuing of a permit to return (whether or not resulting in the individual’s return
to the United Kingdom) does not prevent a subsequent permit to return from being
issued (whether or not the earlier permit is still in force).
Obligations after return to the United Kingdom
9 Obligations after return to the United Kingdom
(1) The Secretary of State may, by notice, impose any or all of the permitted obligations
on an individual who—
(a) is subject to a temporary exclusion order, and
(b) has returned to the United Kingdom.
(2) The “permitted obligations” are—
(a) any obligation of a kind that may be imposed (on an individual subject
to a TPIM notice) under these provisions of Schedule 1 to the Terrorism
Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011—
(i) paragraph 10 (reporting to police station);
(ii) paragraph 10A (attendance at appointments etc);
(b) an obligation to notify the police, in such manner as a notice under this section
may require, of—
(i) the individual’s place (or places) of residence, and
(ii) any change in the individual’s place (or places) of residence.
(3) A notice under this section—
(a) comes into force when given to the individual; and
(b) is in force until the temporary exclusion order ends (unless the notice is
revoked or otherwise brought to an end earlier).
(4) The Secretary of State may, by notice, vary or revoke any notice given under this
section.
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(5) The variation or revocation of a notice under this section takes effect when the notice
of variation or revocation is given to the individual.
(6) The validity of a notice under this section is not affected by the individual—
(a) departing from the United Kingdom, or
(b) returning to the United Kingdom.
(7) The giving of any notice to an individual under this section does not prevent any further
notice under this section from being given to that individual.
Offences and proceedings etc
10 Offences
(1) An individual subject to a temporary exclusion order is guilty of an offence if, without
reasonable excuse, the individual returns to the United Kingdom in contravention of
the restriction on return specified in the order.
(2) It is irrelevant for the purposes of subsection (1) whether or not the individual has a
passport or other similar identity document.
(3) An individual subject to an obligation imposed under section 9 is guilty of an offence
if, without reasonable excuse, the individual does not comply with the obligation.
(4) In a case where a relevant notice has not actually been given to an individual, the
fact that the relevant notice is deemed to have been given to the individual under
regulations under section 13 does not (of itself) prevent the individual from showing
that lack of knowledge of the temporary exclusion order, or of the obligation imposed
under section 9, was a reasonable excuse for the purposes of this section.
(5) An individual guilty of an offence under this section is liable—
(a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years
or to a fine, or to both;
(b) on summary conviction in England and Wales, to imprisonment for a term not
exceeding 12 months or to a fine, or to both;
(c) on summary conviction in Northern Ireland, to imprisonment for a term not
exceeding 6 months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to
both;
(d) on summary conviction in Scotland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding
12 months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to both.
(6) Where an individual is convicted by or before a court of an offence under this section,
it is not open to that court to make in respect of the offence—
(a) an order under section 12(1)(b) of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing)
Act 2000 (conditional discharge);
(b) an order under section 227A of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995
(community pay-back orders); or
(c) an order under Article 4(1)(b) of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order
1996 (S.I. 1996/3160 (N.I. 24)) (conditional discharge in Northern Ireland).
(7) In this section—
“relevant notice” means—
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(a) notice of the imposition of a temporary exclusion order, or
(b) notice under section 9 imposing an obligation;
“restriction on return” means the requirement specified in a temporary
exclusion order in accordance with section 2(1).
(8) In section 2 of the UK Borders Act 2007 (detention at ports), in subsection (1A), for
“the individual is subject to a warrant for arrest” substitute  “the individual—
(a) may be liable to be detained by a constable under section 14 of the
Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 in respect of an offence
under section 10(1) of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015,
or
(b) is subject to a warrant for arrest.”
11 Review of decisions relating to temporary exclusion orders
(1) This section applies where an individual who is subject to a temporary exclusion order
is in the United Kingdom.
(2) The individual may apply to the court to review any of the following decisions of the
Secretary of State—
(a) a decision that any of the following conditions was met in relation to the
imposition of the temporary exclusion order—
(i) condition A;
(ii) condition B;
(iii) condition C;
(iv) condition D;
(b) a decision to impose the temporary exclusion order;
(c) a decision that condition B continues to be met;
(d) a decision to impose any of the permitted obligations on the individual by a
notice under section 9.
(3) On a review under this section, the court must apply the principles applicable on an
application for judicial review.
(4) On a review of a decision within subsection (2)(a) to (c), the court has the following
powers (and only those powers)—
(a) power to quash the temporary exclusion order;
(b) power to give directions to the Secretary of State for, or in relation to, the
revocation of the temporary exclusion order.
(5) If the court does not exercise either of its powers under subsection (4), the court must
decide that the temporary exclusion order is to continue in force.
(6) On a review of a decision within subsection (2)(d), the court has the following powers
(and only those powers)—
(a) power to quash the permitted obligation in question;
(b) if that is the only permitted obligation imposed by the notice under section 9,
power to quash the notice;
(c) power to give directions to the Secretary of State for, or in relation to—
(i) the variation of the notice so far as it relates to that permitted
obligation, or
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(ii) if that is the only permitted obligation imposed by the notice, the
revocation of the notice.
(7) If the court does not exercise any of its powers under subsection (6), the court must
decide that the notice under section 9 is to continue in force.
(8) If the court exercises a power under subsection (6)(a) or (c)(i), the court must decide
that the notice under section 9 is to continue in force subject to that exercise of that
power.
(9) The power under this section to quash a temporary exclusion order, permitted
obligation or notice under section 9 includes—
(a) in England and Wales or Northern Ireland, power to stay the quashing for a
specified time, or pending an appeal or further appeal against the decision to
quash; or
(b) in Scotland, power to determine that the quashing is of no effect for a specified
time or pending such an appeal or further appeal.
(10) An appeal against a determination of the court on a review under this section may only
be made on a question of law.
(11) For the purposes of this section, a failure by the Secretary of State to make a decision
whether condition B continues to be met is to be treated as a decision that it continues
to be met.
12 Temporary exclusion orders: proceedings and appeals against convictions
(1) Schedule 3 makes provision about proceedings relating to temporary exclusion orders.
(2) Schedule 4 makes provision about appeals against convictions in cases where a
temporary exclusion order, a notice under section 9 or a permitted obligation is
quashed.
Supplementary
13 Regulations: giving of notices, legislation relating to passports
(1) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision about the giving of—
(a) notice under section 4, and
(b) notice under section 9.
(2) The regulations may, in particular, make provision about cases in which notice is to
be deemed to have been given.
(3) The Secretary of State may make regulations providing for legislation relating to
passports or other identity documents (whenever passed or made) to apply (with or
without modifications) to permits to return.
(4) The power to make regulations under this section—
(a) is exercisable by statutory instrument;
(b) includes power to make transitional, transitory or saving provision.
(5) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section is subject to
annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.
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14 Chapter 2: interpretation
(1) This section applies for the purposes of this Chapter.
(2) These expressions have the meanings given—
“act” and “conduct” include omissions and statements;
“act of terrorism” includes anything constituting an action taken for the
purposes of terrorism, within the meaning of the Terrorism Act 2000 (see
section 1(5) of that Act);
“condition A”, “condition B”, “condition C”, “condition D” or “condition
E” means that condition as set out in section 2;
“court” means—
(a) in the case of proceedings relating to an individual whose principal place
of residence is in Scotland, the Outer House of the Court of Session;
(b) in the case of proceedings relating to an individual whose principal place
of residence is in Northern Ireland, the High Court in Northern Ireland;
(c) in any other case, the High Court in England and Wales;
“permit to return” has the meaning given in section 5;
“temporary exclusion order” has the meaning given in section 2;
“terrorism” has the same meaning as in the Terrorism Act 2000 (see
section 1(1) to (4) of that Act).
(3) An individual is—
(a) subject to a temporary exclusion order if a temporary exclusion order is in
force in relation to the individual; and
(b) subject to an obligation imposed under section 9 if an obligation is imposed
on the individual by a notice in force under that section.
(4) Involvement in terrorism-related activity is any one or more of the following—
(a) the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism;
(b) conduct that facilitates the commission, preparation or instigation of such acts,
or is intended to do so;
(c) conduct that gives encouragement to the commission, preparation or
instigation of such acts, or is intended to do so;
(d) conduct that gives support or assistance to individuals who are known or
believed by the individual concerned to be involved in conduct falling within
paragraph (a).
It is immaterial whether the acts of terrorism in question are specific acts of terrorism
or acts of terrorism in general.
(5) It is immaterial whether an individual’s involvement in terrorism-related activity
occurs before or after the coming into force of section 2.
(6) References to an individual’s return to the United Kingdom include, in the case of an
individual who has never been in the United Kingdom, a reference to the individual’s
coming to the United Kingdom for the first time.
(7) References to deportation include references to any other kind of expulsion.
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15 Chapter 2: consequential amendments
(1) In paragraph 2 of Schedule 1 to the Senior Courts Act 1981 (business allocated to the
Queen’s Bench Division), after paragraph (bd) insert—
“(be) all TEO proceedings (within the meaning given by paragraph 1
of Schedule 3 to the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015
(proceedings relating to temporary exclusion orders));”.
(2) In section 133(5) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (compensation for miscarriages of
justice)—
(a) omit “or” at the end of paragraph (e);
(b) after paragraph (f) insert  “or
(g) on an appeal under Schedule 4 to the Counter-Terrorism and
Security Act 2015.”
(3) In section 18 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (exclusion of matter
from legal proceedings: exceptions)—
(a) in subsection (1), after paragraph (dd) insert—
“(de) any TEO proceedings (within the meaning given by
paragraph 1 of Schedule 3 to the Counter-Terrorism
and Security Act 2015 (temporary exclusion orders:
proceedings)) or any proceedings arising out of such
proceedings;”;
(b) in subsection (2), after paragraph (zc) insert—
“(zd) in the case of proceedings falling within paragraph (de), to—
(i) a person, other than the Secretary of State, who is or
was a party to the proceedings, or
(ii) any person who for the purposes of the proceedings
(but otherwise than by virtue of appointment as a
special advocate under Schedule 3 to the Counter-
Terrorism and Security Act 2015) represents a person
falling within sub-paragraph (i);”.
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S C H E D U L E S
SCHEDULE 1 Section 1
SEIZURE OF PASSPORTS ETC FROM PERSONS SUSPECTED OF INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORISM
Interpretation
1 (1) The following definitions have effect for the purposes of this Schedule.
(2) “Immigration officer” means a person who is appointed as an immigration officer
under paragraph 1 of Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971.
(3) “Customs official” means a person who is designated as a general customs official
under section 3(1) of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 or as a
customs revenue official under section 11(1) of that Act.
(4) “Qualified officer” means an immigration officer or customs official who is
designated by the Secretary of State for the purposes of this Schedule.
(5) “Senior police officer” means a police officer of at least the rank of superintendent.
(6) “Travel document” means anything that is or appears to be—
(a) a passport, or
(b) a ticket or other document that permits a person to make a journey by any
means from a place within Great Britain to a place outside Great Britain, or
from a place within Northern Ireland to a place outside the United Kingdom.
(7) “Passport” means—
(a) a United Kingdom passport (within the meaning of the Immigration Act
1971),
(b) a passport issued by or on behalf of the authorities of a country or
territory outside the United Kingdom, or by or on behalf of an international
organisation, or
(c) a document that can be used (in some or all circumstances) instead of a
passport.
(8) “Port” means—
(a) an airport,
(b) a sea port,
(c) a hoverport,
(d) a heliport,
(e) a railway station where passenger trains depart for, or arrive from, places
outside the United Kingdom, or
(f) any other place at which a person is able, or attempting, to get on or off any
craft, vessel or vehicle in connection with entering or leaving Great Britain
or Northern Ireland.
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(9) A place is “in the border area” if it is in Northern Ireland and is no more than one
mile from the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.
(10) “Involvement in terrorism-related activity” is any one or more of the following—
(a) the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism;
(b) conduct that facilitates the commission, preparation or instigation of such
acts, or is intended to do so;
(c) conduct that gives encouragement to the commission, preparation or
instigation of such acts, or is intended to do so;
(d) conduct that gives support or assistance to individuals who are known or
believed by the person concerned to be involved in conduct falling within
paragraph (a).
It is immaterial whether the acts of terrorism in question are specific acts of terrorism
or acts of terrorism in general.
(11) “Terrorism” and “terrorist” have the same meaning as in the Terrorism Act 2000 (see
sections 1(1) to (4) and 40 of that Act).
(12) “Judicial authority” means—
(a) in England and Wales, a District Judge (Magistrates’ Courts) who is—
(i) designated under paragraph 29(4)(a) of Schedule 8 to the Terrorism
Act 2000, or
(ii) designated for the purposes of this Schedule by the Lord Chief
Justice of England and Wales;
(b) in Scotland, the sheriff;
(c) in Northern Ireland, a county court judge, or a district judge (magistrates’
courts) who is—
(i) designated under paragraph 29(4)(c) of Schedule 8 to the Terrorism
Act 2000, or
(ii) designated for the purposes of this Schedule by the Lord Chief
Justice of Northern Ireland.
(13) The Lord Chief Justice may nominate a judicial office holder (as defined in
section 109(4) of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005) to exercise his or her functions
under sub-paragraph (12)(a)(ii).
(14) The Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland may nominate any of the following to
exercise his or her functions under sub-paragraph (12)(c)(ii)—
(a) the holder of one of the offices listed in Schedule 1 to the Justice (Northern
Ireland) Act 2002;
(b) a Lord Justice of Appeal (as defined in section 88 of that Act).
(15) “The 14-day period” and “the 30-day period” have the meanings given by
paragraphs 5(2) and 8(7) respectively.
Powers of search and seizure etc
2 (1) This paragraph applies in the case of a person at a port in Great Britain if a constable
has reasonable grounds to suspect that the person—
(a) is there with the intention of leaving Great Britain for the purpose of
involvement in terrorism-related activity outside the United Kingdom, or
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(b) has arrived in Great Britain with the intention of leaving it soon for that
purpose.
(2) This paragraph applies in the case of a person at a port in Northern Ireland, or in the
border area, if a constable has reasonable grounds to suspect that the person—
(a) is there with the intention of leaving the United Kingdom for the purpose of
involvement in terrorism-related activity outside the United Kingdom, or
(b) has arrived in Northern Ireland with the intention of leaving the United
Kingdom soon for that purpose.
(3) The constable may—
(a) exercise any of the powers in sub-paragraph (5) in the case of the person, or
(b) direct a qualified officer to do so.
(4) A qualified officer must (if able to do so) comply with any direction given by a
constable under sub-paragraph (3)(b).
(5) The powers are—
(a) to require the person to hand over all travel documents in his or her
possession to the constable or (as the case may be) the qualified officer;
(b) to search for travel documents relating to the person and to take possession
of any that the constable or officer finds;
(c) to inspect any travel document relating to the person;
(d) to retain any travel document relating to the person that is lawfully in the
possession of the constable or officer.
(6) The power in sub-paragraph (5)(b) is a power to search—
(a) the person;
(b) anything that the person has with him or her;
(c) any vehicle in which the officer believes the person to have been travelling
or to be about to travel.
(7) A constable or qualified officer—
(a) may stop a person or vehicle for the purpose of exercising a power in sub-
paragraph (5)(a) or (b);
(b) may if necessary use reasonable force for the purpose of exercising a power
in sub-paragraph (5)(a) or (b);
(c) may authorise a person to carry out on the constable’s or officer’s behalf a
search under sub-paragraph (5)(b).
(8) A constable or qualified officer exercising a power in sub-paragraph (5)(a) or (b)
must tell the person that—
(a) the person is suspected of intending to leave Great Britain or (as the case
may be) the United Kingdom for the purpose of involvement in terrorism-
related activity outside the United Kingdom, and
(b) the constable or officer is therefore entitled under this Schedule to exercise
the power.
(9) Where a travel document relating to the person is in the possession of an immigration
officer or customs official (whether a qualified officer or not), the constable may
direct the officer or official—
(a) to pass the document to a constable as soon as practicable, and
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(b) in the meantime to retain it.
The officer or official must comply with any such direction.
Travel documents in possession of immigration officers or customs officials
3 (1) Where—
(a) a travel document lawfully comes into the possession of an immigration
officer or customs official (whether a qualified officer or not) without a
power under paragraph 2 being exercised, and
(b) as soon as possible after taking possession of the document, the officer or
official asks a constable whether the constable wishes to give a direction
under paragraph 2(9) in relation to the document,
the officer or official may retain the document until the constable tells him or her
whether or not the constable wishes to give such a direction.
(2) A request under sub-paragraph (1) must be considered as soon as possible.
Authorisation by senior police officer for retention of travel document
4 (1) Where a travel document is in the possession of a constable or qualified officer as a
result of the exercise of a power under paragraph 2, the relevant constable must as
soon as possible either—
(a) seek authorisation from a senior police officer for the document to be
retained, or
(b) ensure that the document is returned to the person to whom it relates.
“The relevant constable” means the constable by whom, or on whose direction, the
power was exercised.
(2) The document may be retained while an application for authorisation is considered.
(3) A constable or qualified officer retaining a travel document under sub-paragraph (2)
must tell the person to whom the document relates that—
(a) the person is suspected of intending to leave Great Britain or (as the case
may be) the United Kingdom for the purpose of involvement in terrorism-
related activity outside the United Kingdom, and
(b) the constable or officer is therefore entitled under this Schedule to retain the
document while the matter is considered by a senior police officer.
This does not apply if the constable or qualified officer expects the application for
authorisation to be dealt with immediately, or if sub-paragraph (4) has been complied
with.
(4) An immigration officer or customs official to whom a direction is given under
paragraph 2(9) must tell the person to whom the travel document in question relates
that—
(a) the person is suspected of intending to leave Great Britain or (as the case
may be) the United Kingdom for the purpose of involvement in terrorism-
related activity outside the United Kingdom, and
(b) a constable is therefore entitled under this Schedule to retain the document
while the matter is considered by a senior police officer.
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This does not apply if the immigration officer or customs official expects the
application for authorisation to be dealt with immediately.
(5) If an application for authorisation is granted—
(a) the travel document must be passed to a constable if it is not already in the
possession of a constable, and
(b) paragraph 5 applies.
(6) If an application for authorisation is refused, the travel document must be returned
to the person as soon as possible.
(7) A senior police officer may grant an application for authorisation only if satisfied that
there are reasonable grounds for the suspicion referred to in paragraph 2(1) or (2).
(8) An authorisation need not be in writing.
(9) Sub-paragraphs (1)(b) and (6) are subject to paragraph 7 and to any power or
provision not in this Schedule under which the document may be lawfully retained
or otherwise dealt with.
Retention or return of documents seized
5 (1) Where authorisation is given under paragraph 4 for a travel document relating to a
person to be retained, it may continue to be retained—
(a) while the Secretary of State considers whether to cancel the person’s
passport,
(b) while consideration is given to charging the person with an offence,
(c) while consideration is given to making the person subject to any order or
measure to be made or imposed by a court, or by the Secretary of State, for
purposes connected with protecting members of the public from a risk of
terrorism, or
(d) while steps are taken to carry out any of the actions mentioned in
paragraphs (a) to (c).
(2) But a travel document may not be retained under this Schedule after the end of the
period of 14 days beginning with the day after the document was taken (“the 14-day
period”), unless that period is extended under paragraph 8 or 11(3).
(3) The travel document must be returned to the person as soon as possible—
(a) once the 14-day period (or the 14-day period as extended under paragraph 8
or 11(3)) expires;
(b) once the power in sub-paragraph (1) ceases to apply, if that happens earlier.
This is subject to paragraph 7 and to any power or provision not in this Schedule
under which the document may be lawfully retained or otherwise dealt with.
(4) The constable to whom a travel document is passed under paragraph 2(9) or 4(5)(a),
or who is in possession of it when authorisation is given under paragraph 4, must
explain to the person the effect of sub-paragraphs (1) to (3).
(5) The constable must also tell the person, if he or she has not been told already under
paragraph 2(8) or 4(3) or (4), that the person is suspected of intending to leave Great
Britain or (as the case may be) the United Kingdom for the purpose of involvement
in terrorism-related activity outside the United Kingdom.
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Review of retention of travel documents
6 (1) This paragraph applies where—
(a) authorisation is given under paragraph 4 for a travel document relating to a
person to be retained, and
(b) the document is still being retained by a constable at the end of the period
of 72 hours beginning when the document was taken from the person (“the
72-hour period”).
(2) A police officer who is—
(a) of at least the rank of chief superintendent, and
(b) of at least as high a rank as the senior police officer who gave the
authorisation,
must carry out a review of whether the decision to give authorisation was flawed.
(3) The reviewing officer must—
(a) begin carrying out the review within the 72-hour period,
(b) complete the review as soon as possible, and
(c) communicate the findings of the review in writing to the relevant chief
constable.
(4) The relevant chief constable must consider those findings and take whatever action
seems appropriate.
(5) If a power under paragraph 2 was exercised in relation to the travel document by an
immigration officer or customs official designated under paragraph 17, the reviewing
officer must also communicate the findings of the review in writing to the Secretary
of State.
(6) In this paragraph—
“reviewing officer” means the officer carrying out a review under this
paragraph;
“relevant chief constable” means—
(a) (except where paragraph (b) or (c) applies) the chief officer of police
under whose direction and control is the constable retaining the
document;
(b) the chief constable of the Police Service of Scotland, if the constable
retaining the document is under that chief constable’s direction and
control;
(c) the chief constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland, if
the constable retaining the document is under that chief constable’s
direction and control.
Detention of document for criminal proceedings etc
7 (1) A requirement under paragraph 4 or 5 to return a travel document in the possession
of a constable or qualified officer does not apply while the constable or officer has
power to detain it under sub-paragraph (2).
(2) The constable or qualified officer may detain the document—
(a) while the constable or officer believes that it may be needed for use as
evidence in criminal proceedings, or
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(b) while the constable or officer believes that it may be needed in connection
with a decision by the Secretary of State whether to make a deportation order
under the Immigration Act 1971.
Extension of 14-day period by judicial authority
8 (1) A senior police officer may apply to a judicial authority for an extension of the 14-
day period.
(2) An application must be made before the end of the 14-day period.
(3) An application may be heard only if reasonable efforts have been made to give to the
person to whom the application relates a notice stating—
(a) the time when the application was made;
(b) the time and place at which it is to be heard.
(4) On an application—
(a) the judicial authority must grant an extension if satisfied that the relevant
persons have been acting diligently and expeditiously in relation to the
matters and steps referred to in sub-paragraph (5);
(b) otherwise, the judicial authority must refuse to grant an extension.
(5) In sub-paragraph (4) “the relevant persons” means—
(a) the persons responsible for considering whichever of the matters referred to
in paragraph 5(1)(a) to (c) are under consideration, and
(b) the persons responsible for taking whichever of the steps referred to in
paragraph 5(1)(d) are being taken or are intended to be taken.
(6) An extension must be for a further period ending no later than the end of the 30-
day period.
(7) “The 30-day period” means the period of 30 days beginning with the day after the
document in question was taken.
9 (1) The person to whom an application under paragraph 8 relates—
(a) must be given an opportunity to make oral or written representations to the
judicial authority about the application;
(b) subject to sub-paragraph (3), is entitled to be legally represented at the
hearing.
(2) A judicial authority must adjourn the hearing of an application to enable the person
to whom the application relates to obtain legal representation where the person—
(a) is not legally represented,
(b) is entitled to be legally represented, and
(c) wishes to be legally represented.
(3) A judicial authority may exclude any of the following persons from any part of the
hearing—
(a) the person to whom the application relates;
(b) anyone representing that person.
10 (1) A person who has made an application under paragraph 8 may apply to the judicial
authority for an order that specified information upon which he or she intends to rely
be withheld from—
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(a) the person to whom the application relates, and
(b) anyone representing that person.
(2) A judicial authority may make an order under sub-paragraph (1) in relation to
specified information only if satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing
that if the information was disclosed—
(a) evidence of an offence under any of the provisions mentioned in
section 40(1)(a) of the Terrorism Act 2000 would be interfered with or
harmed,
(b) the recovery of property obtained as a result of an offence under any of those
provisions would be hindered,
(c) the recovery of property in respect of which a forfeiture order could be made
under section 23 or 23A of that Act would be hindered,
(d) the apprehension, prosecution or conviction of a person who is suspected
of being a terrorist would be made more difficult as a result of the person
being alerted,
(e) the prevention of an act of terrorism would be made more difficult as a result
of a person being alerted,
(f) the gathering of information about the commission, preparation or
instigation of an act of terrorism would be interfered with,
(g) a person would be interfered with or physically injured, or
(h) national security would be put at risk.
(3) The judicial authority must direct that the following be excluded from the hearing of
an application under this paragraph—
(a) the person to whom the application under paragraph 8 relates;
(b) anyone representing that person.
11 (1) A judicial authority may adjourn the hearing of an application under paragraph 8
only if the hearing is adjourned to a date before the expiry of the 14-day period.
(2) Sub-paragraph (1) does not apply to an adjournment under paragraph 9(2).
(3) If an application is adjourned under paragraph 9(2) to a date after the expiry of the
14-day period, the judicial authority must extend the period until that date.
12 (1) If an extension is granted under paragraph 8 for a period ending before the end of
the 30-day period, one further application may be made under that paragraph.
(2) Paragraphs 8 to 11 apply to a further application as if references to the 14-day period
were references to that period as previously extended.
Restriction on repeated use of powers
13 (1) Where—
(a) a power under paragraph 4 or 5 to retain a document relating to a person is
exercised, and
(b) powers under this Schedule have been exercised in the same person’s case
on two or more occasions in the previous 6 months,
this Schedule has effect with the following modifications.
(2) References to 14 days (in paragraph 5(2) and elsewhere) are to be read as references
to 5 days.
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(3) Paragraph 8 has effect as if the following were substituted for sub-paragraph (4)—
“(4) On an application, the judicial authority must grant an extension if
satisfied that—
(a) the relevant persons have been acting diligently and expeditiously
in relation to the matters and steps referred to in sub-
paragraph (5), and
(b) there are exceptional circumstances justifying the further use of
powers under this Schedule in relation to the same person.
Otherwise, the judicial authority must refuse to grant an extension.”
Persons unable to leave the United Kingdom
14 (1) This paragraph applies where a person’s travel documents are retained under this
Schedule with the result that, for the period during which they are so retained (“the
relevant period”), the person is unable to leave the United Kingdom.
(2) The Secretary of State may make whatever arrangements he or she thinks appropriate
in relation to the person—
(a) during the relevant period;
(b) on the relevant period coming to an end.
(3) If at any time during the relevant period the person does not have leave to enter or
remain in the United Kingdom, the person’s presence in the United Kingdom at that
time is nevertheless not unlawful for the purposes of the Immigration Act 1971.
Offences
15 (1) A person who is required under paragraph 2(5)(a) to hand over all travel documents
in the person’s possession commits an offence if he or she fails without reasonable
excuse to do so.
(2) A person who intentionally obstructs, or seeks to frustrate, a search under paragraph 2
commits an offence.
(3) A person guilty of an offence under this paragraph is liable on summary conviction—
(a) to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months, or
(b) to a fine, which in Scotland or Northern Ireland may not exceed level 5 on
the standard scale,
or to both.
16 A qualified officer exercising a power under paragraph 2 has the same powers of
arrest without warrant as a constable in relation to an offence under paragraph 15.
Accredited immigration officers and customs officials
17 (1) For the purposes of this paragraph, a qualified officer is an “accredited” immigration
officer or customs official if designated as such by the Secretary of State.
(2) Sub-paragraphs (1), (2) and (3)(a) of paragraph 2 apply to an accredited immigration
officer or customs official as they apply to a constable.
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(3) In paragraph 2(3)(b) and (4) “qualified officer” does not include an accredited
immigration officer or customs official.
(4) In paragraphs 2(9) and 3 “immigration officer or customs official” does not include
an accredited immigration officer or customs official.
(5) Paragraph 4(1) has effect, in relation to a travel document that is in the possession of
an accredited immigration officer or customs official as a result of the exercise of a
power under paragraph 2 by that officer or official, as if the reference to the relevant
constable were a reference to that officer or official.
Code of practice
18 (1) The Secretary of State must issue a code of practice with regard to the exercise of
functions under this Schedule.
(2) The code of practice must in particular deal with the following matters—
(a) the procedure for making designations under paragraphs 1(4) and 17;
(b) training to be undertaken by persons who are to exercise powers under this
Schedule;
(c) the exercise by constables, immigration officers and customs officials of
functions conferred on them by virtue of this Schedule;
(d) information to be given to a person in whose case a power under this
Schedule is exercised;
(e) how and when that information is to be given;
(f) reviews under paragraph 6.
(3) A constable, immigration officer or customs official must perform functions
conferred on him or her by virtue of this Schedule in accordance with any relevant
provision included in the code by virtue of sub-paragraph (2)(c) to (e).
(4) The failure by a constable, immigration officer or customs official to observe
any such provision does not of itself make him or her liable to criminal or civil
proceedings.
(5) The code of practice—
(a) is admissible in evidence in criminal and civil proceedings;
(b) is to be taken into account by a court or tribunal in any case in which it
appears to the court or tribunal to be relevant.
19 (1) Before issuing the code of practice the Secretary of State must—
(a) publish it in draft,
(b) consider any representations made about the draft, and
(c) if the Secretary of State thinks it appropriate, modify the draft in the light
of any representations made.
(2) The Secretary of State must lay a draft of the code before Parliament.
(3) Anything done before the day on which this Act is passed is as valid as if done on or
after that day for the purposes of sub-paragraphs (1) and (2).
(4) Once the code has been laid in draft before Parliament the Secretary of State may
bring it into operation by regulations made by statutory instrument.
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(5) The first regulations under sub-paragraph (4) cease to have effect at the end of the
period of 40 days beginning with the day on which the Secretary of State makes the
regulations, unless a resolution approving the regulations is passed by each House
of Parliament during that period.
(6) A statutory instrument containing any subsequent regulations under sub-
paragraph (4) may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before
each House of Parliament and approved by a resolution of each House.
(7) If regulations cease to have effect under sub-paragraph (5)—
(a) the code of practice to which the regulations relate also ceases to have effect,
but
(b) that does not affect anything previously done, or the power to make new
regulations or to issue a new code.
(8) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (5), the period of 40 days is to be computed in
accordance with section 7(1) of the Statutory Instruments Act 1946.
20 (1) The Secretary of State may revise the code of practice and issue the revised code.
(2) Paragraph 19 has effect in relation to the issue of a revised code as it has effect in
relation to the first issue of the code.
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S C H E D U L E S
SCHEDULE 2 Section 3
URGENT TEMPORARY EXCLUSION ORDERS: REFERENCE TO THE COURT ETC
Application
1 This Schedule applies if the Secretary of State—
(a) makes the urgent case decisions in relation to an individual, and
(b) imposes a temporary exclusion order on the individual.
Statement of urgency
2 The temporary exclusion order must include a statement that the Secretary of State
reasonably considers that the urgency of the case requires the order to be imposed
without obtaining the permission of the court under section 3.
Reference to court
3 (1) Immediately after giving notice of the imposition of the temporary exclusion order,
the Secretary of State must refer to the court the imposition of the order on the
individual.
(2) The function of the court on the reference is to consider whether the urgent case
decisions were obviously flawed.
(3) The court’s consideration of the reference must begin within the period of 7 days
beginning with the day on which notice of the imposition of the temporary exclusion
order is given to the individual.
(4) The court may consider the reference—
(a) in the absence of the individual,
(b) without the individual having been notified of the reference, and
(c) without the individual having been given an opportunity (if the individual
was aware of the reference) of making any representations to the court.
(5) But that does not limit the matters about which rules of court may be made.
Decision by court
4 (1) In a case where the court determines that any of the relevant decisions of the Secretary
of State is obviously flawed, the court must quash the temporary exclusion order.
(2) If sub-paragraph (1) does not apply, the court must confirm the temporary exclusion
order.
(3) If the court determines that the decision of the Secretary of State that the urgency
condition is met is obviously flawed, the court must make a declaration of that
2 Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (c. 6)
SCHEDULE 2 – Urgent temporary exclusion orders: reference to the court etc
Document Generated: 2015-05-22
Status: This is the original version (as it was originally enacted).
determination (whether it quashes or confirms the temporary exclusion order under
the preceding provisions of this paragraph).
Procedures on reference
5 (1) In determining a reference under paragraph 3, the court must apply the principles
applicable on an application for judicial review.
(2) The court must ensure that the individual is notified of the court’s decision on a
reference under paragraph 3.
Interpretation
6 (1) References in this Schedule to the urgency condition being met are references to
condition E being met by virtue of section 2(7)(b) (urgency of the case requires a
temporary exclusion order to be imposed without obtaining the permission of the
court).
(2) In this Schedule “the urgent case decisions” means the relevant decisions and the
decision that the urgency condition is met.
(3) In this Schedule “the relevant decisions” means the decisions that the following
conditions are met—
(a) condition A;
(b) condition B;
(c) condition C;
(d) condition D.
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S C H E D U L E S
SCHEDULE 3 Section 12
TEMPORARY EXCLUSION ORDERS: PROCEEDINGS
Introductory
1 In this Schedule—
“appeal proceedings” means proceedings in the Court of Appeal or
the Inner House of the Court of Session on an appeal relating to TEO
proceedings;
“the relevant court” means—
(a) in relation to TEO proceedings, the court;
(b) in relation to appeal proceedings, the Court of Appeal or the Inner
House of the Court of Session;
“rules of court” means rules for regulating the practice and procedure to
be followed in the court, the Court of Appeal or the Inner House of the Court
of Session;
“TEO proceedings” means proceedings on—
(a) an application under section 3,
(b) a reference under Schedule 2,
(c) a review under section 11, or
(d) an application made by virtue of paragraph 6 of this Schedule
(application for order requiring anonymity).
Rules of court: general provision
2 (1) A person making rules of court relating to TEO proceedings or appeal proceedings
must have regard to the need to secure the following—
(a) that the decisions that are the subject of the proceedings are properly
reviewed, and
(b) that disclosures of information are not made where they would be contrary
to the public interest.
(2) Rules of court relating to TEO proceedings or appeal proceedings may make
provision—
(a) about the mode of proof and about evidence in the proceedings;
(b) enabling or requiring the proceedings to be determined without a hearing;
(c) about legal representation in the proceedings;
(d) enabling the proceedings to take place without full particulars of the reasons
for the decisions to which the proceedings relate being given to a party to
the proceedings (or to any legal representative of that party);
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(e) enabling the relevant court to conduct proceedings in the absence of any
person, including a party to the proceedings (or any legal representative of
that party);
(f) about the functions of a person appointed as a special advocate (see
paragraph 10);
(g) enabling the relevant court to give a party to the proceedings a summary of
evidence taken in the party’s absence.
(3) In this paragraph—
(a) references to a party to the proceedings do not include the Secretary of State;
(b) references to a party’s legal representative do not include a person appointed
as a special advocate.
Rules of court: disclosure
3 (1) Rules of court relating to TEO proceedings or appeal proceedings must secure that
the Secretary of State is required to disclose—
(a) material on which the Secretary of State relies,
(b) material which adversely affects the Secretary of State’s case, and
(c) material which supports the case of another party to the proceedings.
(2) This paragraph is subject to paragraph 4.
4 (1) Rules of court relating to TEO proceedings or appeal proceedings must secure—
(a) that the Secretary of State has the opportunity to make an application to the
relevant court for permission not to disclose material otherwise than to the
relevant court and any person appointed as a special advocate;
(b) that such an application is always considered in the absence of every party
to the proceedings (and every party’s legal representative);
(c) that the relevant court is required to give permission for material not to be
disclosed if it considers that the disclosure of the material would be contrary
to the public interest;
(d) that, if permission is given by the relevant court not to disclose material,
it must consider requiring the Secretary of State to provide a summary
of the material to every party to the proceedings (and every party’s legal
representative);
(e) that the relevant court is required to ensure that such a summary does not
contain material the disclosure of which would be contrary to the public
interest.
(2) Rules of court relating to TEO proceedings or appeal proceedings must secure that
provision to the effect mentioned in sub-paragraph (3) applies in cases where the
Secretary of State—
(a) does not receive the permission of the relevant court to withhold material,
but elects not to disclose it, or
(b) is required to provide a party to the proceedings with a summary of material
that is withheld, but elects not to provide the summary.
(3) The relevant court must be authorised—
(a) if it considers that the material or anything that is required to be summarised
might adversely affect the Secretary of State’s case or support the case of a
party to the proceedings, to direct that the Secretary of State—
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(i) is not to rely on such points in the Secretary of State’s case, or
(ii) is to make such concessions or take such other steps as the court
may specify, or
(b) in any other case, to ensure that the Secretary of State does not rely on the
material or (as the case may be) on that which is required to be summarised.
(4) In this paragraph—
(a) references to a party to the proceedings do not include the Secretary of State;
(b) references to a party’s legal representative do not include a person appointed
as a special advocate.
Article 6 rights
5 (1) Nothing in paragraphs 2 to 4, or in rules of court made under any of those paragraphs,
is to be read as requiring the relevant court to act in a manner inconsistent with Article
6 of the Human Rights Convention.
(2) The “Human Rights Convention” means the Convention within the meaning of the
Human Rights Act 1998 (see section 21(1) of that Act).
Rules of court: anonymity
6 (1) Rules of court relating to TEO proceedings may make provision for—
(a) the making by the Secretary of State or the relevant individual of an
application to the court for an order requiring anonymity for that individual,
and
(b) the making by the court, on such an application, of an order requiring such
anonymity;
and the provision made by the rules may allow the application and the order to be
made irrespective of whether any other TEO proceedings have been begun in the
court.
(2) Rules of court may provide for the Court of Appeal or the Inner House of the Court
of Session to make an order in connection with any appeal proceedings requiring
anonymity for the relevant individual.
(3) In sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) the references, in relation to a court, to an order
requiring anonymity for the relevant individual are references to an order by that
court which imposes such prohibition or restriction as it thinks fit on the disclosure—
(a) by such persons as the court specifies or describes, or
(b) by persons generally,
of the identity of the relevant individual or of any information that would tend to
identify the relevant individual.
(4) In this paragraph “relevant individual” means an individual on whom the Secretary
of State is proposing to impose, or has imposed, a temporary exclusion order.
Initial exercise of rule-making powers by Lord Chancellor
7 (1) The first time after the passing of this Act that rules of court are made in exercise
of the powers conferred by this Schedule in relation to proceedings in England and
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Wales or in Northern Ireland, the rules may be made by the Lord Chancellor instead
of by the person who would otherwise make them.
(2) Before making rules of court under sub-paragraph (1), the Lord Chancellor must
consult—
(a) in relation to rules applicable to proceedings in England and Wales, the Lord
Chief Justice of England and Wales;
(b) in relation to rules applicable to proceedings in Northern Ireland, the Lord
Chief Justice of Northern Ireland.
(3) But the Lord Chancellor is not required to undertake any other consultation before
making the rules.
(4) A requirement to consult under sub-paragraph (2) may be satisfied by consultation
that took place wholly or partly before the passing of this Act.
(5) Rules of court made by the Lord Chancellor under sub-paragraph (1)—
(a) must be laid before Parliament, and
(b) if not approved by a resolution of each House before the end of 40 days
beginning with the day on which they were made, cease to have effect at the
end of that period.
(6) In determining that period of 40 days no account is to be taken of any time
during which Parliament is dissolved or prorogued or during which both Houses are
adjourned for more than 4 days.
(7) If rules cease to have effect in accordance with sub-paragraph (5)—
(a) that does not affect anything done in previous reliance on the rules, and
(b) sub-paragraph (1) applies again as if the rules had not been made.
(8) The following provisions do not apply to rules of court made by the Lord Chancellor
under this paragraph—
(a) section 3(6) of the Civil Procedure Act 1997 (parliamentary procedure for
civil procedure rules);
(b) section 56(1), (2) and (4) of the Judicature (Northern Ireland) Act 1978
(statutory rules procedure).
(9) Until the coming into force of section 85 of the Courts Act 2003, the reference in
sub-paragraph (8)(a) to section 3(6) of the Civil Procedure Act 1997 is to be read as
a reference to section 3(2) of that Act.
Use of advisers
8 (1) In any TEO proceedings or appeal proceedings the relevant court may if it thinks
fit—
(a) call in aid one or more advisers appointed for the purposes of this paragraph
by the Lord Chancellor, and
(b) hear and dispose of the proceedings with the assistance of the adviser or
advisers.
(2) The Lord Chancellor may appoint advisers for the purposes of this paragraph only
with the approval of—
(a) the Lord President of the Court of Session, in relation to an adviser who may
be called in aid wholly or mainly in Scotland;
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(b) the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland, in relation to an adviser who may
be called in aid wholly or mainly in Northern Ireland;
(c) the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, in any other case.
(3) Rules of court may regulate the use of advisers in proceedings who are called in aid
under sub-paragraph (1).
(4) The Lord Chancellor may pay such remuneration, expenses and allowances to
advisers appointed for the purposes of this paragraph as the Lord Chancellor may
determine.
9 (1) The Lord President of the Court of Session may nominate a judge of the Court of
Session who is a member of the First or Second Division of the Inner House of that
Court to exercise the function under paragraph 8(2)(a).
(2) The Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland may nominate any of the following to
exercise the function under paragraph 8(2)(b)—
(a) the holder of one of the offices listed in Schedule 1 to the Justice (Northern
Ireland) Act 2002;
(b) a Lord Justice of Appeal (as defined in section 88 of that Act).
(3) The Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales may nominate a judicial office holder
(as defined in section 109(4) of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005) to exercise the
function under paragraph 8(2)(c).
Appointment of special advocate
10 (1) The appropriate law officer may appoint a person to represent the interests of a party
in any TEO proceedings or appeal proceedings from which the party (and any legal
representative of the party) is excluded.
(2) A person appointed under sub-paragraph (1) is referred to in this Schedule as
appointed as a “special advocate”.
(3) The “appropriate law officer” is—
(a) in relation to proceedings in England and Wales, the Attorney General;
(b) in relation to proceedings in Scotland, the Advocate General for Scotland;
(c) in relation to proceedings in Northern Ireland, the Advocate General for
Northern Ireland.
(4) A person appointed as a special advocate is not responsible to the party to the
proceedings whose interests the person is appointed to represent.
(5) A person may be appointed as a special advocate only if—
(a) in the case of an appointment by the Attorney General, the person has a
general qualification for the purposes of section 71 of the Courts and Legal
Services Act 1990;
(b) in the case of an appointment by the Advocate General for Scotland, the
person is an advocate or a solicitor who has rights of audience in the Court
of Session or the High Court of Justiciary by virtue of section 25A of the
Solicitors (Scotland) Act 1980;
(c) in the case of an appointment by the Advocate General for Northern Ireland,
the person is a member of the Bar of Northern Ireland.
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Relationship with other powers to make rules of court and other proceedings
11 Nothing in this Schedule is to be read as restricting—
(a) the power to make rules of court or the matters to be taken into account
when doing so, or
(b) the application of sections 6 to 14 of the Justice and Security Act 2013
(closed material proceedings).
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S C H E D U L E S
SCHEDULE 4 Section 12
TEMPORARY EXCLUSION ORDERS: APPEALS AGAINST CONVICTIONS
Right of appeal
1 (1) An individual who has been convicted of an offence under section 10(1) or (3) may
appeal against the conviction if—
(a) a temporary exclusion order is quashed, and
(b) the individual could not have been convicted had the quashing occurred
before the proceedings for the offence were brought.
(2) An individual who has been convicted of an offence under section 10(3) may appeal
against the conviction if—
(a) a notice under section 9, or a permitted obligation imposed by such a notice,
is quashed, and
(b) the individual could not have been convicted had the quashing occurred
before the proceedings for the offence were brought.
Court in which appeal to be made
2 An appeal under this Schedule is to be made—
(a) in the case of a conviction on indictment in England and Wales or Northern
Ireland, to the Court of Appeal;
(b) in the case of a conviction on indictment or summary conviction in
Scotland, to the High Court of Justiciary;
(c) in the case of a summary conviction in England and Wales, to the Crown
Court; or
(d) in the case of a summary conviction in Northern Ireland, to the county
court.
When the right of appeal arises
3 (1) The right of appeal under this Schedule does not arise until there is no further
possibility of an appeal against—
(a) the decision to quash the temporary exclusion order, notice or permitted
obligation (as the case may be), or
(b) any decision on an appeal made against that decision.
(2) In determining whether there is no further possibility of an appeal against a decision
of the kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (1), any power to extend the time for giving
notice of application for leave to appeal, or for applying for leave to appeal, must
be ignored.
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The appeal
4 (1) On an appeal under this Schedule to any court, that court must allow the appeal and
quash the conviction.
(2) An appeal under this Schedule to the Court of Appeal against a conviction on
indictment—
(a) may be brought irrespective of whether the appellant has previously
appealed against the conviction;
(b) may not be brought after the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the
day on which the right of appeal arises by virtue of paragraph 3; and
(c) is to be treated as an appeal under section 1 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968
or, in Northern Ireland, under section 1 of the Criminal Appeal (Northern
Ireland) Act 1980, but does not require leave in either case.
(3) An appeal under this Schedule to the High Court of Justiciary against a conviction
on indictment—
(a) may be brought irrespective of whether the appellant has previously
appealed against the conviction;
(b) may not be brought after the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the
day on which the right of appeal arises by virtue of paragraph 3; and
(c) is to be treated as an appeal under section 106 of the Criminal Procedure
(Scotland) Act 1995 for which leave has been granted.
(4) An appeal under this Schedule to the High Court of Justiciary against a summary
conviction—
(a) may be brought irrespective of whether the appellant pleaded guilty;
(b) may be brought irrespective of whether the appellant has previously
appealed against the conviction;
(c) may not be brought after the end of the period of two weeks beginning with
the day on which the right of appeal arises by virtue of paragraph 3;
(d) is to be by note of appeal, which shall state the ground of appeal;
(e) is to be treated as an appeal for which leave has been granted under Part 10
of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995; and
(f) must be in accordance with such procedure as the High Court of Justiciary
may, by Act of Adjournal, determine.
(5) An appeal under this Schedule to the Crown Court or to the county court in Northern
Ireland against a summary conviction—
(a) may be brought irrespective of whether the appellant pleaded guilty;
(b) may be brought irrespective of whether the appellant has previously
appealed against the conviction or made an application in respect of the
conviction under section 111 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 or
Article 146 of the Magistrates’ Courts (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 (S.I.
1981/1675 (N.I. 26)) (case stated);
(c) may not be brought after the end of the period of 21 days beginning with the
day on which the right of appeal arises by virtue of paragraph 3; and
(d) is to be treated as an appeal under section 108(1)(b) of that Act or, in
Northern Ireland, under Article 140(1)(b) of that Order.
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2000 CHAPTER 11 
PART I 
INTRODUCTORY 
1 Terrorism: interpretation. 
(1) In this Act “terrorism” means the use or threat of action where— 
(a) the action falls within subsection (2), 
(b) the use or threat is designed to influence the government [F1or an international 
governmental organisation] or to intimidate the public or a section of the 
public, and 
(c) the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious [F2, 
racial] or ideological cause. 
(2) Action falls within this subsection if it— 
(a) involves serious violence against a person, 
(b) involves serious damage to property, 
(c) endangers a person’s life, other than that of the person committing the action, 
(d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the 
public, or 
(e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic 
system. 
(3) The use or threat of action falling within subsection (2) which involves the use of 
firearms or explosives is terrorism whether or not subsection (1)(b) is satisfied. 
(4) In this section— 
(a) “action” includes action outside the United Kingdom, 
(b) a reference to any person or to property is a reference to any person, or to 
property, wherever situated, 
(c) a reference to the public includes a reference to the public of a country other 
than the United Kingdom, and 
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(d) “the government” means the government of the United Kingdom, of a Part of 
the United Kingdom or of a country other than the United Kingdom. 
 
(5) In this Act a reference to action taken for the purposes of terrorism includes a reference 
to action taken for the benefit of a proscribed organisation. 
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PART V 
 
COUNTER-TERRORIST POWERS 
 
 
Suspected terrorists 
 
 
40 Terrorist: interpretation. 
 
(1) In this Part “terrorist” means a person who— 
(a) has committed an offence under any of sections 11, 12, 15 to 18, 54 and 56 
to 63, or 
(b) is or has been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts 
of terrorism. 
 
(2) The reference in subsection (1)(b) to a person who has been concerned in the 
commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism includes a reference to a 
person who has been, whether before or after the passing of this Act, concerned in the 
commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism within the meaning given 
by section 1. 
